Why South African boards construe elements of their regulatory obligations differently in respect of enterprise risk management (ERM) by Woolford, Graham Harley
1 
 
 
  
 
Why South African Boards construe elements of their 
regulatory obligations differently in respect of Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) 
 
By Graham Harley Woolford B.Sc., M.Sc. (with distinction), FASSA, FIA 
 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration 
Edinburgh Business School at Heriott Watt University 
Month and Year of submission May 2013 
 
 
 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognize that the copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from 
the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the prior written 
consent of the author. 
  
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“At the regular meeting of the Board, which never sat for above half an hour, two or three 
papers were read by Miles Grendall.  Melmotte himself would speak a few slow words, 
intended to be cheery, and always indicative of triumph, and then everybody would agree to 
everything, somebody would sign something, and the Board for that day would be over.”  
“The Way We Live Now”, a satirical novel by Anthony Trollope written in the 1800’s.  
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Abstract  
Internationally, Boards of companies are increasingly required by law to take responsibility 
for their risk oversight. For example, the Sarbanes- Oxley Act (2002) in the USA; 2010 UK 
Corporate Governance Code; The revised Code of, and Report on, Governance Principles 
for South Africa (King III), (2009) firmly place the onus on the Board for managing risk in 
the organization. There is appreciable evidence that a high proportion of Boards do not 
fully embrace these obligations (Beasley M.S et al., 2010, 2011, 2012; FSA, 2007; Deloitte, 
2012), leaving businesses highly vulnerable and unprepared for risky events. The aim of 
this research is to understand why South African Boards, in view of their strict corporate 
governance regulatory obligations, manage their risks differently.  The objectives of this 
constructivist research are to question Boards on the extent of their adherence to legislated 
risk management requirements; and by analysing their repertory constructs understand how 
Board members construe elements of their risk; and further to understand whether Boards 
suffer from cognitive bias when faced with risky choices as predicted by Prospect Theory; 
and whether this cognitive bias adds to the risk exposure of the organisation. The research 
uses empirical data to demonstrate the extent of the shortfall between legislative directives 
and company practice. As a result of establishing how Boards construe risk, the outcome 
also highlights reasons for the shortfall between what regulators regard as risk oversight 
and the challenges Boards face in meeting these risk oversight obligations.  
The research examines the causal relationships between certain variables and the risk 
attitude and processes adopted by the Board. The following issues are evaluated: the 
differences in attitude to risk between highly compliant Boards and weakly compliant 
Boards; the differences in risk attitudes between members of the Board; and between 
Boards of different companies.   
 The results suggest that; South African Boards face extreme difficulties in making sense of 
the risk environment; Board members are subject to a high degree of cognitive bias when 
facing risk and uncertainty; it seems unlikely that Boards behaviour towards risk can be 
described fully by the tenets of Prospect Theory; Boards suffer from source dependence in 
assessing risk; Boards’ behaviour towards risk is linked to their degree of regulatory 
adherence in terms of corporate governance.  
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A behavioural form of moral hazard is identified where Boards which have implemented 
enterprise risk measures develop a sense of overconfidence in the belief that such measures 
will automatically and fully protect the business in all circumstances which in turn adds to 
the overall risk of the business. 
A further important indicative result of this research is a ‘Common / Variable 
Characteristics of Risk’ hypothesis. Boards appear to possess a common set of behavioural 
characteristics which govern the way they manage their risk, and a variable set of 
behavioural characteristics, the extent of which is directly linked to the level of risk 
readiness of the Board, and which also impacts on the way they manage their risk. 
This research highlights a possible phenomenon referred to as ‘Reality Drift’ in which 
Boards of companies may gradually lose touch with key aspects of their businesses through 
a process of cognitive bias and false and inadequate information. This phenomenon may 
explain why Boards of many regulated companies make errors of judgement and overlook 
areas of major risks to their businesses. 
This research also briefly addresses many important research questions around risk and risk 
management as posed in recent relevant publications. 
Finally, this research appears to be unique in the study of intact Boards, and adds to the 
important body of literature in respect of ‘sensemaking’ and ‘group sensemaking’, 
particularly in the area of risk management. 
This research is likely to be of assistance to regulators and company stakeholders in 
understanding how Boards perceive their regulatory obligations relating to risk oversight, 
and will provide further insight into risk management processes. 
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Glossary of terms  
Cognitive bias 
Describes the innate natural human biases individuals display when faced with a set of 
internal and external issues. In this research the term will be used mainly in the context of 
the bias people exhibit when faced with risk and uncertainty. 
Compliance 
In this thesis this word refers to the extent to which a company adheres to its various 
obligations under the legislative framework pertaining to that company in terms of its 
corporate governance, stock exchange, taxation and all other relevant legislation governing 
the operation of the company. Weakly compliant and strongly compliant ratings indicate 
relatively increasing compliance to the requirements of the legislative environment. 
Construct 
A construct represents the view individuals have construed about the world as they have 
experienced it; constructs also indicate how individuals are likely to construe the world as 
they continue to experience it. 
Element (of risk) 
This term is used in the context of a Repertory Grid, (see definition below) and is an 
example of the particular topic under discussion. In this research the elements will therefore 
be elements of risk, which are those specific sources of risk typically identified by Boards 
as constituting sources of risk to their businesses, such as Market Risk, Operational Risk 
and Financial Risk. 
Enterprise Risk Management 
Describes the processes, tools and regulatory measures which are adopted by the company 
across all facets of its organisation to manage and control internal and   external risk. 
King III and Corporate Governance 
The third report on corporate governance in South Africa was launched in September 2009 
in response to the new Companies Act no 71 of 2008 and changes in international 
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governance trends. This report known as King III was compiled by the King Committee 
headed by Justice Mervin King and came into effect on 1 March 2010. 
King III applies to all entities, regardless of the form of the incorporation or whether it is in 
the public, private or non-profit sectors. In South Africa, under King III, entities are 
required to make a statement as to whether or not they apply the principles and then explain 
their practices. There are 9 main issues to which companies are required to adhere, and 
report on in the Integrated Report (providing a comprehensive overview on financial and 
non-financial matters) on corporate governance as shown below: 
  Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship 
Best practice Boards and Directors 
Audit committees and their function 
The governance and management of risk 
The governance of information, communication and technology and IT risk. 
Compliance with laws, rules and standards 
Internal audit 
Governing stakeholder relationships 
Integrated Reporting and disclosure  
 
This information was extracted from the King Code of Governance for South 
 Africa 2009, Institute of Directors Southern Africa, www.iodsa.co.za 
 
Prospect Theory 
Describes the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992). Prospect Theory is a 
descriptive behavioural hypothesis relating to human cognitive bias when people are faced 
with risk and uncertainty. It describes individual risk aversion when facing gains, risk 
seeking when facing losses, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity to increasing gains 
and losses. The Probability Weighting Function describes how individuals distort their 
view of probabilities, and the Value Weighting Function describes how individuals value 
gains and losses.   
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Risk and uncertainty 
Risk arises when there is a chance of not being able to achieve set or stated objectives, 
when the probability of failure is quantifiable. Uncertainty arises when the probability of 
the alternative outcomes are unknown. 
Repertory Grid 
A cognitive mapping system which records in a qualitative and quantitative manner the 
way individuals construe and think about particular issues. It comprises a set of rating 
scales which uses the individual’s own personal constructs about an issue, topic or subject 
and uses ratings to express the strength or conviction of their personal meanings. 
Sensemaking 
This term, coined by Weick K.E. (2001), describes the mental or cognitive processes 
humans undergo in dealing with their internal and external environment.   
Specific Risk 
An element of risk that can be eliminated either by repeated exposure to the same elements 
of risk, or by diversifying the business so that it is exposed to the same element of risk from 
a variety of different sources. 
Systematic Risk 
An element of risk that cannot be eliminated by diversification, no matter how widely 
spread the business, and no matter how often the element of risk arises. (Systemic Risk 
which is not referred to in this thesis relates to aggregation risk (normally amongst financial 
institutions) which are subject to similar risks and where failure of an entire financial 
system could be caused by a single source of risk e.g. credit risk). 
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    Introduction    Chapter 1.
1.1 Overall intention – aims and objectives 
Ever since the epic tales of ancient mythical heroes such as Orpheus and Hercules, human 
endeavours have been plagued by the unforeseen and unexpected. While this thesis is about 
risk and uncertainty in a modern regulated business context, it will be shown that the 
hamartia in a business’s efforts to survive is still usually grounded in the combination 
of capacity for error and misjudgement of risk. As the quotations which follow 
demonstrate, everywhere there is evidence of hubris of overweening arrogance and pride in 
the face of logic when presented with risky choices; and the counter effect of intervention 
through regulatory oversight (in a divine sense perhaps!) to protect the numerous 
stakeholders of the business from failure.  
“From excessive levels of compensation, to shoddy treatment of customers, to a deceitful 
manipulation of one of the most important interest rates, and now this morning to news of 
yet another mis-selling scandal, we can see that we need a real change in the culture of the 
[Banking] industry” ( Sir Mervyn King (Governor of the Bank of England, June 29th, 
2012). 
Banks face billions more in Libor losses, Charles Riley @CNNMoneyInvest July 13, 2012: 
12:51 PM ET 
“Banks implicated in the Libor-fixing scandal will likely take billions more in losses as a 
result of pending litigation and regulatory penalties… Barclays, the British bank admitted 
that its staffers attempted to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate. Many of the 
world's major banks, including Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland, Credit Suisse, 
Citigroup , UBS and JPMorgan Chase  disclosed that they are being investigated (for 
irregularities).Barclays has agreed to pay $453 million to U.S. and U.K. regulators, a 
settlement which provided the basis for Morgan Stanley's calculation that at least ten 
additional banks could be fined between $420 and $651 million by regulators.” 
The overall intention of this research is then to study how Boards make sense and deal with 
their ERM (enterprise risk management) issues. Enterprise risk can be defined as the extent 
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to which the outcomes of the corporate strategy of a company may differ from those 
specified in its corporate objectives, or the extent to which they fail to meet these 
objectives, be they financial or regulatory. A range of external and internal factors can 
cause the outcomes of a company’s activities to depart from those set out in its corporate 
objectives (Dickinson, 2001). 
With increasing globalization, Boards face an overwhelming barrage of uncertainty and 
struggle to make sense of their risks. It is to be expected that Boards of different companies, 
and different members on the Board, all with different experiences and psychological, 
educational and motivational backgrounds, will interpret the regulatory imposition of risk 
oversight processes and the external risk environment differently (Daft and Weick, 1984).  
Legislators around the globe have responded to the poor performance in terms of risk 
management by Boards of companies by introducing wave after wave of new legislation 
which threatens to swamp the administrative machinery of organizations; consequently 
businesses lag regulation. In the United Kingdom the Financial Services Authority reports 
that the quality of risk assessment and mitigation strategies amongst financial services 
companies continues to fall, which can be partially attributable to the rapid pace of 
regulatory change (e.g. the Basel II solvency requirements) being forced on companies 
(FSA 2009; FSA 2010; Beasley et al., 2010; King III, 2009). 
Against this background of risk management, lays an interesting human phenomenon 
referred to in the literature on behavioural finance, which describes the many and varied 
cognitive biases and heuristics which individuals exhibit when faced with choices. Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992,) is one such Theory, 
which models choice behavior for individuals when faced with risk and uncertainty. 
McFadden (1999) summarizes other behavioural tendencies of individuals when faced with 
choices. See Table 2.3 below.  
More specifically, the research intention is to study how and why these various factors 
influence the ways Boards respond to risk and uncertainty, as set out in the aims and 
objectives below: 
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1.1.1 The aims of the research  
To examine the reasons why Boards, in spite of strict corporate governance 
guidelines, deal with the myriad risk issues facing the company, to different effect, 
in developing strategies to deal with enterprise risk management (ERM). 
1.1.2 The objectives of the research 
O1:  To investigate to what extent Board members of companies which apply 
corporate governance regulations are liable to human bias in risk estimation; 
O2:  To investigate to what extent Boards which are less subject to individual 
human biases are more effective in developing strategies to deal with ERM; 
O3:  To investigate to what extent Boards that adhere to corporate governance are 
more effective in developing strategies to deal with ERM. 
O4:  To examine the ways in which the estimation and personal construing of risk 
differs between highly compliant and less compliant Boards.    
1.2 A rationale and some questions 
The constituents of the Dow Jones Industrial Index (comprising 30 leading stocks mainly 
based in the USA) have changed substantially over the past 50 years, indicating that a 
proportion of companies fail. Well known examples of failed constituents are General 
Motors and AIG. As another example, the Board of Northern Rock underestimated the 
widening spread between money-market and depositor rates and went into receivership. 
The knowledge base around corporate failure, and the reasons for it, is well documented.  
Probst and Raisch (2005) discuss some of the effects which have caused large companies 
such as Enron, United Airlines and Kmart to fail.  It is clear that bad decisions on the part 
of Boards have led to corporate failure. What is not clear from the literature is the extent of 
failures which have arisen due to factors beyond the control of the Board. “Industry effects 
alone cannot explain why some companies within an industry fail while others continue to 
be successful” (Probst and Raisch, 2005, p.90). It is difficult to separate foreseeable from 
unforeseeable risks. 
As discussed above, there is considerable evidence that Regulators have taken steps to 
attempt to minimize risk of corporate failure by transferring responsibility to the Board. As 
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Boards are responsible to, and have the authority to act on behalf of, shareholders (and 
other stakeholders) it seems reasonable to expect Boards to be given the full responsibility 
to ensure that risk management systems are in place and that proper measures are taken to 
minimize risk. Regulators (King III, 2010; Deloitte, 2012) have for example given special 
powers to the Audit Committee and have made provision for the appointment of a Chief 
Risk Officer. There is evidence of lack of adherence on the part of Boards to regulatory 
directives (Beasley et al., 2010, 2011 and 2012; Deloitte, 2012). Furthermore the UK 
Financial Services Authority reports findings of immature enterprise wide risk oversight 
despite the fact that most respondents described their risk culture as risk averse or strongly 
risk averse (FSA, 2010).  
The case of Telkom, South Africa’s fixed line operator is an example of how companies 
often fail by not managing risk.  “The announcement last week that Telkom was exiting the 
lucrative Nigerian telecoms market has once again highlighted the importance of doing 
one’s homework before entering foreign markets. Telkom’s failure in the West African 
economy has been attributed by analysts to its poor choice of acquisition target when it 
entered that market. Analysts said that Telkom should not have bought Multi-Links, which 
uses code division multiple access (CDMA) technology, which is preferred in North 
America but nowhere else. Telkom could spend as much as R1.3billion to get out of Multi-
Links. It spent R3.2billion when it bought the unprofitable company. Telkom has written 
down the value of the Nigerian business by more than R5.6 billion” (City Press Newspaper, 
4 December 2010).  
There is evidence that Boards have not implemented the measures they ought to have done 
(Beasley et al.,2010, 2011,2012; Deloitte 2012). This evidence is further supported by the 
measures regulators across the globe have taken to address shortcomings in managing risk. 
The epistemological gap therefore appears to be why Boards have not implemented these 
measures, and how they actually construe their risk oversight responsibilities.   
In view of the points made in this section, which identify the heart of the issue as one of 
poor management of risk-assessment, monitoring, and implementation procedures, what 
will count as evidence? It seems to be a matter of what Boards pay attention to. Is it 
possible that many of the corporate failures of the past could have been foreseen by the 
management in charge. And if so, why did they not act in time? Why are the errors which 
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occurred so obvious with hindsight? Why do companies keep making the same errors? Do 
Boards not possess the collective wisdom to learn from others’ mistakes? Probst and Raisch 
(2005) researched 100 large US corporations which had failed, or had suffered serious 
erosion of their market capitalisations. They identified the following main reasons for 
corporate failure: in most cases of failure the companies grew and changed too quickly; 
managers became too powerful; and nurtured an excessive success/risk culture. 
It is possible to summarize the 5 salient areas of the knowledge base which are relevant to 
this research as follows: 
 Corporate Governance regulation, implementation and adherence and Boards’ level 
of risk preparedness;  
 The natural human biases to which people are subject when faced with risk and 
uncertainty; 
 The degree of risk aversion exhibited by Boards when faced with risky choices; 
 The understanding and awareness of the internal and external environment and the 
use to which cognitive mapping has been used to develop and understand group 
strategic decision making;  
 Finally, the way Boards interact and collaborate as a group in making sense of their 
risk 
This research will thus attempt to provide further answers to the questions of how Boards 
construe and deal with risk and uncertainty. 
Table 4.9 summarises these key characteristics of the knowledge base relating to corporate 
risk, and how they lead to the derivation of the research question, as follows: Why do South 
African Boards, in spite of strict corporate governance regulations governing the 
management of risk, exhibit varying degrees of effectiveness in developing strategies to 
deal with their enterprise risk management (ERM)?  
The following section deals with the structure of the research methodology, and the final 
section summarises the areas of the knowledge base which are relevant to the research 
question, and which arise from the rationale for this research.  
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1.3 Methodology summary 
The research methodology will be phenomenological, adopting a constructivist field-based 
approach. The research level will be initially exploratory with a method based around a 
comparative multiple case study design structured to make some causal statements possible. 
In order to support the triangulation of results, and to obtain as much insight as possible to 
how Boards understand and deal with risk, data will be collected in several ways as 
follows:  
 interviewees will be required to complete written questionnaires designed to 
provide data on their risk readiness, the extent of their propensity to assume risk 
and the degree to which they are subject to cognitive bias in assessing risky 
situations, as shown in Appendix B. Explicit judgments will be made about the data 
based on the themes of the Beasley et al., (2010, 2011 and 2012) reports and the 
work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992). 
 a semi-ethnographic approach will be used to elicit information from members of 
the Board using Personal Construct Psychology (using a Kellyan (1955/1991) 
constructivist technique the Repertory grid)  which emphasizes the personal aspects 
of sensemaking and adopts an  interpretivist epistemology and a phenomenological 
constructivist ontology in order to understand how Boards construe their risk taking 
behaviour. 
 a “feedback" session will be conducted with members of the Boards to record and 
analyse their responses to the  intact Board data.  
While the techniques described above will use a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
forms of analysis, the research remains phenomenological. 
Specifically, the design hinges on a comparison between the differences in views held by 3 
distinct Boards, 2 of whom are selected on the basis of stronger regulatory compliance in 
the area of risk management, and the other on the basis of weaker regulatory compliance. 
While the choice of the above “polar” comparison between highly and weakly compliant 
firms seems obvious at this stage, other interesting polarities designed to test the effect of 
other variables or to test the influence of other factors by means of systematic comparisons 
– referred to as “replication”- arose during the course of the research highlighted other 
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important aspects of the research (Yin, 2003). A great deal of research has been conducted 
using case studies as a research strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
In order to develop a systematic basis to analyse human cognition – and in our case how 
Boards understand risk and its ramifications- Kelly (1955/1991) developed personal 
construct theory (PCT), an explicit theory of human understanding. To elicit understanding 
(or “sensemaking”, in Weik’s (2001) terms), Kelly (1955/1991) developed Repertory Grid 
analysis (RepGrid), a cognitive mapping technique for measuring intended meaning. 
The RepGrid technique, which is a powerful mapping tool (Jankowicz 2004; Wright R.P., 
2006) used to explore the depths of cognitive understanding and reasoning, particularly in 
terms of how people make sense of their internal and external environment, (Weik 2001; 
Kelly 1955/1991) was used in the account which follows to elicit how intact Boards 
construed elements of their regulatory obligations with respect to risk management. 
RepGrid techniques have been widely reported in the literature as providing a “powerful, 
rigorous and systematic interviewing approach” (Wright R.P., 2006, p.295) of eliciting how 
cognitive behaviour might influence how Boards engage in strategic decision making in 
terms of ERM  (Alexander et al., 2011; Jankowicz 1990;  Wright R.P.,2004, 2006, 2008; 
Wright and Jankowicz, 2007). 
The empirical work was structured round several stages: a) choice of participant Boards b) 
pilot study development of two questionnaires, assessing Risk Readiness; and Risk 
Aversion c) pilot study assessment of a structured interview technique, the RepGrid d) a 
main study which applied the questionnaires, after certain modifications and additions, and 
a program of RepGrid interview to three selected Boards. Importantly, and this may be a 
unique aspect of this particular thesis, is the knowledge gained from feedback sessions with 
the 3 Boards. 
1.4 Signposting  
The thesis is set out in 8 Chapters as follows: 
 Chapter 2 the literature review is set out in 4 separate parts, and deals with a range 
of issues facing businesses, including the legislative environment; the state of risk 
readiness; cognitive bias when faced with risk and uncertainty and the literature 
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relating to Prospect Theory, a model describing human decisions when faced with 
risk and uncertainty; and interaction between Board members in decision making.  
 Chapter 3 deals with research methodology. 
 Chapter 4 deals with the pilot study and the results of the pilot study and 
modifications to the questionnaires used in the pilot study (9 Board members from 
different companies were interviewed and the results presented and discussed).The 
questionnaires in the pilot study were obtained from: Beasley et al. (2010, 2011, 
2012); from Kahneman and Tversky (1992) and the RepGrid methodology derived 
from Jankowicz (2006). 
 Chapter 5 deals with the results of the main study questionnaires used to elicit data: 
the Risk Readiness Questionnaire, the Risk Aversion Questionnaire and the Risk 
Bias Questionnaire. These final form questions, which appear in Appendix B, arose 
out of the results of the pilot study. 
 Chapter 6 is the main findings Chapter and covers the RepGrid results. 
 Having collected and analysed the results, attention then turns to the results of the 
Research Objectives, in Chapter 7 and further theory development and the 
identification of a potentially important hypothesis, referred to as the 
Common/Variable Risk Hypothesis. 
 Chapter 8 deals with the summary and conclusions and answers the research 
question. 
The following Chapter 2 deals with the literature review, in 4 parts.  
 
   
 
 
 
  
27 
 
 
   Literature Review Chapter 2.
2.1  Signposting  
The literature review addresses 4 key themes arising from the rationale outlined in Chapter 
1 above, and is presented in 4 parts as follows: 
Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 1 
Corporate Board decision making in the context of the regulatory environment 
Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 2 
Policy Practice Implementation Gap in respect of Corporate Governance and Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM)  
Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 3 
Behavioural issues in Board decision making 
Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 4 
Literature review synthesis establishing links between risk assessment, Board decision 
making and risk regulation 
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 1  
Role of Corporate Board decision making 
2.2  Background to Organisation Theory and Corporate Board Decision Making 
 
In this Part attention will be paid to the many and varied processes, strategies and 
influences which determine Board responses to the internal and external environment, with 
particular emphasis on how Boards make decisions when faced with risk and uncertainty. 
For the purposes of this thesis, risk and uncertainty are defined in the glossary, and their 
definitions are shown here for convenience. “Risk arises when there is a chance of not 
being able to achieve set or stated objectives, when the probability of failure or gain is 
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quantifiable. Uncertainty arises when the probability of the alternative outcomes are 
unknown.” 
2.3 Structure of this Part 
This complicated Part deals with organisation theory and the corporate decision making 
process of Boards. This vast topic on Board response to corporate governance and ERM 
has been addressed from many different angles, such as construct theory and organisational 
sensemaking (Kelly 1955/91; Weick 1995, Wright, 2004, 2006, 2008; Pandza, 2009), 
behavioural perspectives around risk and uncertainty, (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979,1992; 
Huse, 2005), strategic responses to organisational processes (Oliver 1991, 1997; Arena et 
al., 2010), institutional complexity and organisational responses to corporate governance as 
a form of institutional complexity (Scott, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2012), the role of 
strategic risk management and regulatory compliance (Arnold et al., 2011), the complexity, 
challenges and shortfalls in the implementation of ERM,  (Beasley et al., 2005, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013 ; McShane et al., 2012), impact of corporate governance on firm value and 
whether firms should actively pursue ERM (McShane et al., 2012), operational structures  
such as the CEO/Board relationship (Boyd et al., 2011), corporate governance regulation 
(King III , 2009), and so on. 
This thesis focuses on how Boards of companies construe and make sense of the risk issues 
which face the company. All the topics mentioned in the previous section have a varying 
role to play in the process of risk management. In order to achieve the formidable challenge 
of dealing adequately with the research question, it is necessary to touch on the many 
aspects covered extensively in the literature as briefly outlined above. Figure 2.1 below 
highlights the many issues to be considered in attempting to understand how Boards deal 
with risk. 
This Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 1 will therefore be presented under the following 
headings: 
Sensemaking, group psychology and early theories of the organization 
Background to group psychology in decision and negotiation in strategy making 
Organisational Theory and Institutional Logic 
Recent Developments in Institutional Theory 
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Developments in Institutional Approaches to ERM 
How Boards respond to institutional change 
 
Figure 2.1 Various factors affecting the way Boards make sense of their risk  
 
 
  
2.3.1 Sensemaking, group psychology and early theories of the firm   
This Section 2.3.1 deals with “sensemaking”, a term coined by Weick (2001), which 
describes the mental or cognitive processes humans undergo in dealing with their internal 
and external environment.  
In order to more fully explain differences in cognitive perception between different people, 
(Weick, 1995) developed the concept of “sensemaking” which he described as a human 
cognitive process which essentially uses retrospective experiences to explain new events. It 
is about thinking processes such as “placing items into a framework, comprehending, 
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understanding.” (p.6) Thus “sensemaking” seems to present a particularly relevant concept 
to assist us in understanding these differences in the way people view issues. Weick (1995) 
thus gives us an insight into how individuals may make sense of risk. How Boards, 
comprising individuals, make sense of their risk is discussed next. 
“Sensemaking (Weick, 1995) [of risk] is necessitated by conditions of ambiguity in 
organized life with the presumption of logic and self-fulfilling prophesies and action 
bias and hindsight. Sensemaking [of risk by Boards] will be influenced by 
improvisation, indeterminacy in adaptive action, learning under adverse conditions 
and self-learning systems”. 
Boards, comprised of people, are likely to behave with human-like qualities. At times they 
will be vulnerable, stressed, pressurised and irrational. Boards are therefore likely, from 
time to time, to “suffer from loss of meaning, surprises and face events that are 
inconceivable or incomprehensible...and in trying to make sense [Boards] will try and make 
things rationally accountable to themselves and others” (Weick, 1993 p.633). 
Furthermore, Boards members will each be endowed with their own set of cognitive 
structures, experience and level of understanding of the nature of the threat facing the firm. 
The strategic response of the Board to external risk depends on the psychological and 
emotional make-up as well as their sense of commitment to tackling the risk challenges and 
threats the firm faces (Eden and Ackermann, 2001).   
Boards are likely to engage in cognitive simplification processes in their strategic decision 
making, (Schwenk, 1984) and in particular therefore how they view and deal with risk. 
These simplification processes lead to in-built biases on the part of Boards. From 
Mintzberg et al. (1976) it is possible to deduce that Boards may engage in 2 basic activities 
when trying to deal with the complexity of risk: The first process is recognition of the risk, 
the second is the diagnosis of risk, where additional data and information is utilised to 
define risk and the required mitigating strategies.  
 Weick (1995) asserts that organizations [in this case Boards] tend to focus more on 
retrospective sensemaking than on planning and prospective decision making. Put into the 
context of how Boards are likely to construe risk, this assertion is consistent with the 
Beasley reports (Beasley et al., 2010, 2011, 2012) and the FSA (2007) report and highlights 
the need for regulators to pressurise Boards to anticipate future potential risks, and not 
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simply to react to past mistakes. Evidence of this forward looking approach to corporate 
governance process is evident in King III, where Boards are required to anticipate the 
probability of anticipated future risky scenarios. 
Further, Weick (1995) stated that in terms of sensemaking “seeing what one believes and 
not seeing that for which one has no beliefs are central to sensemaking. Warnings of the 
unbelievable may go unheeded. This means that the variety in a firm’s repertory of beliefs 
[relating to risk matters] should affect the amount of time it spends consciously struggling 
to make sense [of the risks it faces]. The greater the variety of beliefs in a repertoire, the 
more fully should any [risky] situation be seen, the more [risk management] solutions 
should be identified, and the more likely it is that someone [on the Board] knows a great 
deal about what is happening” (words in brackets inserted to highlight the relevance of 
Weick’s (1995) work to this thesis). 
In this research it became clear that Boards do not always have a clear understanding of 
their risk issues; they have different levels of risk readiness; individual Board members 
think differently about risk issues from their colleagues; they suffer from cognitive bias, to 
differing extent, based on the level of their risk preparedness; and are subject to different 
regulatory requirements based on their primary regulatory authority and industry grouping. 
These factors are shown in Figure 2.2 below: 
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Figure 2.2 The issues Boards deal with when trying to make sense of their risk 
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It would seem that Boards comply with these postulates, so that the basis and methods used 
for trying to “make sense” of their risk making is reliable. 
Further, Kelly’s (1955/1991) fundamental postulate as well as the corollaries as shown in 
Appendix N also appear to apply equally to organisational entities as well as humans. 
Boards build representations of the risk phenomena they experience, and in the case of risk, 
as predictive tools in their business. In this research the different Boards developed their 
own meaning around how they constructed risk, and produced different constructs for the 
same events, or elements of risk. A person’s construct evolves over time in the light of new 
information. The same will happen with Boards. We can therefore probably rely on the 
RepGrid data as a snapshot of Boards’ views of risk at any one time. 
It is possible to conclude therefore that Boards make sense of their risk, and that from Kelly 
(1955/1991) we can deduce that Boards satisfy the fundamental postulate, enabling this 
research data to be considered a reliable view of the way Boards make sense of risk, and the 
information provided during the course of this research in respect of that risk. 
As stated earlier, Board members do not agree on many aspects of their risk. Boards 
however are forced to make decisions. The process of “making sense” of their risk, will 
therefore consist of some type of negotiation between the “cognitive factions” (Tegarden et 
al., 2009, Section 2.3.1) within the Board, arriving at a common construing of the risk, 
though individually it is possible that all may disagree with the final decision!  Kelly 
(1955/1991) offers a way of describing the process in his Sociality Corollary, see Appendix 
N: ‘to the extent that one person construes the construction process of another, he may play 
a role in a social process involving the other person’. The point is that Board members do 
not have to share the same constructs, or be using them the same way, as their colleagues; 
what matters is that each person seeks to understand the others’, whether he agrees with 
them or not. Boards will as a group therefore find a way of making sense of their risks, a 
form of “group sensemaking”. 
This would suggest that diverse Boards with a large variety in their repertory of beliefs 
should have a better chance of making sense of their risk issues.  
The next sub-section considers further insights from the literature relating to how intact 
Boards might deal with internal and external risk issues. 
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While the literature indicates that there has been a considerable amount of research on 
sensemaking at the individual level, it appears however that there has only been limited 
research with respect to how sensemaking occurs in groups (Umapathy, 2010).  Therefore 
while there is a framework for understanding how individuals may make sense of risk, in 
this research how intact Boards attempt to make sense of the risks which face them by 
means of a comparative case study will be assessed. This is a lengthy sub-section with sub-
headings relating to collaboration, the persona of the Board, interaction and polarisation of 
Board members and further insights into how individual biases may affect the way Boards 
deal with risk. 
Collaboration 
Collaborative sensemaking would involve groups engaging in sensemaking processes based 
on individual world views which may be at odds with others’ views. Umapathy (2010, p.2) 
describes the broad requirements for collaborative sensemaking which include: 
“Constructing and sharing knowledge; developing shared knowledge collaboratively; 
developing shared situation awareness and shared understanding; and communication 
coordination and collaboration required to support above activities”  
In this context considerable obstacles would appear for different types of risk encountered, 
the different experiences of the Boards, the level of skill and knowledge in a continuously 
changing internal and external environment. Collaboratively, Boards are likely to behave 
like their individual members (Allison, 1971). 
Daft, Weick (1984) assume that the organisational interpretation process may operate at a 
higher level than for individuals due to companies’ greater cognitive ability, information 
sharing capacity amongst managers and longer memory. 
Boards may be therefore be considered as complex multi-faceted personalities, with 
varying levels of cognitive and analytic skills, dealing with complex issues, such as trying 
to make sense of the risk environment. Reaching convergence amongst Board members 
characterises the act of organising, and enables the organisation to evaluate and deal with 
risk as a cohesive system (Weick, 1995; Pandza, 2009). 
Boards are likely to treat internal and external changes as opportunities or threats (Dutton 
and Jackson, 1987). Deloitte (2012, p.58) report that only 43% of large South African 
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companies describe in detail their risk mitigation strategies, and how they maximise their 
risk opportunities. In assessing how Boards construe risk, it is important to understand their 
actions when faced with risk and uncertainty, and it would appear from the literature that 
when faced with risky situations companies often behave in a similar way in dealing with 
this risk, irrespective of the circumstances (Jackson and Dutton, 1988). 
Difficulties with sensemaking Weick (1995) “should result in organisations being left with 
larger chunks of residual uncertainty, which necessitates their taking larger risks, which 
increases the probability that they will fail. This prediction originates in an organisation’s 
capability for sensemaking in the face of uncertainty about the future” (p.97). 
 
Kelly (1995/1991) developed a parallel often overlapping theory of personal understanding 
called Personal Construct Theory, and in particular a set of corollaries which are referred to 
in Appendix N. These corollaries are important to understand how Boards, comprising of 
individuals, will interact and how they make sense of their risk. Importantly the sociality 
corollary (to the extent that one person construes the construction process of another; he 
may play a role in the process of that other person), the commonality corollary (to the 
extent that one person employs a construction of experience which is similar to that 
employed by another; his processes are psychologically similar to those of the same person) 
and the individuality corollary (people differ from each other in their construction of 
events) will shape the interactive processes within the Board in making sense of risky 
decisions. 
The themes of sensemaking and personal construct theory will arise throughout this thesis. 
2.3.2 Background to group psychology in decision and negotiation in strategy 
making 
The literature urges researchers to develop holistic views of institutional theory, to include 
aspects of behavioural theory. Much of this thesis focuses on behavioural issues, particular 
cognitive biases associated with strategic decisions and attitudes to risk and uncertainty. 
“Fewer than one out of 8 of articles published in leading scientific management journals is 
about actual Board behaviour” (Huse, 2005, p. S66).  
Huse (2005, p. S67) further describes a framework which integrates various theories in 
order better to understand Board behaviour in terms of corporate governance, as the 
following Table 2.1 demonstrates: 
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Table 2.1 A framework integrating various theories of Board behaviour (Huse, 2005, 
p. S67) 
General Theory 1 Contingency theory Various designs of corporate 
governance need to consider 
the actors and the 
environment  
General Theory 2 Evolutionary perspective 
deals with learning processes 
relating to new institutional 
logics 
The evolutionary perspective 
is indicated through various 
learning loops, at individual, 
group, organisational or 
societal levels. 
Board Role Theories Agency and resource 
dependence theories 
- 
Board Process Theories 1 Nature of interactions taking 
place in the corporate 
governance arena 
Trust, emotion, adjustment 
of Boards to external 
regulatory pressure 
Board Process Theories 2 Explanation of the evolution, 
existence and consequences 
of formal and informal 
structures and norms 
including Board leadership 
characteristics 
- 
Board Process Theories 3 Board decision making 
culture including cognitive 
conflicts, preparation and 
involvement, generosity and 
openness, creativity, critical 
questioning. 
- 
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Schwenk (1984, p.115) describes in detail 4 of the many inherent biases Boards are likely 
to make when dealing with strategic issues. These biases are likely to increase risks in 
formulating strategy, as summarised in Table 2.2, in which Schwenk (1984, p.115) defines 
3 stages of strategy formulation: 
 Stage 1 – Goal formulation/problem identification in which [Boards] will first 
recognise and then collect information and diagnose problems or risk issues; 
 Stage 2 – Strategic alternatives generation during which a range of plausible 
solutions is found to address the specific problem or area of uncertainty; 
 Stage3 – Evaluation and selection phase during which the best alternative plan or 
strategy is selected. 
Table 2.2 Simplification biases in Board cognitive processes (summarised 
from Schwenk, 1984) 
  Cognitive Bias and 
Stage 1 goal 
formulation/problem 
identification 
Stage 2 strategic 
alternatives generation 
Stage 3 evaluation and 
selection 
Anchoring and 
adjustment leads to 
underuse of evidence, 
gaps not being perceived 
Inferences of 
impossibility leads to 
premature rejection of 
alternatives 
Illusion of control leads 
to inaccurate assessment 
of the risks of the  
alternatives 
Prior hypothesis bias 
leads to evidence being 
ignored and gaps not 
perceived 
Single outcome 
calculation leading to 
restricting alternatives to 
a single one 
Representativeness 
comprising: insensitivity 
to predictability; 
insensitivity to sample 
size; illusion of validity; 
all leading to inaccurate 
prediction of the 
consequences of 
alternatives 
Escalating commitment 
leading to significance of 
the gap being minimised, 
and the strategy not 
revised 
Denting value trade-offs 
leading to biased use of 
evaluation criteria 
Devaluation of partially 
used alternatives, leading 
to rejection of strongly 
but poorly presented 
alternatives 
Reasoning by analogy 
leading to problem 
misdefined 
(oversimplified), 
inappropriate strategy 
Problem sets leading to 
alternatives restricted 
- 
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revision 
Table 2.2 derived from Schwenk, 1984, p.115                                                    
At an individual level, executives have been shown to exhibit different risk taking 
propensities based on their socio-economic background. There seems to be an association 
between risk taking and the achievement of greater success in terms of wealth, income, 
position and authority (MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990).Thus executives perceive that 
greater risk leads to greater wealth creation. This is likely to affect the way they respond to 
risk and uncertainty. 
As a group however, Top Management Teams (TMT’s) and Boards in particular also 
behave as distinct cognitive entities and exhibit characteristics such as memory and 
forgetfulness, knowledge sharing, cognitive bias, processing of knowledge, formulation and 
decision making (Daft and Weick, 1984).  Lyles and Schwenk (1992, p. 156) discuss 
“shared understandings within organisations that influence organisational behaviour” and 
describe 2 characteristics that influence the development of organisational knowledge 
structures, which refers to the shared beliefs at an organisational level: 
 How key decision makers’ schemata (individual level knowledge) influence the 
developments, within the firm, of widely held cause and effect beliefs which have a 
structure; 
 There are core features of the knowledge structure that remain largely invariant over 
time; there are also peripheral features of the knowledge base which tend to be more 
ephemeral and shift with changes in the internal and external environment.  
It would seem possible that the highly complex nature of the knowledge structures relating 
to risk and uncertainty mean that such knowledge is not generally available to the top 
management team by virtue of the high degree of experience, cognitive insight and 
complexity necessary to fully grasp these issues. 
At an individual level, Board members will act on their own “sensemaking” of the strategic 
situations they face. Their personal constructs will depend on their experience, values and 
personalities. At Board level, the collective experiences, cognitive interactions, the shared 
knowledge and interaction of the various personalities will determine the overall strategic 
response and attitude to risk (Hambrick, 2007). 
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Group knowledge structures (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992) exist in which the knowledge 
within a company consists of core knowledge which is constant and reflects the key 
elements of the company’s ethos and strategy, and peripheral knowledge which is more 
variable and responds to changes in the internal and external environment, and it would 
seem that there are identifiable characteristics of risk taking executives (MacCrimmon and 
Wehrung, 1990), while upper echelons theory premises that Boards experience, values and 
personalities will affect the choices they make (Hambrick 2007). There does not appear to 
be much literature in the field of how corporate governance has changed the level of risk 
awareness and strategising around risk issues. The literature (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992) 
premises that knowledge structures depend to a large extent on the sharing of knowledge 
within the firm. Simple information is easily communicated and readily understood. As 
firms increase their level of complexity, so the issues become increasingly complex and 
information becomes difficult to disseminate and knowledge itself requires explicit 
management. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990, p. 434) suggest that it would be 
“..desirable to study how changes in risk in one area affect risk taking in the other area.”  
This supported the pilot study results which indicated that Boards exhibit source 
dependence, whereby the attitude of Boards to different types of risk varies, 
notwithstanding that the extent of the risk to the business may have similar consequences. 
Further, Boards comprise cognitive factions, which are sub-groups of individuals with 
diverse views and attitudes to risk within the Board. These cognitive factions will interpret 
in different ways the many and varied risks which face the firm (Tegarden et al., 2009). The 
interplay of these cognitive factions in terms of their strength within the organisation, how 
vocal they are and the “political feasibility” (Eden and Ackermann 2001, p.121) of their 
suggestions will determine how the Board as an intact cognitive entity responds to risk. It is 
possible that sub-groupings based on cognitive factions can also reflect other kinds of 
stakeholder differences: those based on having differing functional objectives (e.g. finance, 
to cut costs; marketing, to meet demand; production, to maintain quality), or, among non-
executive directors especially, and people who have directorships on more than one 
company Board, on being sensitive to the needs of external interest groups. 
It is also possible that when faced with highly complex issues Boards may resort to altering 
their perception of reality, in order to develop responses to risk which are perceived to be 
soluble with greater certainty and confidence Schwenk (1984). Thus Boards may develop 
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strategies to deal with perceived problems, and not actual problems– the distinction 
between ‘perceived’ and ‘actual’ being, clearly, an issue which will be addressed in greater 
detail in the Methodology chapter. Finally, Wallach et al. (1962) tried to identify answers to 
the question of how Boards as a group respond to risk. Their empirical studies suggest that 
groups will tend to take riskier decisions than the average of their counterparts, described as 
the risky shift phenomenon. This phenomenon will be considered in more detail below. 
2.3.3 Organisational Theory and Institutional Logic 
In this section the evolution of theory of Board behaviour over the past decade is discussed. 
Organisations are no longer considered to be run by mostly rational agents dealing with 
economic and technical issues. Current institutional philosophy projects the company as an 
entity operating under “institutional prescriptions” which determine their behaviour, and 
that companies seek “legitimacy and organisational survival” (Forgues et al., 2012, p.460). 
At a corporate level, Board members in charge of organisations (Greenwood et.al, 2011) 
face “institutional complexity” (p.318) in confronting an array of internal operational and 
corporate governance structures with which they must comply, and in their widest sense an 
external environment comprising the market and the government agencies, regulatory and 
legal environment, collectively referred to in the literature as institutional factors.  
 
It is clear therefore that organisations are beset with an array of complex issues, and that as 
a group of individuals, Boards strive to make sense of these issues, and further that there is 
an interaction between these members as they construct their environment, in particular 
with regard to how they assess risk in the context of regulatory pressures. These themes 
will run throughout the thesis, and will be discussed in more detail later on. 
2.3.4 Developments in Institutional Theory 
Attention now turns to how Boards will respond to the external environment (the field).  
Institutional Theory focuses on the results of the pressures and constraints imposed on 
businesses as result of institutional factors (Oliver 1991), and their influence on conformity 
to the environment. As with many areas of business, institutional theory has evolved 
considerably over recent years. “Early versions of institutional theory placed particular 
emphasis on institutional myths and beliefs as shared social reality and on the processes by 
which organisations tend to become instilled with value and social meaning” (p.145). 
Boards do not however always conform to institutional exigencies. Oliver (1991) further 
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demonstrated the conditions under which “organisations will resist institutionalisation” 
(p.145), and discussed the complementary though convergent theory of resource 
dependence to “demonstrate how organisational behaviour may vary from passive 
conformity to active resistance in response to institutional pressures” (p.146).  “These 
relative differences in responses to the external environment reflect divergent assumptions 
about the degree of choice, awareness, and self-interest that organisations possess for 
handling external constraints” (p.148). 
 
Globally, (and South Africa is no exception) Boards are required to adhere to a highly 
structured set of standards relating to corporate governance, and in particular risk 
management.  Institutional theory suggests that Boards would conform to these criteria and 
would view their actions as socially and legitimately desirable; and would persist until 
these externally imposed criteria are attained. Strategic decisions relating to risk would 
therefore be automatically enshrined within the processes of the business. 
 
From a resource dependent perspective however, Boards would exhibit self-serving 
measures of control and influence over the governance adherence process. Boards have 
thus moved from traditional socialised and compliant characteristics to a level of greater 
self-determinacy and control (Forgues et al., 2012).  
2.3.5  Developments in Institutional Approaches to ERM 
Since the 1990’s there has been accelerating interest in ERM as a holistic form of corporate 
control over risk issues and as “a new wave of self-regulating approaches” (Arena et al., 
2010, p.672). 
One of the questions to be answered in this thesis is why Boards respond differently to 
corporate governance requirements and why their attitude to ERM varies.  Institutional 
theory poses the question in broader terms (Forgues et al., 2012) and asks why 
“organisations respond differently to seemingly similar institutional demands” (p.461).  
Greenwood et al.,(2011); Scott, (2008) argue that organisations are in a state of flux, and 
their responses to institutional demands, and the degree of institutional complexity, will 
vary according to changing processes in the internal and external environment, and 
different companies will experience such complexity to different degrees, and hence will 
respond to it differently. 
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In the quest to understand why Boards do not adhere to their regulatory requirements, 
Greenwood et al. (2011) suggests that  different sets of  institutional logics (loosely defined 
as a guiding set of principles which govern the behaviour and response of an organisation) 
may be in conflict, which adds to the  level of institutional complexity. For example 
adherence to corporate governance implies increased legitimacy and less institutional 
pressure, and at the same time requires management commitment and cost. These 2 logics 
are incompatible and may result in institutional resistance. Some organisations on the other 
hand may be able to achieve compatibility (e.g. a compliant position) by managing these 
conflicts. Generally the higher the number of logics, the greater the degree of institutional 
complexity, and in the case of risk management, the greater the degree of conflicting logics, 
perhaps the greater the degree of institutional resistance to compliant risk management.  
The nature and extent of institutional complexity is fundamentally (Greenwood at al., 2011) 
shaped by the structure of the organisations’ field within which they are located. At this 
level the overarching set of meanings and normative criteria become encoded in local 
logics that are manifested in rituals, practices and day to day behaviour (Greenwood et al., 
2011, p. 334), and Scott (2008). 
2.3.6 How Boards respond to institutional change 
From the literature there appear to be several approaches to the analysis of companies’ 
response to institutional change. Smets et al., (2012, p.878) describe 3 proposed 
explanations which specifically might explain how Boards respond to their compliance 
obligations. 
1. Board response to the introduction of new legislation, in particular corporate 
governance, is portrayed as an external shock on the institutional status quo of the 
firm, resulting in a shift in the firms approach and regulatory attitude and changer in 
internal policies (change to the field level approach). 
2. The second portrayal of organisational response to institutional change plays out at 
the conflict points where the field response to change is contradictory to the status 
quo, and this conflict results in a change in the organisation to accommodate these 
institutional pressures. 
3. The third portrayal relates to the way the Board deals with “intraorganisational 
dynamics” (p.878) influenced by political interests of senior managers, the 
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sensemaking response of the company, dynamics between different cognitive and 
operational groups and stakeholder demands such as auditors and shareholders.       
In particular it seems that it is possible to categorise several outcomes of institutional and 
field level responses to risk management, set out in the broad headings below:   
2.3.7 Voice and intra-organisational power 
Boards are legally responsible for the introduction of the risk management strategy of the 
firm. Clearly there are many different ways in which the Board may implement field level 
strategies to deal with risk. The proponents [within a Board] of a particular strategy are 
likely to have their views adopted to the extent of their power and sensible articulation of 
their logic, and “to the influence of that logic’s field - level proponents over resources, 
including legitimacy, that they control” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p.349).   
2.3.8 Agency 
In considering how Boards perceive risk it is important to recognise that they do not behave 
as individuals with no external constraints except their own personal wealth. Boards are 
constrained by corporate governance obligations which carry the force of law (Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, King III).  As “agents” of the principals, that is the shareholders of the 
company, it can be assumed that Boards will exhibit risk averse tendencies. However some 
principals will wish their Boards to assume more of a risk seeking approach on the basis 
that higher risks are rewarded by correspondingly higher returns. The challenge of 
corporate governance is therefore to align the risks of the Board members with those of the 
shareholders (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia,1989). 
2.3.9 Executive incentive structures as an influence on Board behaviour and attitude 
towards risk  
The literature appears to deal inconclusively with the impact of executive incentive 
structures on company performance (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). However, (Wright 
P. et al., 2007) incentive share options are directly associated with higher risk taking on the 
part of the Board. Interestingly on the subject of executive share ownership, “there is a 
monotonically positive association between shareholdings and growth-oriented firm risk 
taking” (Wright P. et al., 2007, p. 83). Higher fixed salaries relative to incentive schemes 
reduce risk seeking behaviour, and vice versa. Options are asymmetric in terms of their 
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payoffs. Executives will tend to become more risk taking and focus on the “upside potential 
of outcome variance” (Wright P. et al., 2007, p.82). 
The literature also deals with how Boards adjust their attitudes to, and their tolerance for, 
risks in line with their compensation structures, as the following examples show:  
 Executives treat their own wealth and that of the firm differently (Bebchuck and 
Fried, 2003), so that executive compensation schemes may not always serve to 
adjust the human biases Boards may engage in when facing risk; 
 Boards may behave contrary to the predictions of Prospect Theory by becoming 
more risk averse in terms of their own options and remuneration when  the firm 
faces losses, and more risk seeking (in terms of accepting a higher proportion of pay 
linked to firm performance) when the firm is doing well (Matta, McGuire, 2008). 
While this research is based on how Boards construe risks, the above 2 citations are 
examples of how individual Board members may assume a different risk persona when 
assuming the mantle of corporate responsibility, and highlight steps Boards may take in the 
light of their own compensation, to alter the risk seeking / risk mitigating stance of the firm 
(Holmes et al., 2010, in press).   
2.3.10 Corporate Governance impact on the way Boards deal with risk issues  
There does not appear to be a great deal of literature on how Boards alter their risk profile 
to deal with corporate governance restrictions / requirements. An interesting paper by Yue- 
Fang Wen (2010) investigated the effects of corporate capital investment via the value 
function of cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992). They used data 
from 685 listed Taiwanese companies, between 2001 and 2006, using 2 assumptions viz., 
firm performance as a reference point, and using the change in annual capital investment as 
a proxy for the value function. In this paper the following issues were observed: 
“Biased behaviours of risk aversion relating to capital investment when firms faced 
gains; and  
 risk seeking relating to capital investment when firms faced losses;  
and loss aversion” (Yue-Fang Wen,2010, p.126);  
as predicted by Prospect Theory. 
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Further, Yue-Fang Wen (2010) importantly noted that when variables of corporate 
governance are introduced, the degree of risk aversion in the gain domain is further 
reduced, and similarly, in the loss domain, levels of risk seeking are diminished. These 
results demonstrate the importance of the corporate governance mechanism in diminishing 
biases relating to the way Boards view and deal with risk, particularly those postulated by 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and will form an important part of this 
research thesis.  
In another example of how Boards deal with regulatory uncertainty in the European Airline 
industry, Engau and Hoffman (2011, p.1) find that “the higher level of [regulatory] 
uncertainty, the broader the range of strategies devised [to deal with this uncertainty]; and 
the more future regulation seems likely to affect a firm, the more actively it seeks to cope 
with the associated uncertainty”.   
The external environment also contributes to changes in the way Boards are likely to 
respond to risk issues. When faced with an external threat, companies may become 
offensive, defensive or passive and will structure their organisational responses to the 
nature and interpretation of the threat (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). Generally the greater 
the threat, the greater the level of strategic response required.  
Faced with regulatory uncertainty and the imposition of greater regulatory demands, Boards 
need to decide on the appropriate response, taking into account the potential impact of 
regulatory requirements and the full scale of options available to them. 
From a behavioural viewpoint, institutional conformity (e.g. adherence to corporate 
governance guidelines) may lead to greater firm performance, acting as an incentive for 
greater compliance (Oliver, 1997). “Institutional conformity may confer legitimacy; social 
acceptance; access to government contracts and grants; and provide easier access to capital 
and other scarce resources such as labour” and so on (p.118). 
The threat of sanction or criminal action ought to weigh heavily on the minds of Board 
members, particularly where they embark on actions which could be interpreted as 
mismanagement (intentional or by oversight) or by attempts to defraud the company and its 
stakeholders. There are many aspects of illegal governance such as collusion and anti-
competitive behaviour, creative accounting practices, misstatements to the regulator and or 
stakeholders etc. The Bernie Madoff (New York Times, June 28
th
, 2012) case exemplifies 
46 
 
 
the flagrant flouting of regulatory responsibilities, and a blinkered approach to its 
consequences, in spite of an acute awareness of the ramifications of his actions as a former 
Chairman of the Nasdaq. 
2.3.11 Other behavioural factors 
One of the interesting aims of this research is to establish, whether in a South African 
context, risk oversight obligations introduce other behavioural elements and changes. For 
example are the conclusions of Prospect Theory and the other mental biases observed 
empirically equally applicable in a regulated corporate environment?  
In terms of assessing whether Board composition affected company performance there is 
conflicting evidence that changes in Board composition affect company performance, 
Board behaviour and attitudes towards risk. (Bhagat and Black, 1999; Berger, Kock, 
Shaeck, 2012; Ho, 2012). Most of these studies were concerned with trying to establish 
some link between the independence of the Board measured by the number of independent 
directors vs. the number of executive directors and the split of the CEO / Chairman function 
with performance over a period of time. Other studies related to the Board composition in 
terms of experience, gender and other personal factors. The aims of the above cited 
research seem ambitious against the background of rotation of Board members, the 
difficulties of measuring performance consistently over a long period, and the changes to 
the nature of businesses over time. 
McShane et al., (2011) refers to several other studies referring to measures of compliance 
(see Glossary - in this thesis compliance refers to the extent to which a company adheres to 
its various obligations under the legislative framework pertaining to that company in terms 
of its corporate governance, stock exchange, taxation and all other relevant legislation 
governing the operation of the company. Weakly compliant and strongly compliant ratings 
indicate relatively increasing compliance to the requirements of the legislative 
environment); and performance using the appointment of a Chief Risk Officer CRO as a 
proxy for  equity market ERM implementation; using equity market responses to 
appointments of senior risk management staff appointments and so on. 
2.3.12 Leadership and the role of the CEO on Board risk decisions  
The role of the CEO in terms of risk management is to identify the elements of risk of the 
business and to develop a coherent strategy to deal with these risks.   
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Wright R.P. (2004, p.61) poses the question: “Why do some firms outperform others?” 
Several reasons are given, namely successful ones were quick to move, and displayed a 
sense of urgency with strong leadership traits. Less successful firms were reported to be 
more concerned with “practices and systems” (Wright R.P., 2004, p. 70), and were less 
focussed on market dynamics. These results would tend to support a view that a diversified 
Board made up of strong leadership, and market focussed individuals who were able to get 
things done quickly would be a recipe for greater success. Thus diversification alone may 
not be a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure success, it is the nature of the 
diversification which is important and the nature of the individual strengths brought to bear 
within the Board. Zahra and Pearce II (1989) conducted a study using a number of variables 
relating to Board composition to establish a link between such variables and corporate 
success. For example Board size was found to be significant, the larger the Board, the 
smaller the chance of bankruptcy. Zahra and Pearce II (1989) reported on a number of 
studies which demonstrated that firm performance was associated with distinct Board 
attributes.         
From the brief insight into the way different Board compositions can affect company 
performance, it is reasonable to expect that Board composition is also likely to impact the 
way Boards construe and deal with risk. This issue will be explored further in Chapters 5 
and 6, in the study of risk attitudes within different intact Boards. In a previous Section the 
need was identified to have techniques which would facilitate the elicitation and analysis of 
the sensemaking process undertaken by Boards in the development of their strategic 
thinking regarding risk management. In a later Section the approaches used to describe 
sensemaking and the various techniques used to elicit information are reviewed. 
2.3.13 Size of company as an influence on attitudes to risk and corporate governance 
The structure of the company Smets et al., (2012) can influence the Board’s response to 
institutional demands. For example large corporations will have resources in terms of 
legitimacy, finance and reputation, and are perhaps less likely to attract the scrutiny of 
regulators. Smaller firms by contrast lack the expertise and resources to respond as quickly 
to institutional demands.    
2.4 Summary of Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 1  
This Part dealt with organisational sensemaking, and institutional issues relating to 
organisational behaviour, with emphasis on how Boards make sense of their risk. The next 
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Part, Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 2, deals with the policy practice implementation gap 
in relation to corporate governance and ERM. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 2 
Policy Practice Implementation Gap in respect of Corporate 
Governance and ERM 
2.5 Background to Corporate Governance obligations 
Globally, Boards of companies are generally subject to strict legal guidelines on their 
regulatory obligations relating to risk management. The literature (Beasley et al., 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013; Arena et al., 2010) suggests that there is a gap between regulatory 
prescription and Board practice. Inter alia, this research proposal aims to understand an 
important issue relating to regulatory risk oversight, viz.: 
 to assess whether South African Boards that adhere to corporate governance are 
more effective in developing strategies to deal with ERM; and in doing so to 
understand the extent to which South African Boards have addressed risk 
management and oversight in their organizations as prescribed by King III (2009); 
and why Boards fall short of their risk management obligations.  
There is a considerable amount of legislation in the USA (The Sarbanes- Oxley Act, 2002), 
the UK (UK Corporate Governance Code 2010), the EU (8
th
 EU Company Law Directive, 
2010) and South Africa (King III, 2009) and elsewhere governing the identification, 
management, mitigation and reporting on risk oversight. Examples are: 
“Board members should satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial information 
and that financial controls and systems of risk management are robust and 
defensible.”  
UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 (p.11) 
Similarly, 
 “The Board should be responsible for the process of risk management” 
 The revised Code of and Report on Governance Principles for South Africa (King III), 
(2009), Chapter 4 
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Also,  
“..the audit committee shall, inter alia: monitor the effectiveness of the company’s 
internal control, internal audit where applicable, and risk management systems..” 
Guidance on the 8
th
 EU Company Law Directive – article 41; Guidance for 
Boards and Audit Committees, 2010 
Finally,  
 “..listed companies are required to provide enhanced risk related exposures in their 
proxy and annual statements.” 
 Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010 
2.5.1 Background to Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
ERM has emerged as an acronym for a “holistic” and integrated approach (Arena et al., 
2010, p.659) to the management of corporate risk.  As discussed in the above section, 
globally, regulators are increasingly applying pressure to companies to apply a range of 
corporate governance measures to improve financial and other controls within companies. 
The aspect of corporate governance relating specifically to risk measurement is often 
referred to as ERM, yet in response to its increasing demand from regulators, auditors, 
shareholders and ratings firms, it’s “implementation remains poorly integrated” (Arena et 
al., 2010, p.659), and there is little research “on the factors associated with ERM” (Beasley 
et al., 2005, p521).     
ERM has been defined by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO), which states: 
“Enterprise Risk Management is a process, effected by an entity’s Board of Directors, 
management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, 
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risks to be 
within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding achievement of the 
entity’s objectives.” (COSO, 2004), and defines 8 elements for a successful ERM strategy, 
as follows: 
Internal Environment – how is risk defined and addressed within the organisation 
51 
 
 
Objective setting – defining goals in terms of risk management 
Event identification – identifies endogenous and exogenous risks (up and downside risks) 
to the firm 
Risk assessment – analysis and evaluation of risks 
Risk response – defining appropriate measures to deal with risk 
Control activities – monitoring of risk mitigation and management strategies 
Information and communication – manage information flows 
Monitoring – overseeing the ERM process  
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) has emerged “as a construct that ostensibly overcomes 
limitations of silo-based traditional risk management, yet little is known of its 
effectiveness” (McShane et al., 2011, p. 641). It would seem that institutional pressures 
have resulted in Boards focusing more on achieving a legitimate response to ERM 
management to satisfy regulators, rather than developing a holistic view to risk. Power 
(2009) discusses “intellectual failure” (p.854) within the ERM model which should be 
addressed by regulators and Boards.   
The reasons for the existence of a policy practice implementation gap are discussed later in 
this section in greater detail. 
2.5.2 State of Readiness of Boards under current legislation 
The 2010 Report on the Current State of Enterprise Risk Oversight (Beasley et al., 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013) carried out by Enterprise Risk Management Initiative (The ERM 
Initiative) in the College of Management at North Carolina State University, in conjunction 
with the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) concluded that, of the 
331 respondents interviewed (mostly CFOs of large listed US companies spread by 
industry and firm size), a significant proportion are of the view that risk management in 
their organizations is deficient  (see Appendix A for a summary of the results). 
In South Africa, Deloitte (2012, p.28), reports that “although risk disclosure has improved, 
the lack of depth leads us to question the robustness of the risk management process 
supporting the disclosure. Although a significant proportion of … companies disclosed the 
52 
 
 
risks facing the company and provided a risk mitigation plan, the risks disclosed often lack 
depth and typically [only] deal with generic risks facing corporate South Africa.”  
 
“Only 21% of the [Corporate Governance] reports contain a clear expression by the board 
of its views relating to the effectiveness of the risk management processes. The board 
determines the risk policy and has to set the risk appetite and risk tolerance of the company. 
Management, in turn has the duty to design and implement a risk management plan within 
the parameters set by the board. In this regard, the disclosures of surveyed companies paint 
a bleak picture. According to the results, boards would do well if they pay more attention to 
the critical role they need to play to ensure effective risk management*” (p.58). 
*Effective risk management may be defined as a prudent, holistic, collective series of 
measures taken by a company within the reasonable tolerance of its resources to reduce the 
impact of its internal and external risk to the point where the company’s vulnerability to 
shocks is reduced to acceptable levels of probability without affecting unnecessarily the 
viability of the business.  
Furthermore, the Deloitte Global Director survey announced in Johannesburg on 14th 
January 2013 revealed that South African directors share similar concerns in respect of 
governance and risk management as their international counterparts. The South African 
results of the survey mirrored the global sentiments in the majority of cases with regulation, 
governance, compliance and risk management being current top of mind issues for Boards. 
South African Director responses were unanimous that changes in the regulatory 
environment will impact the Board’s focus over the next few years, particularly since the 
introduction of King III (See Glossary).  According to the survey 100% of South African 
directors claimed that they are successfully maintaining an appropriate balance between 
risk oversight, growth, performance and strategy. The high rate of agreement by South 
African directors was attributed to the fact that South African governance under King III 
requires an integrated form of reporting comprising risk management, governance and 
performance measurement. (Deloitte Global Centre for Corporate Governance, Director 
360: Degrees of Progress, 2013). 
 
Similarly in the UK, (FSA, 2007) indicated that many firms surveyed were still in the 
implementation phases of their risk management processes and firms were in fact less 
prepared than they thought. While the oversight review of the FSA, into mostly financial 
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firms (banks, insurers), indicated a higher level of compliance than US companies, the 
report also did not highlight reasons for the shortcomings. It would therefore appear that, 
globally, regulation is well ahead of implementation.    
It is to be expected that Boards of different companies, and different members on the 
Board, all with different experiences and psychological, educational and motivational 
backgrounds can be expected to interpret the regulatory imposition of risk oversight 
processes and the external risk environment differently (Daft and Weick, 1984), suggesting 
that different Boards will react differently to different external environments.  
The question arises now as to why ERM is not fully implemented. The obvious responses 
are lack of resources, conflicting priorities and lack of understanding, skills and knowledge. 
The more obscure reasons may be seated in psychology: the daily pressures on staff to 
conform to a set of procedures to process and report on regulatory issues provides a 
“cognitively comfortable world which focuses inwards on systems and controls” 
(Power,2009, p.852). However the dichotomy of thought which arises when Boards are 
required to contemplate events which might arise in the future provides a “less comfortable 
arena” (p.852); time and management thought are needed to assess possible future 
scenarios which may be seen as an unnecessary distraction from operational exigencies. In 
short, preparing for the unknown and unexpected is a much more challenging and abstract 
process than dealing with tangible “rule based” (p.852) operational issues, and this might 
explain the frictional effects of a properly structured ERM approach.    
Arnold et al., (2007) provides insight into the impact of institutional logics in the form of 
ERM implementation on the organisational processes within the firm. Using 4 case studies, 
some firms managed to develop an effective internal regulatory structure, while others 
experienced substantial difficulties, citing interference and disruption to operational 
processes, and resource limitations putting them at a relative disadvantage to their 
competitors. These control structures were regarded as limiting their “flexibility to act” and 
“these results raise questions regarding whether structural differences between firms 
contributed to different experiences in implementation difficulty and different perceptions 
in the impact in terms of organisational flexibility” (Arnold et al., 2012, p.173). In this later 
study based on reported organisational structures and experiences provided by 113 chief 
audit executives, whose companies had submitted regulatory reports based on the Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) requirements for internal controls, led to the following conclusions (p.186): 
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1. The strength of strategic ERM processes is very [sic] predictive of an organisation’s     
flexibility. 
2. An organisation’s flexibility is positively related to their ability to implement 
effective processes for addressing compliance with new regulations. The strength of 
the relationship is mediated by the strength of the control environment. 
3. There is evidence that the ability to implement an effective ERM program in line 
with a regulatory umbrella is more easily achieved by companies that already had 
some form of ERM system in place, compared to those who had no prior ERM 
structure in place. (Thus corporate governance legislation appears to present the 
greatest challenges to those companies who in fact require protection).  
2.6 Summary of Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 2  
This Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 2 began with a brief introduction to corporate 
governance legislation worldwide, with particular reference to risk. 
In spite of onerous legal requirements, Boards are shown to be lagging in the full 
implementation of their corporate governance processes, and are struggling to “make 
sense” (Weick 2001) of their risk environment and face an enormous barrage of 
unpredictable events on a continual basis. Weick (1995) developed the concept of 
“sensemaking” to describe the human cognitive process, which uses retrospective 
experiences to explain responses to new events, and in the context of this research how 
Boards respond to internal and external risk. 
In this situation, Boards engage in a process of collective sensemaking. There is evidence 
that Boards collaborate and organise, are subject to systematic bias, that cognitive factions 
emerge, and the Board as a whole develops a unique and complex persona to deal with risk 
and uncertainty, which are regarded as opportunities or threats. In considering the Board as 
a “persona” it was to be expected to find in this study that Boards would indeed “make 
sense” in their own unique way to risk and uncertainty. 
An entire academic area of institutional logic has grown rapidly and there is considerable 
literature on organisational dynamics, and in particular how Boards respond to institutional 
demands (Greenwood et al., 2012).  
Similarly the field of research around ERM has exploded and it is clear from the literature 
that the introduction of ERM into the field has presented severe challenges to Boards.  
55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
56 
 
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 3 
Behavioural economics and inherent mental biases 
A prime area of interest in this research was to recognise that, in assessing risk and reward 
within the company, Boards are subject to a range of in-built mental biases, referred to in 
the literature on behavioural economics, which will affect the way they as individuals will 
be influenced, and by the qualitative and quantitative aspects of risk which they face from 
time to time.    
Camerer (2006, p.1) describes behavioural economics as the “modelling of systematic 
imperfections in human rationality applied to the study and engineering of organizations, 
markets and policy. These imperfections include limits on rationality, willpower and self-
interest”. 
Not much research has been carried out in the field of behavioural economic biases in 
organisations (Camerer, 2006). The question that arises from this is therefore how Board 
members, faced with risk, and all with inherent and different mental biases will collectively 
arrive at a single decision to deal with the risk. 
Executive risk taking varies across and within different forms of monitoring, and Boards 
are likely to exhibit risk seeking as well as risk-averse behaviour depending on 
circumstances (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
Risk preferences of decision makers, and hence the behaviour of directors faced with risky 
decisions is likely to be influenced by the way in which the problems are “framed” 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Starmer (2000, p. 338) goes so far as to state that “very 
minor changes in the presentation or ‘framing’ of prospects can have dramatic impacts 
upon the choices of decision makers”. 
This framing effect can be highly influential in decision making at Board level when issues 
(relating to risk or any other strategic issue) are presented by individual Board members. 
This framing effect could alter the outlook members have in terms of their quantitative and 
qualitative assessments of risk.  
In an experiment designed to gauge the discrepancy between “aspirational goal setting” and 
past performance Lant (1992, p. 641) concluded that companies are likely to base their 
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decisions on past performance, with a “systematic bias tending towards optimism.”  Thus in 
evaluating risky situations, Boards may tend to be more optimistic than past risky situations 
suggest they ought to be. Similar systematic biases were noted by Figenbaum and Thomas 
(1988). 
2.6.1 The key human biases 
There is a great deal of literature on this area of behavioural economics, which largely 
makes statements about individuals, but which, taken in conjunction with material on group 
behaviour, can be extended to biases in Board decision making; and Table 2.3 below (a 
compilation taken directly from McFadden (1999, p.85) summarises the key human biases 
which have been observed empirically by a number of different researchers. 
2.6.2 Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory 
Until the seminal paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), expected utility theory “EUT” 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) had been widely accepted as a normative model 
descriptive of human decision making under risk. EUT states that individuals will value 
risky outcomes by multiplying the probability of the outcome by the utility of the outcome 
to that individual (Mongin P., 1997). While a normative approach is theoretically appealing 
and tractable, it is what decisions people actually make when faced with risk and 
uncertainty rather than how they ought to behave that seems more important. 
“Empirical studies dating from the early 1950’s have revealed a variety of patterns in 
choice behaviour that appear inconsistent with EUT” (Starmer, 2000, p. 336). 
In a further major challenge to EUT and normative behaviour under risk, Maurice Allais 
(1953) highlighted two empirically observed and widely discussed irrational biases, the so-
called common consequence and common ratio effects:  
2.6.3 Common consequence effect      
Given 2 options, people will, contrary to EUT, mostly choose the option which provides 
more certainty against an option which provides a higher expected return. 
2.6.4 Common ratio effect  
EUT predicts that given 2 options, with the probability of the payoff under the first option 
being a constant multiple of the probability of the second option, people will always choose 
the same option irrespective of changes to the probability of occurrence. Considerable 
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empirical evidence has supported Allais’ (1953) findings which demonstrate that people 
will behave irrationally and alter their choice of option based on the underlying 
probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Starmer 2000; Camerer 2003).  Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) proposed an alternative theory of choice under risk and demonstrated 
that humans approach choice in which in-built mental biases systematically violate the 
axioms of expected utility theory. There is some literature on the application of Prospect 
Theory to group decision making behaviour, and the extent of cognitive bias at Board or 
company level (Figenbaum and Thomas, 1988). One of the objectives of this research is to 
identify whether this anomaly exists, against the background of the interaction of Board 
members and the influence of ever increasingly stringent corporate governance 
requirements. 
2.6.5 Description of Prospect Theory 
As seen above, Prospect Theory sets out to explain the anomalies of Expected Utility 
Theory (EUT), which is why humans do not follow a mathematically logical approach to 
decisions when faced with risk. EUT supposes that individuals will consistently choose the 
highest value of a range of probability weighted present values of a set of outcomes. Thus 
they will be consistently rational in their choice of risky alternatives, irrespective of the 
circumstances. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) noted that there are “consistent 
inconsistencies” (the authors description) when humans are faced with risk. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) identify 4 distinctive features of choice under risk: 
Risk aversion 
Individuals will tend to become risk averse when they have experienced some past gains     
Risk seeking 
They will tend to become risk seeking when they have suffered prior losses 
Loss aversion 
Individuals feel the pain of losses more acutely than the elation of a gain. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1992, p. 303) described this as “losses loom larger than gains”, and quantified this 
ratio as 2.25, that is that the pain of a given monetary loss induces a feeling of discomfort 
2.25 times more than the corresponding feeling of happiness for the same monetary gain 
Diminishing sensitivity 
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There is a diminishing sensitivity to increasing losses and gains. Thus there is a marginal 
reduction of value attached to increasing gains and losses. Thus people become inured to 
increasing gains and losses. For example a person who has just won 100 will attach a far 
greater value to a further gain of 50, than the same person would if he had just won 
1,000,000. The following graph shows the distinctive Prospect Theory curve, with 
annotations to highlight the features described above. 
Table 2.3 A summary of the major recognized and documented cognitive anomalies 
exhibited by individuals (McFadden 1999, p.85) 
Effect Bias Description 
CONTEXT Anchoring 
 
 
Context 
 
Framing 
 
 
Promin’nce 
 
 
Saliency 
Judgments are influenced by quantitative cues 
contained in the statement of the decision task 
History and presentation of the decision task 
influence perception and motivation 
Equivalent lotteries, presented differently, are 
evaluated differently 
The format in which a decision task is stated 
influences the weight given to different aspects 
Subjects are inconsistent in selecting/ weighting 
the information judged salient to a decision task 
REFERENCE 
POINT 
Assymetry 
                    
 
Reference Point 
 
Endowm’nt 
Effect 
Subjects show risk aversion for gains; risk 
tolerance for losses;  weigh losses more heavily 
Choices are evaluated in terms of changes from 
an endowment or status quo point 
Current status and history are favored relative to 
alternatives  
AVAILABILITY Availability 
 
 
Certainty 
Responses rely too heavily on readily retrieved 
information, and too little on background 
information 
Sure outcomes are given more weight than 
60 
 
 
 
Focal 
 
Isolation 
 
Primary/Recency 
 
Regression 
 
 
Separation 
 
Represent’veness 
 
Regret 
uncertain outcomes 
Quantitative information is retrieved or reported 
categorically 
The parts of a multiple-part or multi-stage lottery 
are evaluated separately 
Initial and recently experienced events are the 
most easily recalled 
Idiosyncratic causes are attached to past 
fluctuations, and regression to the mean is 
underestimated 
High conditional probabilities induce 
overestimates of unconditional probabilities 
Bets  are decomposed into a sure outcome and a 
bet relative to this sure outcome 
Individuals are likely to avoid choices which may 
lead to feelings of regret 
SUPERSTITION Credulity 
 
 
Disjunctive 
 
Superstit’n 
 
Suspicion 
Evidence that supports patterns and causal 
explanations for coincidences is accepted too 
readily 
Consumers fail to reason through or accept the 
logical consequences of actions 
Causal structures are attached to coincidences, 
and ‘‘quasi-magical’’ powers to opponents 
Peoples mistrust offers and in unfamiliar 
situations question the motives of opponents  
PROCESS Rule Driven 
 
Process 
 
Temporal 
Behavior is guided by principles and analogies 
rather than utilitarian calculus 
Evaluation of outcomes is sensitive to process 
and change  
Time discounting is temporally inconsistent, with 
short delays discounted too sharply relative to 
long delays 
PROJECT’N Misrepres’n Subjects may misrepresent judgments for real or 
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Projection 
perceived strategic advantage 
Judgments are altered to reinforce internally or 
project to others a self-image 
 
Figure 2.3 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Prospect Theory Curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is now necessary to consider the relevance of Prospect Theory to the study of risk 
management in the corporate environment. 
Every day, businesses are faced with risk and uncertainty, and Boards are required to 
develop strategies to deal with this risk. If these natural human biases which have been 
shown to exist among individuals are similarly endemic at a corporate level, then 
businesses are not seeing risks for what they are. Thus some further insight may be gained 
into why companies fail, and if this phenomenon does exist, it may be possible to alert 
Boards to be on guard, and develop strategies to protect, against these collective cognitive 
distortions.  
Value 
Reference point 
which is the 
current asset 
position 
Loss aversion O 
Risk aversion facing gains 
showing diminishing 
sensitivity 
Risk seeking facing 
losses showing 
diminishing sensitivity 
Gain 
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2.6.6 Reference dependence and preference reversal 
Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory assume reference-dependence. This means 
that the utility or value derived from a set of risky alternatives, or indeed the decision taken 
by an individual when faced with these risky choices, will depend on the size of the gain or 
loss relative to their current wealth. Prospect Theory states that individuals become less 
sensitive to larger gains and losses (diminishing sensitivity). Also, individuals exhibit a 
form of preference reversal in which they will choose more certain outcomes when faced 
with gains, but more risky alternatives when faced with losses.  
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992) however, is “more clearly rooted in 
psychology than most other theories, which are generally based on ingenious ways of 
weakening the independence axiom” (the independence axioms assume that people 
implicitly cancel common outcomes of equal probability in comparing risky choices)  
which leads mathematically to expected utility  and subjective expected utility (Camerer, 
2006, p. 8). This means that individuals are able to identify common characteristics among 
risky choices made up of several characteristics. (Simple example: Prospect A provides a 
20% chance of winning a lottery ticket which has a 1 in 10,000 chance of winning $1M. 
Prospect B provides a 20% chance of winning 2 lottery tickets each of which has a 1 in 
10,000 chance of winning $1M.  Individuals ought to attach the same relative values to A 
and B as they would to 2 other prospects C and D where C has no chance of winning 
anything and D provides a 20% chance of winning one lottery ticket.)     
Prospect Theory has been tried and tested in numerous settings over 3 decades 
(Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988; Harless and Camerer, 1994), and the results are shown to 
support strongly the postulates of Prospect Theory, in that firms which are loss making or 
performing below budget appear to be risk averse, and conversely firms operating above 
target levels tend to display risk averse strategies (Figenbaum and Thomas, 1988).     
2.6.7 The basic mathematics of Prospect Theory, the certainty effect and the 
reflection effect. 
In order to describe the way in which individuals deviate from uniformity in risk-taking 
depending on size of gain or loss, it is necessary to examine the mathematical assumptions 
of Kahneman & Tversky (1979). The same methodology used by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) will be applied to Boards to establish whether similar cognitive biases exist at a 
Board level, and how this impacts on Boards’ response to risk and uncertainty. 
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) postulated that individuals faced with a risky decision will 
choose a maximizing solution which enhances their value as follows: Let x, x’ represent the 
binary outcomes of a lottery. Let v be a value function which attributes a value to the 
lottery outcomes. Let p represent the probability of x, and 1-p the probability of occurrence 
of x’. w(p), and w(1-p), respectively represent the probability weighting function which 
overweights* low probabilities, and underweights* high probabilities. If V represents the 
value of the prospect, then:  
V(x,x’) = Max [  w(p) . v(x) ; w(1-p) . v(x’) ]                                                            (2.1) 
*Overweighting/underweighting of probability describes the behavioural response to given 
probabilities, where individuals will subconsciously attach a higher/lower value to the 
implicitly or explicitly stated probability of a given event, and use this biased probability in 
determining their strategy in dealing with the event. 
People therefore systematically tend to distort economic values involving certainty, 
probability and possibility; and will hence overweight outcomes that are considered certain, 
compared to outcomes which are considered probable. Thus faced with choice, people will 
seek a more certain outcome. This is referred to as the certainty effect. When people are 
faced with choices involving losses, they will tend to reverse their certainty bias, and seek 
options which provide the lowest expected loss. This is referred to as the reflection effect.  
Thus people will be risk averse when they consider themselves to be wealthier than their 
normal status quo level, and will become risk tolerant or even risk seeking when they have 
lost and are less well off than their status quo position. These 2 processes combine to create 
the familiar S – shaped Prospect Theory curve shown in Figure 2.3 above, which plots 
gains relative to the status quo on the x-axis, and attributed value on the y-axis. The curve 
is concave above the x-axis (to the right of the reference point) reflecting risk aversion, 
concave below the y-axis reflecting risk tolerance. Immediately to the left of the reference 
point the curve is steeper than to the right of the reference point, indicating loss aversion. 
2.6.8 The independence axiom  
Tversky (1972) stated that in order to simplify choice between alternatives, people often 
disregard components that the alternatives share, and focus on the components that 
distinguish them. This is referred to as independence. Thus Board members, who for 
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example enter into a competitive tender process, may tend to distinguish between the 
probability of success of winning the tender and the expected gain on the project.  
Boards may consequently be focused separately on the contract price to improve the 
probability of winning the tender; and separately will consider the strategy and expected 
profitability of the contract, once awarded. This form of bias can lead to potentially high 
risk strategies.     
2.6.9 How low and high probability events are construed 
A simplification process in the evaluation of prospects can lead people to discard events of 
extremely low probability and to treat events with extremely high probability as being 
certain. People tend to be limited in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme 
probabilities, consequently highly improbable events are either disregarded or over-
weighted, and the difference between high probability and certainty is either neglected or 
exaggerated (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Two obvious consequences of failure to recognize low probabilities are failure on the part 
of Boards to insure adequately, or to recognize that highly improbable events do happen 
(BP oil spill 2010). 
An example of a consequence of treating high probabilities as certainties is where a 
company commences with the internal planning in anticipation of winning a tender before 
the final documentation is complete on the basis that the tender award is “in the bag”, with 
obvious consequences in the event of the failure of the tender to materialize. 
Another example of group behaviour is evident in asset bubbles. The top of a bull market, 
by definition, occurs when the entire set of market participants believe that prices will 
continue to rise. This herd instinct engenders a high degree of incoherent optimism leading 
to market participants overlooking downside risks.  The apparent high probability of a gain 
is often treated with certainty, leading perhaps to unexpected losses (in a market crash for 
example).       
Many of the mathematical models developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) are based 
on the decisions taken by the majority of people when presented with these prospects. 
However, in some experiments the majority was less than in others. This means that a 
(significant) minority of people make decisions which violate the tenets of prospect theory. 
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The external observer needs to be wary of falling into the representativeness trap described 
below! 
2.6.10 An example of a Board underweighting high probability events 
In 2000 during the dot-com crash Nortel Networks, a company which had traded for over a 
century and became a computer networking giant with a staggering market capitalisation of 
over $300 billion, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Nortel executives never 
foresaw the impending disaster. The aftermath included an accounting scandal including 
the overstatement of revenue over several years, manipulated earnings by the then CFO, 
and resulted in the departure of ten executives and five directors. In their failure to foresee 
the disaster, the resulting 2 counts of fraud all point to how Boards might behave when 
faced with uncertainty.  In the first instance the Board may have suffered from 
overconfidence bias, and assumed that the high probability of continued success was a 
certainty.   The subsequent fraudulent activity on the part of highly respected executives is 
a further example of how executives assume that the high probability of successfully 
concealing fraud equates to certainty. (New York Times - January 15, 2009, on page B2 of 
the New York edition).  
These human biases evident in the Nortel case are typical of many others (failures of 
WorldCom and Enron for example) where human bias distorts the probability of events, as 
predicted by Prospect Theory as well as other research on human biases as outlined above. 
2.6.11 Criticism for Prospect Theory, and evidence of its predictability  
Support and criticism for Prospect Theory 
The postulates of Prospect Theory have been endorsed by an extensive body of literature 
Starmer 2000; Wu et al., 2005; Camerer, 2006). Figenbaum and Thomas (1988) carried out 
an extensive study into the risk attitudes of over 2000 US companies between 1960 and 
1979 and consistently found a negative risk-return relationship for companies experiencing 
below target level returns, and a positive risk- return relationship for companies with above 
target returns. Thus companies with below target returns, facing losses pursued high risk 
projects resulting in a negative risk reward ratio, and vice versa. “These results support the 
basic propositions of Prospect Theory (in companies) and are extremely robust within and 
across industries and for all time periods studied” (p.85).  
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 However, Bosch-Domenech and Silvestre (2010) demonstrate, in a real money experiment, 
evidence of risk aversion in the case of high probability losses, which contradicts Prospect 
Theory and its cumulative version (Kahneman and Tversky 1992). “In decision making 
under risk, the major distinction appears not to be between the domains of gains and losses, 
but between the domains of large vs. small money amounts” (Bosch–Domenech and 
Silvestre, 2010, p.180).  
Levy and Levy (2002) claim that the main justification for Prospect Theory is based on the 
fact the individuals will tend to choose a financially certain alternative which is lower than 
the expected value of a risky prospect.   In their experiments Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) required subjects to declare the certainty equivalent of either negative or positive 
prospects. Such prospects are not common in financial markets.  Levy and Levy (2002) 
consequently rejected the S-shaped value curve due to this artificial framing and bias 
introduced by the certainty effect.   
This work of Levy and Levy was immediately refuted by Wakker (2002) on the basis that 
they thought, incorrectly, that probability weighting could be ignored; thus Wakker (2002) 
demonstrated the experiments conducted by Levy and Levy (2002) do in fact support the S-
shaped Prospect curve. “Their hypotheses of convex utility for gains is contrary to the 
diminishing marginal utility assumed in classical analyses, the diminishing sensitivity 
assumed in Prospect Theory, and virtually all empirical findings of the vast literature on the 
topic” (Wakker 2002, p.981).  
Bromiley (2010) also criticises Prospect Theory on the grounds that the empirical basis for 
the  research relies on prospects which are unrealistic in a business context, and for 
example ignore current wealth in assessing risk and the incidence of mixed gambles (i.e. 
those which offer a positive as well as a negative outcome. In this research these factors 
were taken into account. Bromiley (2010) advocated the use of a multi-factor model 
involving 5 basic variables as a preferable way of assessing risk aversion and tolerance. 
The 5 variables were: performance, capacity, aspirations, expectations and risk.   
Criticisms of the laboratory techniques used in deriving Prospect Theory 
The conclusions of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992) were not based on business 
applications but on empirical studies using hypothetical lottery style questions based on a 
modest monthly (Israeli) salary and directed at students. They relied on the “assumption 
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that people often know [a priori] how they would behave in actual situations of choice, and 
on the further assumption that subjects have no special reason to disguise their true 
preferences” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p.265).  
It would therefore appear that Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1992) research does not 
deal directly with the question of how individuals change their value function based on the 
potential gain and current wealth relationship. This has also not been tested in businesses. 
That is, where the Board may adopt a different view of value when faced with a risky 
choice depending on the size of the expected outcome relative to the extent of the 
company’s resources. 
In an attack against Prospect Theory, Nwogugu (2006, p. 452) claims that the methodology 
and results of Prospect Theory are fundamentally flawed. He claims that the experimental 
process failed to present the effects of:  “order of choices; cognitively induced  bias by 
repeatedly posing the same type of question to interviewees;  impact of response time;  
effect of knowledge on choices; effects of mood; effects of regret and mental states; the 
effects on the individual of gradually changing the prices, instead of changing the prices 
randomly; decision makers objectives and changes over time; content/context and gender 
issues; impact of principal/agent relationship issues; the dynamics of “mixed prospects” ; 
and the effect of task complexity on the respondents answers” (p.452). 
Principally Nwogugu (2005, 2006) claims that the main area of departure from rational 
economic thought is that for most people value is relative to total wealth; and not gains 
relative to the status quo. He further asserts that Prospect Theory is essentially the same as 
utility theory as they “are both based on probability weighted or factor weighted 
summations of possible outcomes.”(Nwogugu, 2006, p. 453). Semantically, this assertion is 
true if one considers that Prospect Theory is an attempt to define these factor weightings 
which Prospect Theory refers to as decision weights. However Prospect Theory attempts to 
explain these decision weights in terms of behavioural biases, and the S-shaped probability 
transformation in Prospect Theory “offer[s] significant predictive improvement over EUT” 
Starmer (2000, p.359). 
In a further critique of Prospect Theory, Laury and Holt (2005, p.2) state “while the use of 
hypothetical payoffs may not affect behaviour much when low amounts of money are 
involved, this may not be the case with high payoffs of the type used by Kahneman and 
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Tversky (1979) to document the reflection effect”.   Further, (Laury and Holt, 2005) claim 
that risk aversion increases sharply when real payoffs in these lotteries are increased. Using 
the same lottery style approach used by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), but with real 
monetary payoffs, Laury and Holt (2005) demonstrated a reduction in reflection rate by 
over 50%.   
2.6.12 Implications of the techniques used to derive Prospect Theory for its relevance 
in corporate decision making  
It would seem that the decisions faced in a corporate environment are often more akin to 
the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) type experiments where business are often faced with 
the choice of a risky project, or staying as they are (certainty).  They are also faced with the 
high probability, low certainty and mixed bet scenarios. It is possible to conclude that 
businesses may oscillate between:  
 utility type functions, relating utility to wealth (or market capitalisation in the case 
of a company);   
 Markowitz (1952) type functions where the utility function has 3 points of 
inflexion, which can be interpreted as people changing their risk tolerance as the 
size of potential gain / loss changes relative to their wealth.  Thus for low gains, 
people may exhibit risk seeking behaviour, and for large gains people revert to a 
risk averse attitude. The reverse situation applies to losses. In a business context, 
companies may be prepared to gamble on smaller projects, but be risk averse to 
larger projects. This makes intuitive sense.   
 Kahneman Tversky (1979, 1992) value / utility functions depending on the specific 
circumstances of the decision frame, such as where people view their current 
position relative to their status quo.     
Nwogugu (2005, p. 167) proposes the use of dynamic multi-factor models (“belief systems 
– which consist of physical, temporal, mathematical, psychological, technological, 
government and monetary factors that directly influence people’s beliefs and opinions 
about issues, and thus give rise to probabilities and decision weights”) which apply weights 
to a series of situation / context  specific variables and a range of qualitative and 
quantitative factors which are known to impact on the risk facing the firm. It could be 
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argued that attempting to apply situationally relevant probabilities to a number of factors 
may give rise to spurious accuracy / results.    
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) however never stated that their Prospect Theory was 
intended to describe a conscious cognitive process employed by people faced with risky 
decisions. By contrast, their model described the outcomes of peoples’ decisions when 
faced with risk, and a formula for describing the nature and extent of this bias.     
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) analyse decision making under risk. Businesses too are 
faced with uncertainty (See Glossary). Business managers are not always provided with a 
clear set of prospects with probabilities and clearly quantified potential gains. In this regard 
Schmidt et al. (2008) advanced Prospect Theory (referred to as PT3) to deal with 
uncertainty (as opposed to risk in which the probabilities of the events are known a priori). 
In the PT3 model the reference point is uncertain, and thus provides a predictive model for 
behaviour of individuals faced with lottery style prospects in which the probability of 
outcomes is unknown. PT3 may thus be considered to be more consistent with real life, 
business type, situations in which the Board (say) is unsure of the probabilities of the 
various risky alternatives which face the company. Due to the nature of uncertainty, it is 
difficult to create a series of questionnaires which provide measurable results which could 
be used to measure the degree of bias based on uncertain events, as it would be necessary to 
state “how uncertain” such events might be. It must be emphasised that Prospect Theory 
and PT3 are descriptive models which explain empirically observed behaviour, and do not 
purport to replicate the cognitive processes employed by individuals in dealing with risk 
and uncertainty.   
Hodgkinson et al. (1999) reports on field studies involving the impact of biases and 
heuristics (rules of thumb) on strategic cognition relating to decision making under 
uncertainty, in which the framing bias (where small changes in the way problems are 
presented affects their perception) leads to reversals of preference as predicted by Prospect 
Theory.  
Other studies have dealt with risk and return issues in the corporate environment. Bowman 
(1980) for example concluded that in a corporate environment, risk taking, and the 
consequent returns, were negatively correlated. The risk attitude of the Board may 
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influence these risk return profiles, and firms under threat (and hence facing losses) are 
likely to be more risk seeking, (Bowman 1982, 1984), as predicted by Prospect Theory.  
Boards are also affected by the nature of their incentives (Wright et al., 2007). They tend to 
become more risk seeking based on the extent of the ratio between their share options and 
their fixed salary components. This behaviour seems counter intuitive to the risk averse 
nature of Board behaviour predicted by Prospect Theory. 
Figenbaum and Thomas (1988) attempted to explore the role of attitudes towards risk in the 
management of strategic risk and thus to understand more fully Bowman’s (1980) risk 
return paradox, which is that contrary to intuitive logic, businesses often violate the risk / 
reward relationship and will choose high risk projects which offer low rewards.  
In summary, there have been many attempts, in the form of a number of models, to explain 
how individuals deal with risk and uncertainty. It would appear that Prospect Theory has 
been the subject of intensive scrutiny and the theory has been extensively applied across a 
large number of applications over more than 3 decades since the first publication of 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The consequences of this theory for 
Board members of companies are that, at times of profitability, Board members will 
generally be conservative and seek certainty. This could result in potentially profitable 
opportunities being discarded. However, when faced with losses, Board members will tend 
to become risk seeking, and this could lead to Boards considering potentially high risk 
opportunities, at a time when they ought to be more prudent. The research will explore 
whether Prospect Theory applies to companies, when faced with risk and uncertainty. In a 
later section an example of Prospect Theory is considered in a company environment. 
2.6.13 The relevance of Prospect Theory in business applications 
As stated above, the main conclusions from Prospect Theory were derived from empirical 
studies based on individuals’ responses to lottery style questions involving hypothetical 
payoffs. This section explores the relevance of Prospect Theory in a group or business 
context.  
Figenbaum and Howard (1988) carried out extensive research to explain Bowman’s risk 
return paradox (the relationship between risk and return was negatively correlated in most 
industries studied by Bowman (1980)). Using extensive data on over 2000 US companies, 
between 1960 and 1979, Figenbaum and Howard (1988, p.97) arrived at results which 
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robustly supported the propositions for Prospect Theory. They demonstrated that “when a 
target Return on Equity (ROE) value is introduced at either the firm or industry level, risk 
and return are negatively correlated for below target firms, and positively correlated for 
above target firms regardless of the period or underlying conditions.” This means that when 
the gain or loss is measured relative to ROE, firms that are operating below target and 
consider themselves to be facing losses, will tend to be taking higher, unrequited risks.  
Overachieving firms (i.e. those facing positive prospects) will on average be taking lower 
risks than their performance would suggest. These results confirm the behavioural 
assumptions of Prospect Theory. 
In terms of specific applications involving Prospect Theory there is also a considerable 
body of literature. Prospect Theory has been used to explain many of the observed 
paradoxes or behavioural anomalies in the financial markets. Some of this work, in terms of 
financial applications has been summarised by Han and Hsu (2004), as set out in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 Summary of Prospect Theory applications 
Phenomenon Author Description 
#Portfolio choice Han and Hsu 
(2004) 
Investors will hold sub-optimal portfolios in violation 
of expected utility theory 
#Disposition 
effect 
Thaler 
(1985) 
Investors hold onto losing stocks for longer, and sell 
winners earlier, than is in their best interests to do 
#Home bias Stracca 
(2002) 
Prospect Theory agents who are sensitive to losses will 
prefer to hold fewer (familiar home based) stocks that 
holding a more efficient diversified portfolio 
#Equity risk 
premium 
Banartzi and 
Thaler(1995) 
The loss aversion feature of Prospect Theory, together 
with the mental accounting and narrow framing biases 
are used to describe why investors overweight the 
returns on equities relative to more secure fixed interest 
securities 
#The volatility 
puzzle 
Barberis, 
Huang and 
Santos 
(2001) 
Prospect Theory is used to demonstrate why equity 
prices are much more volatile than the underlying 
earnings  
#Initial 
underpricing of 
Loughran 
and Ritter 
(2002) 
Sponsors behind new stock issues tend to be loss 
averse, as predicted by Prospect Theory, and tend to 
anchor their perception of the true value of the stock to 
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IPO’s the value pertaining at the filing date with the listing 
authority 
#Long run 
underperformance 
of IPO’s 
Barberis and 
Huang 
(2004) 
Returns from IPO’s tend to be positively skewed, due 
to the often more risky nature of their businesses 
relative to longer established companies. Cumulative 
Prospect Theory agents tend to overweight the tails of 
the distributions they seek, and will be attracted to 
IPO’s, forcing up prices, which result in their eventual 
underperformance. 
*Banking 
investor 
protection and 
earnings 
management 
Shen, Chih 
(2005) 
Prospect Theory may apply as there appears to be a 
positive relationship between risk and return for high 
earning banking groups, and a negative relationship 
between risk and return for underperforming banks. 
*Explaining 
investor 
behaviour when 
firms face 
liquidation 
Kyle et 
al.(2006) 
Prospect Theory is used to explain the anomaly of 
liquidation decisions on the part of owners who are 
willing to maintain a risky project with relatively low 
risk, and liquidate it when it breaks even. On the other 
hand companies will tend to liquidate projects with a 
relatively high risk outlook if the projected profits rise 
or drop to the breakeven point.  
#Summarised from Han and Hsu, 2004 
*Those items marked are studies conducted in respect of organisations   
 
Yazdipour, Constand (2010, pp. 96-97) argue that in the area of financial distress and 
failure it is not possible to focus purely on business operations to explain the reasons, but 
also to include human, managerial and decision making issues to explain corporate failure. 
They propose that human biases could provide more powerful success / failure 
predictability for small and medium sized enterprises. Their article is particularly relevant 
to the subject, and supports the conclusions of this thesis which highlight the systematic 
bias of Boards when faced with risk:  
    “... findings from the fields of cognitive psychology and neuroscience have 
fundamentally changed the way we now look at how financial decisions are made. An 
entrepreneur may assign a low risk assessment to an otherwise high risk project and 
subsequently take on a riskier project than the potential return justifies.” (p.96).  
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The following comments from the same article are also relevant to this study: 
 “the very powerful affect heuristic has been defined as a feeling state, such as 
“goodness or badness” when one faces an investment opportunity....and can be viewed as a 
quality, such as acceptable or unacceptable, when associated with a risky business 
venture....and has been able to explain the otherwise peculiar negative relationship 
between expected risk and expected return or gain in investment situations.”(p.97) 
This thesis will show that Boards tend to underweight probabilities, and this is consistent 
with the assertions in the first quote. The final clause in the second quote indicates that the 
affect heuristic, which is essentially a mental process for arriving at an appropriate solution, 
explains why higher expected risks are associated with lower expected returns. In this 
context Boards will therefore conservatively value projects where the outcome appears 
highly certain, in line with the empirical findings of this thesis. 
2.7 Advances in Prospect Theory  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed Prospect Theory which has formed an important 
cornerstone of this research, in providing a basis for quantifying the degree of risk aversion 
and risk bias for Boards. Prospect Theory provides a descriptive model for behaviour under 
risk. Chiefly Prospect Theory proposes a probability weighting function which predicts 
individuals’ distortion to given probabilities, and a value weighting function which 
demonstrates the value people attach to losses and gains. For a given prospect it is then 
possible to predict the value attached to the gain using the weightings from the probability 
and value weighting functions.  
In subsequent developments (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992) “Cumulative” Prospect theory 
was developed in which rank-dependent decision weights were used to predict the values 
people would attach to prospects using the same probability and value weighting functions 
as before. 
Schmidt, Starmer, Sugden (2008) proposed a third-generation Prospect Theory (PT3) in 
which the reference point (i.e. the origin of zero gain or loss) is uncertain. There are other 
features built into PT3 such as reference dependence where the preferences or weights 
attached to prospects are state dependent. However in all versions of Prospect Theory gains 
and losses are defined relative to a reference point; and a value weighting function, is used 
to transform these values into indices, to which the corresponding transformed value from 
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the probability weighting function is applied to determine value. As this research was 
primarily preoccupied with the results of the value and probability weighting functions, 
subsequent advances in prospect theory do not alter the validity of the techniques used here. 
In any event this research simply uses parts of prospect theory to assess risk aversion and 
risk bias.  
van de Kuilen, Wakker, (2011) describe a parameter free method for measuring the 
weighting functions for Prospect theory and rank-dependent utility. This mid-weight 
method calculates midpoints in the weighting function scale. The method allows more than 
two non-zero outcomes (i.e. prospects of the form (P1:X1; P2:X2;P3:X3 ,where Pi is the 
probability of the i
th
 outcome with payoff  Xi), whereas the data derived in the Risk Bias 
Questionnaire (Appendix B) was of the binary form (P1:X1; P2:X2). One suggestion for 
further research might be to test Boards’ outcomes using this technique. Real life situations 
involve multiple outcomes and the results would be strengthened if a multi-outcome 
approach were used.    
In this thesis, the technique used in the analysis of the results of the Risk Bias 
questionnaire, was to choose zero as the reference point to establish the difference 
attributed to gains and losses as shown in Figure 5.5.  This choice was made in line with the 
original basis of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992). However, businesses 
may have other reference points (Koop, Johnson, 2010) such as sales targets, return on 
capital or achievement of financial budgets. In a financial regulated environment such as 
BINS for example, the objective may be a solvency based target. Thus the choice of 
reference point is important and may substantially change the results. 
Schmidt, Zank (2011) argue that the reference point ought to be determined from the data 
itself (endogenous reference point) by analyzing the point at which the behaviour of the 
respondent changes, by noting changes in the levels of sensitivity to risk. In this research, 
as shown in Figure 5.4, it is difficult to detect any point along the (smooth) curves at which 
behaviour can be said to change.  It would however be interesting to conduct a larger study 
to assess the impact of Boards decisions on a change in the reference point from say a 
breakeven point (as was assumed in this research), to the achievement of the budget. In this 
research as can be seen from the last 2 questions in the Risk Readiness Questionnaire there 
is little evidence of behavioural change around the budget point.        
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2.8 Summary Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 3 
So far this Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 3 has dealt with the large number of human 
biases which influence the way humans perceive and deal with risk. 
The biases demonstrated by Maurice Allais (1953) who won the Nobel prize for economics 
for his famous paradoxes (common ratio effect and common outcomes effect) challenged 
for the first time classic Expected Utility Theory developed by Daniel Bernoulli in the 17
th
 
Century and which had stood the test of time as a model of choice for over 2 centuries.  
This revelation sparked a flurry of experiments which supported the view that human bias 
was prevalent, and this gave rise to a large number of experiments which identified a range 
of irrational cognitive biases described in Table 2.3 above. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed Prospect Theory to provide a descriptive theory 
of choice under risk. Their experiments were based on individuals, and not groups. Many 
supporting experiments across a range of business applications confirmed the validity of 
their theory. 
The purpose of this research is to examine how Boards deal with risk. There is not much 
research into whether Prospect Theory provides a descriptive basis for how Boards and 
corporate entities deal with risk and uncertainty.  
Nwogugu (2005, p.151) highlights this issue and criticises Prospect Theory (PT) and 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) on the basis that the experiments were conducted on 
individuals, and therefore “PT/CPT do not explain group decisions ... and that decisions are 
rarely made in the contexts in which Kahneman and Tversky’s research was performed.” 
The research will therefore explore the pervasiveness of human biases postulated in 
Prospect Theory, in the way Boards deal with risk and uncertainty and attempt to establish 
whether indeed human biases are prevalent in Boards’ decision making processes. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review Part 4 
Literature review synthesis establishing links between risk assessment, 
Board decision making and risk regulation 
Much effort and energy has been devoted to the discussion around effective institutional 
logics relating to corporate governance and ERM.  
Firms suffer from an increasing level of institutional pressure (Greenwood et al., 2012) to 
apply corporate governance principles, and firms have great difficulty in making sense of 
their risk (Weick, 1995). Institutional pressure results in varied responses from different 
companies (Oliver, 1997), and organisations attempt to conform to institutional pressure in 
order to achieve legitimacy and ensure survival (Forgues et al., 2012). 
The areas of institutional pressure to be researched in this thesis relate in general to 
corporate governance obligations required of companies, and in particular the area of 
integrated risk management imposed on companies by regulators, referred to as enterprise 
risk management (ERM).  
 (Hagigi et al., 2009, p.294) “There has been a considerable body of research in the area of 
risk management. While integrated risk management has been discussed by several 
researchers, most of the empirical analysis did not use this approach. Many studies by   
academic practitioners have examined the various elements of risk; however most of them 
have emphasised the particular aspects of risk, while overlooking any interrelationship 
among these elements [ERM]. Future research should attempt to integrate the effects of 
multiple elements of risk and incorporate the behavioural aspects of risk [management]”.  
However in terms of this integrated risk management, the literature relating to ERM is 
“very rare” (McShane et al., 2011, p.642; Beasley et al., 2005). Little is known about why 
some companies adopt ERM measures, and others do not (Beasley et al., 2005, p.522). 
Various proxies have been used for the level of ERM to assess its impact on firm 
performance; a single factor used as a basis to assess the level of compliance may lead to 
spurious results. In this research many aspects of compliance have been researched such as 
level of reporting, the degree to which various risks have been identified, the role of risk in 
strategic decisions etc.  A questionnaire was therefore created to assess the many aspects of 
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regulatory compliance based on the work of Beasley et al., (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013).  This 
approach will be discussed further in the methodology section. 
The literature emphasises that a silo approach to risk management has proved ineffective, 
and that “an integrated approach to risk management will enhance efficiency and reduce 
risk … and that such analysis should incorporate the correlations among the growing 
number of exogenous elements of risk, and the often ignored behavioural effects of 
managers in decision making in the[ir] risk management strategy (Hagigi et al., 2009, 
p.293).    Further, “human behaviour is an important source of ‘intellectual failure’ within 
the ERM model which should be addressed by regulators, senior management and Boards” 
(Power, 2009, p.854). 
Arena et al. (2010, p. 673) states that there is “evidence supporting the holistic research 
approach that considers the behaviour of people and their interrelations, along with the 
technological solutions as they occur in historical events and cycles”.  
Finally, Yazdipour, Constand (2010, pp.96-97) argue that in the area of financial distress 
and failure it is not possible to focus purely on business operations to explain the reasons, 
but also to include human, managerial and decision making issues to explain corporate 
failure. They propose that human biases could provide more powerful success / failure 
predictability for small and medium sized enterprises. 
Power (2007) presents an account of ERM as a rational and easily integrative process into 
the firm. Regulatory structures on the other hand require a high degree of process design 
and implementation which impacts the entire field. ERM is couched in technical terms. 
There is a prescriptive set of processes to follow, without considering the “specificity of 
organisations” (Arena et al., p. 661). Thus businesses are left to their own devices regarding 
implementation. 
2.9 Literature review leading to the research question. 
In terms of operational and field level changes there is the possibility that firms introduce 
ERM “merely as a compliance device” without investigating the enterprise wide overhaul 
of risk management systems and incorporation into the business process (Arena et al., 2010, 
p.661). 
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As stated firms respond differently to institutional pressure, “future researchers should 
examine the effects of a broader range of organisational consequences associated with 
institutional isomorphism..” so that research into the effects of corporate governance on risk 
management appears to be a gap in the literature as advocated by Oliver (1997, p.118). 
It is therefore important to understand whether firms buy into the philosophy of ERM, or 
regard it as an unnecessary imposition which requires attention, and “to gain a fuller 
appreciation of the nature and consequences of incompatible pressures on organisations, 
and how organisations cope with tensions between ‘institutionalised rules’ and ‘efficiency 
criteria’ (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 320). 
Further research (Greenwood et al., 2011, p.332)  “should appreciate that a multiplicity of 
logics are in play in any particular [organisational] context [and the research] should be 
more explicit about the justification of which logics are incorporated into the analysis”. 
Inherent individual human biases cloud peoples’ perceptions of risk and uncertainty, and 
lead to choices which are not in line with expected utility theory. Irrational behaviour is the 
terminology used in the literature to describe these mental biases. In particular Prospect 
Theory suggests the people will tend to underweight high probabilities, overweight low 
probabilities, will be more sensitive to losses than gains, will be risk averse facing gains, 
and risk seeking facing losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992). However the literature is 
light on how Prospect Theory is likely to affect groups, or Boards in particular. 
2.10 Literature summary and synthesis 
The literature review has highlighted many aspects of risk management within companies. 
The cardinal areas of risk management seem to be:  
 The nature of  institutional logics in the form corporate governance legislation 
imposed on Boards by regulators; 
 The extent to which Boards are compliant; 
 How Boards make sense of risk within the internal and external environment; 
 How individuals are innately biased when faced with risk and how these individual 
biases translate themselves into group bias;  
 How Boards interact as a group in dealing with strategic issues, and consequently 
how Boards as a group respond to risk and uncertainty.     
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In considering the structure of the knowledge base, much of the complexity and spread of 
knowledge can be attributed to communication within the firm, and the degree of 
understanding by those who receive the information. Developing knowledge and 
understanding of the risk issues which face the company is highly complex.  
2.11 The Research Gaps 
The research gaps as stated above are therefore to understand the impact of multiple 
institutional and field based logics on the firm. In specific terms this research will focus on 
corporate governance and ERM, and the reasons why Boards construe their risks differently 
in respect of their corporate governance and ERM obligations. There seems to be no theory 
why Boards are required to conform and yet are deliberately non-compliant. The research 
will also focus on field based issues such as the nature of the company, and the composition 
of the Board and the influence of behavioural factors on how the Board construes and 
makes sense of its risk.   
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 Research Methodology  Chapter 3.
3.1 Introduction to Research Methodology Chapter  
This Chapter deals with the many and varied issues relating to the choice of methodology 
used in the pilot study as well as the main analysis.  
For ease of reference the aims and objectives of the research are summarised below, together 
with a summary of the techniques used to elicit relevant data. The reasons for these 
techniques are dealt with below. 
3.1.1 The aim of the research is:  
To examine the reasons why Boards, in spite of strict corporate governance guidelines, deal 
with the myriad risk issues facing the company, to different effect, in developing strategies 
to deal with enterprise risk management. 
3.1.2 The objectives of the research are shown below, together with a summary of 
the techniques to be used to answer the questions. 
O1:  To examine to what extent Board members of companies which apply corporate 
governance regulations are liable to human bias in risk estimation. The existing quantitative 
and qualitative interview (Appendix B questionnaires (Risk Readiness; Risk Aversion and 
Risk Bias)) will provide answers to this question. 
O2: To examine to what extent Boards which are less subject to individual human biases 
are more effective in developing strategies to deal with ERM. It will be necessary to use 
RepGrid techniques to elicit information relating to risk levels of risk readiness and a 
scorecard to assess levels of effectiveness to deal with ERM.   Levels of risk readiness will 
be compared with levels of human bias (Appendix B questionnaires (Risk Readiness; Risk 
Aversion and Risk Bias)). 
O3:  To investigate to what extent Boards that adhere to corporate governance are more 
effective in developing strategies to deal with ERM. It will be necessary to use RepGrid to 
elicit information relating to risk levels of risk readiness and a scorecard to assess levels of 
effectiveness to deal with ERM.   Levels of risk readiness will be compared with measures 
of corporate governance implementation (Appendix B Questionnaires (Risk Readiness; 
Risk Aversion and Risk Bias)). 
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O4: To examine the ways in which the estimation and personal construing of risk differs 
between highly compliant and less compliant Boards. The Appendix B questionnaires (Risk 
Readiness; Risk Aversion and Risk Bias) and the elicitation of information from the 
RepGrid interviews and a scorecard was used to gauge whether Boards would become 
more aware of their risk exposures and obligations and hence more effective in 
implementing measures to identify and mitigate risk. 
The techniques adopted and data collection methods used will now be discussed in full 
detail. 
3.2 Chosen Research Methodology Summary 
This research was mainly about the perceptions individual Board members have about risk, 
and the degree to which they were subject to individual human biases, in spite of the 
presence of an onerous regulatory framework, which ought to minimize risky choices. 
Board members are subject to a large number of influences such as the need to develop the 
business, to deal with unexpected surprises which constantly arise from the internal and 
external environment, regulation, pressure from the various stakeholders of the company 
and so on. At the same time Board members have their own personal aspirations, fears and 
cognitive biases. In order to understand fully the outcome of all these factors on their 
decisions it was necessary to draw on well-grounded methodologies which have been 
extensively employed in similar research. The first of the three main objectives was to 
understand the over-and under-estimation of risk amongst Board members. In order to 
achieve this objective, the principles of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
which deal with human behaviour under risk were applied. The second objective was to 
examine the reasons for this behaviour in individuals’ thinking and for this the principles of 
sense-making (Weick, 2001) and Personal Construct Theory (Kelly, 1955/1991) were 
utilised. The third objective of the main study was to compare the difference in views held 
by 2 distinct intact Boards, one of whom was selected on the basis of strong* regulatory 
compliance in the area of risk management, and the other on the basis of weak regulatory 
compliance. (*A strongly compliant Board can be considered to be a Board which has 
implemented a carefully structured risk management process according to the various 
guidelines laid down by the relevant legislation governing that company in all its various 
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forms, and in addition to which it actively assesses and manages its risk and deals with risk 
issues in a systematic way). 
 In short, the research proceeded in 3 main steps: 
 A description of the behaviour of the chosen respondents when faced with risk 
choices, principally using the techniques of Kahneman and Tversky (1992).  
 An examination of the ways in which managers make sense and construe this 
behaviour using the RepGrid, a Kellyan (1995/1991) constructivist technique. 
 An analysis of the feedback from the Boards after being presented with the 
results of the analysis. 
The research therefore adopted a mainly constructivist field-based approach. 
3.2.1 Epistemological and Ontological Issues 
There are innumerable reasons and causes for the particular risk profile of an organization, 
such as market risk, natural disasters, financial risk and so on. In interpreting and making 
sense of their risk environment, Board members attempt to synthesize a vast number of 
continually changing internal and external factors. In this research there was an attempt to 
understand why Boards behaved as they did when trying to make sense of their risk issues. 
In attempting to choose a research paradigm, the following main factors were relevant to 
this research.  
The research orientation 
In making a decision as to the most appropriate research orientation to pursue (hypothesis 
or exploratory, single or multiple cases), and to decide where on the research orientation 
matrix this research lies, the following issues were relevant: 
This research was exploratory, and required a close understanding through interviews and 
questionnaires of the processes at work when Boards make decisions on risk issues. The 
study encompassed several Boards, resulting in a multiple-sample approach. The 
Researcher recognized that it was difficult to arrive at blanket theories about enterprise risk 
which encompass all types of business, in all circumstances, so that an indicative approach 
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made sense to the current research, and possibly provided an insight into how risks are dealt 
with in the wider corporate population. The plan was to engage in conversation with 
members of Boards and get to understand their innermost thoughts and views of risk, how 
they dealt with it and why. The orientation was therefore towards an ethnographic approach 
in which the researcher became embedded in the thoughts and mental processes of the 
Board around risk matters. A pilot exploratory study was conducted to test the proposed 
methodology; Quadrant C defined the research orientation as shown in Figure 3.1 below: 
Figure 3.1 Research orientation matrix  
 
Figure 3.1 Modified from Introduction to Business Research, Volume 1, Heriott Watt 
University, Roberts et al., 2005. 
In the main study it was proposed to conduct a comparison between 3 intact Boards, and 
examine why and how they construed their risks differently. This led to the testing of 
various hypotheses, so that the research orientation shifted towards the middle ground 
between A and C.  
The following discussion considers the relative benefits of the 2 main alternative research 
paradigms.  
 The positivist paradigm 
A         
Multiple case 
hypothesis 
based 
C         
Multiple case 
exploratory 
study  
B              
Single case 
hypothesis 
based  
D             
Single case 
exploratory 
study 
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Positivism pre-supposes that there are independent causes leading to observed effects. 
While this research is concerned with establishing causal links between certain variables, 
such as whether the degree of regulatory compliance adopted by a company influences its 
effectiveness in managing risk, there was greater focus in this research with why this 
happens, and not so much with the degree to which this relationship exists.  There was an 
attempt therefore to make sense of a highly complex business environment, managed by 
complex individuals, all of whom have differing perceptions of the perceived realities in 
which their businesses operate, and all of whom are subject to a large number of cognitive 
biases. A positivist approach was deemed less conducive to dealing with this complex 
changing environment with unstable variables and disequilibrium. When considering how a 
Board may behave, or operate collectively to make decisions regarding risk, it is difficult to 
attempt to explain such behaviour in such a complex situation- in terms of a convenient set 
of variables in a causal relationship that is simple enough to be inspected and tested- 
bearing in mind that the relationship may be moderated by different factors in different 
companies, different industries, and over different time periods and changing economic 
conditions. 
The constructivist paradigm 
By contrast, the epistemology of constructivism is grounded in pedagogy.  Constructivism 
is a model of learning, the process by which knowledge is represented and gained. People 
are sensitive to external stimuli, recognized or unrecognized (Richardson, 2003).They 
internalise their experience, and begin to recognize these stimuli, learn from, them and use 
them to deal with new situations. This on-going iterative process is the way humans may 
learn to solve problems. Past experiences provide mental techniques for dealing with new 
perceived problems, and for making sense of the environment (Weick 1995, 2001). 
Constructivism as a research model is more concerned with why certain observed causal 
links might exist. It relies on a much deeper and richer understanding of the forces 
underlying observable causal connections, and provides a framework for delving into how 
decisions are made, and why they are made. This research sought to understand how Boards 
construed their risk obligations, and why they adopted the processes they did, in developing 
strategies to deal with these uncertainties.    In trying to make sense of this extremely 
complicated and rapidly changing environment it would be wonderful to be able to identify 
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a series of universally applicable causal links which would provide a realisable means of 
predicting how and why Boards might behave in certain circumstances – a sort of utopian 
quantum physics notion of a Grand Universal Theory of business risk, which combines all 
the laws of risk (in this thesis) in the business universe. Unfortunately in business there are 
so many variables, all changing rapidly, and overlain with the unpredictable and changing 
decisions and human biases of management that at best it may only be possible to 
understand why certain decisions regarding risk situations have been taken in a more 
closely defined set of circumstances; it may never be possible to predict, based on past 
experience, how and why risky decisions are made in all circumstances, taking into account 
all the relevant variables.  
The constructivist model for understanding and seeking answers to behavioural patterns can 
be used to understand what happens in a small set of circumstances. One can investigate, in 
this thesis for example, how a risk averse* Board may behave differently from a risk 
tolerant Board; and can seek to understand how and why it happens in these set of 
circumstances, and that may provide an understanding that may be applicable, and can be 
subsequently tested for, on a wider scale. In this way the knowledge base of risk is 
enhanced. 
*In this context a risk averse Board will be inclined towards a prudential approach in 
assessing risk, will be highly systematic in the analysis of such risks, and will adopt a 
cautious approach to a solution involving a risky choice. In particular a risk averse Board 
will choose the option with a high probability of a low gain as opposed to a low probability 
option with a high potential gain; and vice versa for a risk tolerant or risk seeking Board.   
In this research certain causal links were identified, and there was some evidence that they 
may exist, and these links were tested as part of the validity exercise. Quantitative and 
qualitative techniques were used to elicit information and to evaluate, analyse and cross-
link the various results of this research in identifying relationships and patterns within the 
current circumstances and sample base. While this research produced indicative results 
based on the selected sample, they may have provided some insight into how and why these 
relationships may apply in other similar, or even different, circumstances. 
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The issue of the degree of risk tolerance / aversion, and the extent of cognitive bias at a 
group level are variables that were quantitatively assessed, and these variables formed an 
important basis for understanding Board behaviour. 
Summary of the differences between positivism and constructivism 
A summary of the salient differences, taken from Table 3.1, Jankowicz, 2006, is shown 
below in Table 3.1. 
 
A question of issues versus variables 
The first comparison in Table 3.1 highlights the distinction between constructivism and 
positivism in terms of the way phenomena (in our case phenomena relating to enterprise 
risk) are construed by Boards.  When faced with risk choices, in seeking to make sense of 
their internal and external environment, Boards will ask questions relating to the issues 
around risk, how it arose, its implications and ramifications, and how to go about 
minimizing or removing its impact, taking all the necessary factors into account. There will 
be no direct immutable link between variables contributing to risk which can be applied to 
its mitigation in a mechanical sense. Boyle’s Law, which links pressure, temperature and 
volume of a gas, describes one of the most elegant examples of scientific phenomena which 
can be linked directly. For any given change in one of the variables (temperature for 
example) of a gas will result in precise and predictable change in the other 2 phenomena, 
pressure and volume. And, more surprisingly, the law applies perfectly to all gasses. As 
discussed above, no such law relating to enterprise risk is possible, as there are too many 
variables, both internal and external, faced in the corporate environment. Furthermore, 
Table 3.1 The basic assumptions of positivism and phenomenology 
(constructivism) (based on  Table 3.1 Jankowicz, 2006)  
Positivism Phenomenology (constructivism) 
Phenomena can be analysed in terms of 
variables 
Phenomena can be summarised in terms of issues 
Data can be collected by a dispassionate 
outside observer 
Data are collected by participants and by outside 
observers, all of whom have varying degrees of 
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involvement and detachment 
Given evidence, we are always capable of 
distinguishing what is true from what is 
untrue, and are therefore enabled to agree 
on the real reasons for things if we wish to 
do so 
Truth can’t be determined in any absolute way; we 
are capable of using evidence to work towards a 
consensus, but must sometimes agree to differ, 
and sometimes conclude that the truth is 
undecidable 
To develop theories that validly explain 
phenomena 
The purpose of enquiry is to gain sufficient 
understanding to predict future outcomes 
Once such theories have been developed 
sufficiently, we should seek to apply them 
for productive purposes   
There is no need to apply theories; understanding 
and prediction are already theory-in-action, being 
theories-from-action  
 
there is unlikely to be unanimity within and across Boards, as to which variables constitute 
risk to the company, and the degree of risk which each variable poses.  
There is a further issue, which can best be highlighted by asking the following question: If 
Board members themselves are not in search of a law relating to risk, should we try and do 
so?  The sheer number of internal and external variables, their changing influences within 
and across companies and the difficulties of assessing their probabilities and impact, and 
finally trying to identify the degree of dependency of each risk on every other risk renders 
this task impossible.   
In business, there is only at best limited control over certain variables, gleaned from 
experience. Boards will ask “What are the issues relating to the risks we face?”; and “what 
is our best strategy to deal with them?”. This research therefore focused mostly on issues, 
and variables when possible to identify them, but mainly the study was about issues.  
Consideration of the 4 main research methods (Summarised from Jankowicz, 2006) 
The main research methods can be split into 4 main areas: 
Interpretivist method: in which ethnography via directed questions, questionnaires and 
biographical techniques are used to make explicit judgments about the data to discover 
whether past issues and events can be used as predictors. 
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Survey method: in which a standard set of questions is completed by a relatively large 
group of people which represent some larger population, in order to explore issues largely 
in the present. 
Experimental method: in which, by way of experiment, there is a focus on variables rather 
than issues.   
Case study method as our preferred method: Yin (1984, p.23) defines the case study 
research method: “as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used”.  
In this thesis the case study method proved to provide a powerful means to understand how 
Boards dealt with risk and uncertainty, and provided a basis for a detailed analysis of the 
complex issues they needed to grapple with in order to arrive at risk management strategies; 
thereby providing a basis to make sense of some of the complex linkages and relationships 
between certain risk phenomena.   
It is possible to criticize the case study method for producing spurious results based on 
small sample sizes and researcher reactance. In this study in order to improve validity and 
generality several companies were researched and 4 different techniques were used to elicit 
data. It is worth dwelling for a short while on the reason for choosing several companies as 
part of this case study. Clearly in making the choice of suitable Boards there was no 
possibility that they would, between them, display all the characteristics of the risk 
universe.  The quest was to identify whether there was a difference in the way a small 
number of Boards dealt with their risk. If it were possible to establish how and why, for a 
small group of Boards, the reasons for their different approaches to risk, then it may be 
possible to suggest certain causal relationships which may be tested as part of another 
study. In short, by replicating the study across multiple samples, it was possible to 
strengthen the conviction that such causal relationships exist, thereby improving validity of 
the conclusions which were drawn (Dooley L.M., 2002; Tellis, T., 1997; Yin R.K., 1981). 
Reports on case studies from many disciplines are widely available in the literature, see 
Appendix E 2 below.  
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The quantitative-qualitative issue in this research 
As stated earlier, this research was grounded in the exploratory multiple case study 
quadrant of the research orientation continuum as shown in Figure 3.1 above. In terms of 
the quantitative-qualitative divide, the research utilized both elements to gather data. While 
this research is phenomenological, both quantitative and qualitative analyses were used in 
this research. The quantitative data will be used where possible to provide strong statistical 
support to the qualitative observations. This will be particularly useful where we are trying 
to measure the level of risk readiness, and where we are interested in the extent of 
cognitive bias of the companies engaged.   
The RepGrid technique is way of describing the meaning a person has for a topic as 
represented by a set of elements. Constructs that describe the qualities being used 
(qualitative) and the ratings that position the elements on those constructs (quantitative) are 
elicited from individual members (of the Board in this study). From this data it was 
possible to understand and measure how Boards responded, as they did, to risk, and why. 
The data from RepGrid was used to understand reasons behind any observed causal links. 
3.2.2 Research Design, and selection of companies to be analysed   
This Section relates to the choice of company, the choice of data, and why the data chosen 
was relevant to this research. 
The research level was initially exploratory with a method based around an inductive, 
comparative, multiple case study design structured in order to identify indicative causal 
links. Verbal questions were directed at Board members concerning the risk readiness of 
their companies, their attitudes to risk and how they construed risk. In addition interviewees 
were required to complete a written qualitative and quantitative questionnaire designed to 
provide data on their risk readiness and the extent of their propensity to assume risk (See 
Appendix B questionnaires Sections 1, 2, 3).  Explicit judgments were made about the data 
based on the themes of the 2010 report (Beasley et al., 2010), and a semi-ethnographic 
approach was used to elicit information from members of the Board.  
Specifically, the design hinged on a comparison between the differences in views held by 3 
distinct Boards, 2 of which were selected on the basis of stronger regulatory compliance in 
the area of risk management, and the other on the basis of weaker regulatory compliance. 
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While the choice of the above “polar” comparison between highly and weakly compliant 
firms seemed obvious at that stage, other interesting polarities designed to test the effect of 
other variables or to test the influence of other factors by means of systematic comparisons 
– referred to as “replication”- were expected to arise during the course of the research and 
highlight other important aspects of the research (Yin 2009).  
Each of the companies selected agreed to make their executive team available, plus a 
number of their non-executive directors. Where possible, members of the top management 
team were selected. The assessment of the level of compliance was based on the Risk 
Readiness questionnaire (Appendix B). This meant that it was not possible to assess the 
level of compliance a priori. 
Details of the 3 companies chosen are as follows: 
 BINS, an insurance company subject to the regulations laid down in the South 
African Short Term Insurance Act, and regulated by the Financial Services 
Board 
 QD, an electronics manufacturer 
 VGOLD, a gold mining company 
Further detailed information on each company is shown in Table 3.2 below: 
Table 3.2 Salient information in respect of each company  
Features BINS QD VGOLD 
 
Nature of 
business 
Short term insurance 
company 
Designer and 
manufacturer of 
specialised electronic 
cash handling systems 
Gold mining company 
Main 
regulatory 
framework  
In addition to King III, the 
specific legislation 
imposed on insurance 
companies are the 
Insurance Laws 
Amendment Act (ILAA), 
the FAIS General Code of 
QD is subject to the 
requirements of King 
III, which is a generic 
set of corporate 
governance and ERM  
requirements, imposed 
on all South African 
The current South African mining 
legislation promulgated under the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 2004 which 
governs VGOLD’s operations 
(“MPRDA”) seeks, among other 
things: 
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Conduct, SAM/Solvency 
II, the Consumer Protection 
Act and various conflict of 
interest issues. 
companies. 
Specifically QD is 
subject to controls 
imposed by the South 
African Reserve Bank 
relating to the 
management and 
defacing of cash notes 
which are transported 
in the products 
manufactured by QD.  
(i) to expand opportunities for 
historically disadvantaged South 
Africans (“HDSA’s”) to enter the 
mineral industry and obtain 
benefits from the exploitation of 
mineral resources; and (ii) to 
promote employment, social and 
economic welfare as well as 
ecologically sustainable 
development. VGOLD is subject 
to extensive legislation relating to 
health and safety  issues, and the 
refining and sale of gold. VGOLD 
is also subject to Australian Stock 
Exchange listing requirements, 
and Australian legislation on the 
reporting of mining and 
geological operations specifically 
relating to the nature and extent of 
the mineral resources under the 
control of the company. 
 
Ownership Private Private Listed  
CEO position Founder and controlling 
shareholder 
Major shareholder, not 
controlling 
Founder and large shareholder, 
not controlling 
Board 
composition 
White males White males, 1 Indian 
female  
White males 
Turnover p.a. R750,000,000  R100,000,000 R2,000,000,000 
No of staff 500 150 350 
Subsidiaries 1 Australian company and  
several South African 
subsidiaries 
Holding company and 1 
operating company 
Main company listing in 
Australia, several subsidiaries in 
South Africa with each different 
mining concessions 
Growth status 
based on 
annual 
increases in 
turnover over 
previous 2 
>20% annual growth Annual growth <0% >20% annual growth  
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years 
Level of 
gearing 
Low High Medium 
Major 
challenges 
faced by 
company 
Curbing losses in 
Australian subsidiary; 
launching of new products 
Liquidity stress; loss of 
market share due to 
regressive R and D 
program; lack of clear 
strategic direction 
Fresh capital requirements, 
exacerbated by loss of confidence 
by investors in SA mining 
companies; political uncertainty 
relating to clarity over mining 
rights; access to mining skills  
Criteria to 
achieve optimal 
financial 
stability 
Achieve profitability in 
Australian subsidiary; 
further growth as new 
products come on stream 
Clear marketing and 
sales strategy 
Stable gold price above USD900 
and access to further capital 
Directors and 
senior 
managers 
11 9 5 
 
The names have been abbreviated to provide anonymity. 
During the course of the interviews, other causal links were sought, such as those identified 
below in Table 3.3 between a Strongly Compliant Board* and a Weakly Compliant Board 
(*defined earlier).  
Table 3.3 Examples of the types of relationships which will be investigated during the 
course of this research 
Strongly Compliant  Weakly Compliant 
Boards demonstrating a high level of regulatory 
compliance 
Boards demonstrating a low level of  regulatory 
compliance 
Boards demonstrating a low degree of mental bias 
with respect to risky projects 
Boards demonstrating  a high degree of mental bias 
with respect to risky projects 
Boards exhibiting a wide range of experience or 
awareness of risk issues 
Boards exhibiting a narrow range of experience or 
awareness of risk issues 
Boards which have recently suffered from strategic 
errors in terms of risk assessment 
Boards which have not suffered from strategic 
errors in terms of risk assessment 
Boards which have a high risk exposure in terms of 
structure (operational or financial gearing) or 
Boards which have a low risk exposure in terms of 
structure (operational or financial gearing) or 
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industry industry 
3.3 Rationale for the use of the inductive comparative case study method 
As discussed in 3.2 and shown in Table 3.3 above, there were  a number of possible 
relationships between variables which were expected to emerge as being worthy of detailed 
investigation into why Boards responded as they did to risk. Some of these links were 
embodied in the research objectives, and there were other possible causal links such as: 
 between corporate governance implementation and cognitive bias with respect to 
assessing corporate risk. 
 between the degree of cognitive bias and the ability to develop effective ERM 
strategies.   
 between the degree of compliance and the quality of risk management systems. 
 how did risk management differ between highly compliant and less compliant 
Boards. 
 between industry type and compliance; companies were selected across different 
industries/sectors. 
 whether there was a link between the diversity of cognitive bias within the Board, 
and its level of risk compliance. 
An inductive approach seemed most appropriate as there was the opportunity to gauge 
responses to the researcher’s interaction with Board members, and draw inferences from 
these empirical observations.  
In choosing the most appropriate case study method, the following issues were considered. 
A comparative case study seemed the most appropriate method to use as there were 3 
companies results with which to make comparisons. A number of interesting links were 
expected to emerge, from which comparisons could be drawn. The alternative experimental 
approach was problematic as it was not easy to isolate any one variable, say a particular 
aspect of the risk environment, and change it, to gauge the impact of the change on other 
dependent variables. However, in the validation phase an attempt was made to highlight the 
possible irrational responses to the Risk Bias Questionnaire (to the extent that they existed) 
and assess to what extent bringing this to respondents’ attention was likely to influence 
their subsequent responses. The extent to which the awareness of irrational choice under 
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risk could be mitigated by external intervention was identified as an area of consideration. 
Other experimental assessments were considered, based on the outcome of the results. 
Finally, the use of a descriptive method seemed the least appropriate as there were multiple 
cases to investigate, using questionnaires and interviews to elicit rich and highly company 
specific data. This seemed inconsistent with the single case study, an unstratified type of 
market survey or an explanatory account associated with the descriptive method.  
Therefore the method chosen was an inductive, comparative multiple case study. 
3.4 Description of the data to be elicited 
Having determined the overall aims and objectives and research methodology which will be 
used, it is now necessary to consider in detail what data was to be collected in order to carry 
out the empirical analyses. From Section 2.10 and 2.11, the literature gaps appear to be: 
 The nature of  institutional logics in the form corporate governance legislation 
imposed on Boards by regulators; 
 The extent to which Boards are compliant; 
 How Boards make sense of risk within the internal and external environment; 
 How individuals are innately biased when faced with risk and how these individual 
biases translate themselves into group bias;  
 How Boards interact as a group in dealing with strategic issues, and consequently 
how Boards as a group respond to risk and uncertainty.     
 
The nature of the data required is summarised in Table 3.4 below: 
Table 3.4 Nature of data required to address gaps in the literature 
Literature gap Data required 
Nature of institutional logics in form of 
corporate governance legislation imposed on 
Boards by regulators 
Details of the Corporate Governance Laws 
in South Africa (King III)  and other 
regulatory frameworks governing the legal 
operation of the company  
The extent to which South African Boards 
are compliant 
Data relating to the extent of compliance of 
companies across the regulatory spectrum 
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How Boards make sense of risk within the 
internal and external environment 
Data relating to how Boards make sense of 
their risk  
How individuals are innately biased when 
faced with risk and how these individual 
biases translate themselves into group bias 
Existing research results on cognitive biases 
at an individual level 
How Boards interact as a group in dealing 
with strategic issues 
Eliciting data from Boards on how they 
construe their risk issues  
How Boards as a group respond to risk and 
uncertainty 
Eliciting group data from intact Boards on 
how they deal with risk and uncertainty 
 
3.5 Detailed description of the proposed techniques to be used 
Several techniques in the form of questionnaires and interviews were employed in this 
research to gather data and knowledge. The techniques used are summarized in Table 3.5 
below. 
3.6 Questionnaires and interviews 
There are 3 questionnaires used in the main study, plus a RepGrid interview, the source and 
details of which are described below:  
 Risk Readiness Questionnaire (Appendix B). This is based on Beasley et al. (2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013) and is designed to measure the level of risk readiness of the 
Board. The Beasley et al. questionnaires were used in this research as a basis for the 
risk readiness study due to the widespread usage and publication of these results in 
the USA, and the endorsement by the Enterprise Risk Management Initiative (The 
ERM Initiative) in the College of Management at North Carolina State University, 
in conjunction with the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA). This endorsement provided twofold validity relating to the specific 
questions and reliability of the results, due to the annual nature of the survey across 
a large number of USA companies. Because of the general non-USA specific nature 
of the questions, it was felt that they could provide a valid assessment of the level of 
risk readiness for South African companies. See Appendix A for a summary of the 
2010 results. 
 Risk Aversion Questionnaire (Appendix B). There is considerable literature on the 
extent of cognitive bias as discussed in Chapter 2 Part 3. Kahneman and Tversky 
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(1979) conducted in-depth research into the extent of human cognitive bias when 
faced with risk. This valuable work provides the basis for understanding human 
biases, and also for providing a methodology to assess the extent of such risk 
aversion. The literature urges researchers to develop holistic views of institutional 
theory, to include aspects of behavioural theory. Much of this thesis focuses on 
behavioural issues, particular cognitive biases associated with strategic decisions 
and attitudes to risk and uncertainty. “Fewer than one out of 8 of articles published 
in leading scientific management journals is about actual Board behaviour” (Huse, 
2005, p. S66).  It was considered prudent to use the existing methodologies which 
have been used extensively in many experiments and research on individuals to 
assess the degree of cognitive bias of Boards which can be considered as a form of 
cognitive entity. The work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) was therefore used in 
the construction of a questionnaire designed to assess the level of risk aversion/risk 
tolerance of individual Board members.  
 Risk Bias Questionnaire (Appendix B). Yazdipour, Constand (2010, pp. 96-97) 
argue that in the area of financial distress and failure it is not possible to focus 
purely on business operations to explain the reasons, but also to include human, 
managerial and decision making issues to explain corporate failure. They propose 
that human biases could provide more powerful success/failure predictability for 
small and medium sized enterprises. Their article is particularly relevant to this 
thesis in terms of the systematic bias of Boards when faced with risk:  
    “... findings from the fields of cognitive psychology and neuroscience have 
fundamentally changed the way we now look at how financial decisions are made. An 
entrepreneur may assign a low risk assessment to an otherwise high risk project and 
subsequently take on a riskier project than the potential return justifies.” (p.96).  
The following comments from the same article are also relevant to this study: 
 “the very powerful affect heuristic has been defined as a feeling state, such as 
“goodness or badness” when one faces an investment opportunity....and can be viewed as a 
quality, such as acceptable or unacceptable, when associated with a risky business 
venture....and has been able to explain the otherwise peculiar negative relationship 
between expected risk and expected return or gain in investment situations.”(p.97) 
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 This Questionnaire was based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and was designed to 
 assess the degree of mental bias prevalent amongst Board members when faced with 
 risky options. The results of the questionnaire were analysed in accordance with the  
 detailed methodology set out in Appendix D of the Pilot Study. (The Risk Bias 
 Questionnaire was not included in the original pilot study.) 
 In order to gather information to answer the 2 final questions set out in Table 3.4 
above, viz., how Boards interact as a group in dealing with strategic issues and how 
Boards as a group respond to risk and uncertainty it is necessary to identify a 
powerful interviewing technique to elicit answers to these questions. The RepGrid 
technique was used for this part of the research, and is discussed in considerable 
detail in 3.7 below. 
The summary of data capturing techniques is set out in Table 3.5 below.  
Table 3.5 Summary of the techniques used in the data and knowledge generation 
phase 
Technique Data / knowledge 
gained 
Process modeled on Comment 
Risk Readiness 
Questionnaire 
State of readiness of the 
Board in terms of risk 
oversight obligations  
Beasley et al., 2010; King III These questions were drawn from 
the Beasley et al. survey, and 
from the King III regulations on 
risk oversight. 
Risk Aversion 
Questionnaire 
Presence of cognitive bias 
amongst Board members 
when faced with risky 
choice 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 The questionnaire is based on the 
questions used by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) 
Risk Bias 
Questionnaire 
Extent of bias amongst 
Board members when faced 
with risky choice – does 
Prospect Theory  apply to 
Board members 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 Questions are based on questions 
used by Kahneman and Tversky 
1979 to gauge the  extent of 
cognitive bias under risk 
Initial RepGrid 
interview with 
individual Board 
members 
How do individual Board 
members construe their risk 
Jankowicz(1990,2004); 
Wright R.P. 
(2006,2008);Alexander et al., 
2011) 
Interviews will be conducted with 
members of intact Boards using 
elicited constructs  
Content Analysis How do Boards as an intact 
entity construe their risk 
obligations  
Jankowicz(2004); Wright R.P 
2006 
The repertory grids will be 
merged to provide an overall view 
of how the Board construes risk – 
this will be discussed with the 
Board and their responses 
recorded. 
The original pilot study questionnaires which were set out in Appendix C were modified 
and expanded, principally in order to obtain additional information which appeared 
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deficient from the pilot study. More detail on these changes is discussed in the pilot study 
(Chapter 4). 
3.7 Repertory Grid Techniques (RepGrid) 
Introduction 
3.7.1 Assessing “Sensemaking” - Construct Theory and Repertory Grid Analysis 
From the discussion in the literature review, it is possible to infer that Boards, comprising 
unique individuals, engage in a process of “sensemaking” in interpreting the risk 
environment. If there is an understanding of how individuals, and hence Boards, construe 
risk, one should be better placed to understand how Boards make sense of their risk 
environment, and the gap which exists between risk regulation and implementation.  
Essentially, in order to investigate efficiently the way in which Board sensemaking works, 
and what sorts of outcomes are achievable, it is  necessary to use appropriate techniques 
that describe the content of individual constructions; and to do so explicitly enough so that 
they can be examined, and the similarities and differences between individuals’ 
sensemaking identified and related to their role and stakeholder background; and 
particularly in the context of intact Boards,  to use techniques that can allow examination of 
these constructions so that the process of negotiation over meaning can be identified. 
It is therefore intended to use repertory grid techniques to measure Boards’ sensemaking of 
their risk management responsibilities. 
In order to develop such a systematic basis to analyse human cognition – and in this case 
how Boards understand risk and its ramifications- Kelly (1955/1991) developed personal 
construct theory (PCT), an explicit theory of human understanding. To elicit understanding 
(or “sensemaking”) Kelly (1955/1991) developed Repertory Grid Analysis (RepGrid), a 
technique for measuring intended meaning. Individuals creatively formulate hypotheses or 
constructs to explain the apparent regularities of their lives and the environment in which 
they reside. The theory Kelly (1955/1991) developed for describing how people construe 
meanings provides a convenient technique for assessing the sensemaking in which a Board 
engages. 
According to Kelly (1955/1991) meaning is conveyed in the form of contrasts, referred to 
as an individual’s personal constructs. Constructs are therefore the building blocks of 
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meaning, and different people may have different ways of construing the same thing. A 
repertory grid is a set of rating scales which uses the individual’s own personal constructs 
about an issue, topic or subject and uses ratings to express the strength or conviction of 
personal meanings. 
A repertory grid interview (RepGrid) is thus a formal way of extracting or eliciting 
information from an individual in a structured measurable manner, without interviewer 
influence or bias (Jankowicz, 2004).  
The RepGrid technique has been widely used in the psychological sciences, management 
sciences, industry and business practice, including the nature of managerial cognition, 
strategic planning and processes where a deep understanding is required of the processes 
underlying a chosen topic (Jankowicz 1990, 2004; Jankowicz and Wright, 2007; Jankowicz 
and Hisrich, 1987, 1990; Stewart and Stewart , 1982; Alexander et al., 2010). 
The RepGrid technique therefore provides a powerful mapping tool (Jankowicz, 2004; 
Wright R.P., 2004) used to explore the depths of cognitive understanding and reasoning, 
particularly in terms of how people make sense of their internal and external environment. 
RepGrid  (Weick, 2001; Kelly, 1955/1991) was used in the account which follows to elicit 
how intact Boards construed elements of their regulatory obligations with respect to risk 
management. RepGrid techniques have been widely reported in the literature as providing a 
“powerful, rigorous and systematic interviewing approach” (Wright R.P., 2004 p.63, 
Alexander et al., 2011) of eliciting how cognitive behaviour might influence how Boards 
engage in strategic decision making in terms of ERM  (Jankowicz 1990; Wright R.P., 2004, 
2006, 2008; Wright and Jankowicz, 2007). 
In particular Repertory Grid Technique has been used to assess the way Boards function 
(Wright, 2006); further, the following table 3.6, taken directly from Wright R.P.(2008, p. 
756) demonstrates the past noteworthy works using RepGrid technique in strategy research, 
and provides important validity to the choice of elements used in the main study. 
Table 3.6 Summary of past noteworthy works using RepGrid techniques in strategy 
research 
Authors Grid Elements Supplied or Element 
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elicited 
elements 
characteristic 
Daniels,de Chernatony and Johnson (1995); 
Daniels, Johnson and de Chernatony 
(1994); Hodgkinson (1997a);Reger and 
Palmer (1996);Walton 1986)  
Companies as 
competitors 
Elicited Homogeneous 
Daniels, Johnson and de Chernatony 
(2002;Ketchen and Palmer (1999);Reger 
(1990);Reger and Huff (1993);Spencer, 
Peyrefitte and Churchman (2003)  
Companies as 
competitors 
Supplied Homogeneous 
Dutton, Walton and Abrahamson 
(1989);Simpson and Wilson (1999); 
Strategic issues 
facing 
organisations  
Elicited Homogeneous 
Dunn and Ginsberg (1986) Organizational 
innovations 
Supplied Homogeneous 
Dunn,Cahill,Dukes and Ginsberg (1986) Policy functions Supplied  Homogeneous 
Ginsberg (1989) Strategic business 
units 
Supplied Homogeneous 
O’Higgins (2002) Non-executive 
directors 
Elicited Homogeneous 
De Leon and Guild (2003) Business plans Elicited Homogeneous 
Bourne and Jenkins (2005) Mixture of work 
and non-work 
elements 
Elicited Homogeneous 
Wright, Butler and Priem (2003);Wright 
(2004) 
Strategy making 
process 
Supplied Heterogeneous 
Wright (2006) Critical activities 
Boards do 
Supplied Heterogeneous 
Jankowicz, 1990 Business Practice Review n/a 
Jankowicz,Wright,2006  Assessing strategic 
competence at 
Board level 
Elicited Homogeneous 
Table taken from Wright R.P. (2008, p.756) 
 
Using RepGrid techniques, Wright (2004) carried out a study of 34 executives and 
members of top management teams of 28 high and low performing companies, to elicit the 
strategic cognitions utilised in making sense of their strategy making experiences. “By 
comparing how executives in successful firms think, interpret and make sense of their 
strategic experiences relative to executives in low performing firms, top managers in 
organisations can learn to think and craft winning strategies for sustained competitive 
advantage.” (Wright R.P., 2004, p.76). The conclusions Wright (2004) drew from this 
particular paper was when comparing executives from low and high performing firms was 
the difference in language and “core perceptual dimensions when describing what 
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constitutes successful strategy making”(Wright R.P., 2004, p. 61). This study is particularly 
relevant to this thesis for the following reasons: 
 it uses RepGrids to elicit information because it is “known to be a powerful, 
rigorous and systematic interviewing approach to discover how people make sense 
of their worlds” (Wright 2004, p.63), and therefore supports the use of RepGrids in 
this thesis;  
 it studies strategy making of several Boards, and tries to establish how successful 
Boards (measured by their ROE), may think differently in respect of strategic 
thinking, from their less successful counterparts; 
 it facilitates the selection of appropriate elements (see Glossary) for the elicitation 
process in order to understand how Board members (and intact Boards)  make sense 
of the risks facing their firms; 
 it is a useful technique to aggregate the information from several members of the 
same Board, and hence will provide useful information of how successful intact 
Boards will construe their risk differently from less successful Boards; 
 It demonstrates that in a single interview, it is possible to obtain accurate and rich 
data.    
While the RepGrid is widely used in the social sciences, there are nevertheless some 
criticisms of the technique (Karapanos, Martens, 2008, pp. 3-5) relating to, for example, the 
following factors: 
 Are idiosyncratic tools a basis for objective research in a homogeneous group 
context?  
 Manipulating group RepGrid data and using it as an indication of group behaviour 
may not be in line with the original philosophy underlying RepGrid techniques, 
which was to account for diversity of individual thought. 
 Do individuals actually think in the form of bi-polar constructs, especially in the 
context of commercial issues, and in the case of this thesis, about risk issues? 
 Are rating scales representative measures of conviction?  
Further information on RepGrid analysis, and the results obtained from pilot and main 
study interviews are set out in later Chapters. 
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Further analysis of the research paradigms together with the epistemological and 
ontological assumptions will be dealt with in the Methodology section. 
It is the intention to use RepGrids in eliciting information from Board members of 
companies during a pilot study, and to use this information drawn from several different 
members within Boards (intact Boards), as well as from members across different Boards. 
For intact Boards it is intended to compare, contrast and combine the grids of the respective 
Board respondents, and to categorise these pooled constructs according to the meanings and 
sentiments they convey about risk (Jankowicz, 2004). In so doing it will be possible to 
draw comparisons between how Boards differ in their attitude and response to risk. It was 
the intention to identify 3 Boards, 2 of which appeared to be well managed and compliant 
in terms of risk, and 1 of which was less so. By comparing the behaviour of the better 
managed companies in terms of risk against the less well managed, it was possible to derive 
conclusions about how Boards could better manage their risks. 
In closing this sub-section it is worth mentioning cognitive and cause mapping is a further 
well recognised technique for analysing organisational sensemaking (Weick, 1995). This 
has led to the use of causal analysis in the development of strategic planning (Eden et al., 
1979, 1983). 
Importantly and relevant to this research, Hodgkinson et al.,(1999) used cause maps in a 
field experiment to assess whether the trained use of cause maps amongst senior executives 
could be used to successfully eliminate cognitive biases, such as the framing effect (which 
arises when minor changes are introduced in the way problems are presented without 
changing the essence of the problem); this investigation concluded that systematic cause 
mapping could reduce the extent of framing bias in strategic decisions involving risk and 
uncertainty. 
Having considered both options carefully, the use of RepGrids seems to offer a more time 
efficient means of eliciting information and for providing a quantitative basis for comparing 
the way different Boards construe risk.     
The background to the use of RepGrids has been discussed in the literature review chapter. 
The methodology has been further discussed in the pilot study, Section 4.8. 
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A set of 9 elements of risk were obtained from interviews. A further element was 
introduced to assess views around the issue of Board remoteness from reality, and the 11
th
 
element was obtained through the results of Wright (2006). As already discussed, elements 
should provide a reasonable coverage of most aspects of whatever is being investigated, 
covering the four corners of the subject matter. In this research a comprehensive set of risk 
elements which affect companies in general was chosen. The chosen elements also needed 
to be discrete so that a wider range of construction could be elicited from respondents 
(Wright R.P., 2006, p. 309). 
Grid protocol states that the choice of elements should be based on the topic of research and 
should be homogeneous, representative and discrete or distinct. Recently, Wright (2008), 
see Table 3.6 above, experimented with the use of heterogeneous elements. He found that 
the issues to be analysed in strategic analyses in a corporate environment were more 
conducive to the use of heterogeneous elements such as critical resources, SWOT analyses, 
company rules and regulations, strategy implementation, appraisal of CEO and senior 
management, stakeholder issues, plans and budgets and long term missions and objectives.     
Further, Wright R.P. (2006, p.70) also introduced an element which he found elicited 
deeper understanding of the cognitive processes of senior executives. This element he 
labeled E6 “Carrying out the strategic process the way you prefer”. A modified form of this 
extra element will be added to the set of elements defined in the pilot study. This modified 
element will be “Carrying out the risk management process the way you prefer”. The 
purpose of adding this extra element was to understand how individual Board members 
positioned themselves with respect to the current risk strategy being applied.  
In order to mask the heterogeneity of the supplied elements, and to use language more 
familiar to executives, Wright R.P. (2008, p.757) used “doing” phrases instead of nouns, 
and the elements used in this thesis have deliberately been couched in terms of doing 
phrases. The final set of elements is shown in Table 4.7 below. 
3.7.2 Format of the interviews      
Each Board member’s interview followed the same format: 
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 Each of the elements derived in the Pilot Study, Table 4.7 was printed onto a 
separate card, with its definition stated alongside. 
 The cards were numbered from 1 to 11, and members were presented with cards in 
the same order to improve reliability. Cards were presented in a defined sequence to 
ensure that as far as possible a different combination of elements appeared in each 
triad.  Where possible depending on time constraints, interviewees were required to 
answer all questions. 
 A triadic form of elicitation was used with a rating scale of 1 to 5 as described in the 
pilot study. 
 The Kellyan question (1955/1991) posed with each set of 3 cards presented was: 
“In what way are any two of these elements similar, but differ from the third, in 
respect of the way you think about the risk issues in your organization” 
 There was a single supplied construct: 
“Overall a lower potential risk to the business vs. overall a higher potential risk to 
the business” 
The purpose of supplying this construct was to assist in the preservation of individual 
meaning when the constructs were aggregated in the content analysis. 
3.8 Selection of analytical techniques 
The analytical techniques used to analyse the data are summarized below: 
3.8.1 Analysis of the Risk Readiness Questionnaire 
For each question in Section 1, which gauged the extent of readiness of the Board, the 
average scores on the 11 point Lickert scale were calculated. The reason for using the 11 
point scale was to be consistent with the techniques of Beasley et al. (2010). Non-
parametric statistical tests were conducted to assess whether within Boards members 
thought differently about their levels of risk readiness, and whether on average the Boards 
themselves thought differently from each other about their levels of risk readiness.  
3.8.2 Analysis of the Risk Aversion Questionnaire 
This Section gauged the extent of risk aversion of the Board. The results of each Board 
member were used to arrive at an average score, which indicated the degree of risk aversion 
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of the Board. This was compared with other risk variables, for example as set out in Table 
3.2 above. 
3.8.3 Analysis of the Risk Bias Questionnaire 
This Section gauged the extent of the mental bias of each Board member when faced with a 
risky choice. A full analysis of the extent of the bias within Boards and between Boards 
will be carried out using standard statistical techniques. The overall average bias within 
each Board was compared with the results of the Risk Readiness Questionnaire to establish 
any possible links between corporate governance and risk bias at Board level.   
3.8.4 Analysis of the RepGrid data 
The research resulted in RepGrid interviews from 22 interviewees across 3 Boards 
representing BINS Insurance, QD Electronics and VGOLD Goldfields. The RepGrid 
interviewees were provided with 11 elements (the key risk factors facing the business) and 
1 supplied construct (“overall contributes a higher source of potential risk vs. overall 
contributes a lower source of potential risk”). Each interview elicited around 10 constructs, 
so that there were 213 elicited constructs in total. These 213 constructs required analysis, 
and the technique used is referred to as “content analysis” (Jankowicz, 2004). 
From these different constructs it was expected to gain an understanding of differences 
within Boards and between Boards operating in different industries with different 
perceptions in terms of risk profiles. As discussed in Section 3.3, it was hoped to establish 
causal links between several variables contributing to, or resulting from, sources of 
enterprise risk as shown in Table 3.2. The challenge in aggregating the constructs from a 
number of different individuals/groups was intended to achieve the following conflicting 
objectives: 
 How to eliminate duplication of elicited meaning to facilitate effective comparison 
 How to retain as much as possible of the essence of personal meaning from each of 
the interviewees. 
As expected, some compromise was needed. The constructs were examined individually, 
and those which conveyed similar or approximately similar meaning were grouped together 
into Categories. This iterative process resulted in the categorization of all items. 
Unclassifiable items were placed into a separate “miscellaneous” category. 
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Once the data was effectively grouped, it was possible using standard (e.g. χ2) statistical 
techniques to assess how constructs within each Board were allocated across different 
categories which summarized their collective meaning; and the percentage of constructs 
within each category were compared across Boards, to assess whether any categories 
featured more prominently between Boards.   
3.9 Reliability and validity of the RepGrid technique 
People are according to Kelly (1955/1991) in a “state of motion” and their thoughts around 
issues are continually changing. They are influenced by the internal and external issues of 
the day. The answers and statistics produced below can only be relied on to provide an 
insight as to how the Boards thought at the time, and it may not be possible to assume that 
their answers will be consistent over time. Fransella, Bell and Bannister (2004) deal 
extensively with the issues of reliability and validity in RepGrid studies. At best we be may 
only be able to conclude that there is a high degree of correlation for constructs (say around 
70%) for constructs elicited over successive periods, that there is greater stability of choice 
for the more popular (“more intense”) constructs chosen. Reliability and validity will 
depend on the nature of the questions, the group involved, the way the questions are framed 
and their consistency and so on.   
There are therefore specific issues to consider in attempting to establish reliability of the 
RepGrid technique, and whether the results of a RepGrid interview are likely to be repeated 
over time. To establish reliability we need to ask the question: “ Will RepGrids produce the 
same results when repeated with the same interviewer, using the same elements, the same 
Kellyan question, bearing in mind the way questions may be framed, the order of questions 
and the possibility of interviewer induced bias?”   
 
Kelly (1955/1991) argued however that it was inappropriate to apply this test to RepGrid 
techniques, as in fact the whole purpose of this technique was to facilitate the identification 
of change, and that humans are in a continual state of mental flux, testing and re-testing the 
facts which confront them. This argument lies at the centre of Kelly’s (1955/91) 
Fundamental Postulate (see Appendix N). 
  
There is significant evidence (Wright R.P. 2008, Table 1) that when tests/re-tests are done, 
a high percentage of repeat constructs emerge. The issues of reliability in the case of a 
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RepGrid interview in which the underlying core constructs of an individual are being 
assessed have been the subject of on-going debate. An individual may change the way in 
which he feels about a certain topic for example, if provided with more information on that 
topic (Wright R.P., 2008). 
 
In terms of validity, the question was whether the RepGrid technique would provide 
answers which reflected the inherent underlying views of the respondent. Kelly’s (1955/91) 
Theory of Personal Constructs applied to how Boards construe risk; how they will analyse, 
interpret and make-sense of risk issues; and how they modify their thinking and develop 
changing plans to deal with the internal and external risk environment.   According to Kelly 
(1955/1991) human constructs which are the fundamental units of thought, tend to be bi-
polar in nature. We tend to think in terms of contrasts (e.g. beautiful versus plain). In this 
case the question regarding validity is whether Kelly’s Theory of Personal Constructs will 
elicit the actual views held by the individual, or in this research, individual members of the 
Board. And more to the point will the responses relating to how Board members view risk 
issues within the company, which are not so much to do with their strongly held beliefs on 
personal issues, represent their innermost views on the “external” subject of risk issues 
facing the company for which they work. 
 
Validity was addressed in 5 possible ways.  
 
 Firstly the technique was used to assess how Boards see and interpret risk within 
their company. These results were fed back to the individual respondents to check 
for validity. 
 Secondly, the results were fed back at a Board level (while preserving 
confidentiality), to assess whether they made sense to them.  
 Thirdly the results across Boards were compared to assess whether the results made 
sense, taking into account the different types of businesses which formed part of the 
research.  
 Fourthly, results of the Risk Readiness, Risk Aversion and Risk Bias Questionnaires 
provided a form of data collection/source triangulation against which the results of 
the RepGrid interviews were able to be compared. 
 Finally, an analysis was carried out to check whether the elicited constructs and 
their connections with the elements did in fact make sense. After the interview, each 
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construct was considered in order to assess its relevance to the Kellyan question, 
and where for example the interviewer gave 2 constructs which were similar, 
whether the ratings for the corresponding elements were consistent. 
3.10 Brief comments on the statistical tests to be used 
The Risk Readiness Questionnaire (Appendix B) elicited data based on an 11 point ordinal 
Lickert scale. The reason for using this scale (as opposed to the more usual 5 point scale) 
was to follow the technique used by Beasley et al. (2010, 2011, 2012).  As there were no 
assumptions relating to the distribution of such data, and the fact that the data were ranked, 
non-parametric methods were applied in their analysis. In particular the Wilcoxon Rank-
Sum test was used to establish differences in locality of the Risk Readiness results between 
the different companies, and the Friedman Rank Test for randomized block design was 
used to establish whether members of each Board think differently about their risk issues. 
The detailed results of these tests are presented in Chapter 5. 
In the case of other data, parametric methods were used, and the following key assumptions 
were made: 
 The observations were independent between the companies – that is the companies 
operated in completely different industries, and the members of each Board had no 
knowledge of the other companies, and were not provided with any information in 
respect of each other. 
 The observations were drawn from normally distributed populations – the sample 
size was low, with the result that the application of the Central Limit Theorem is a 
potential weakness of the analysis. 
 Sampled populations have the same variance – this is also a potential weakness of 
the analysis. 
 The variables were measured on an interval scale.      
3.11 The assumptions made in this research  
The Beasley et al. (2010) questionnaire which was expanded by the addition of new 
questions provided a basis for understanding the extent of adherence to corporate 
governance.  This questionnaire was assumed to be relevant to Boards of South African 
companies in terms of assessing their compliance. 
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During the interviews, quantitative questions to assess mental biases amongst Board 
members were posed to each interviewee; the questions which were drawn from Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) were assumed:  
 to provide statistically reliable results in terms of their number and structure; and  
 accurately to depict whether Board members were biased or not when faced with a 
choice question in the context of the risks facing the company, and whether this was 
how they would respond in practice to a real life problem of choice faced by the 
business; and 
 to provide an accurate and insightful analysis of managerial cognition at Board level 
with respect to risk oversight.  
One of the assumptions of Personal Construct Theory, is that the elements presented to [the 
Board] members are thoroughly familiar and understood by them. In some cases this may 
not have applied – for example a Financial Director may not think about market risks, and a 
Sales Director say, may be unaware of the true nature of the financial risks facing the firm.  
Finally, it was assumed that the results of the RepGrid interviews and analysis techniques 
would be sufficiently robust to be able to draw inferences as to how and why intact Boards 
performed in terms of their risk management. 
3.12 Summary of the research method used 
From the discussion of the above points, the research method used was a constructivist, 
exploratory, multiple case study method, using a semi-ethnographic, formal, structured 
interview approach, and questionnaires, to obtain qualitative and quantitative data in order 
to establishing the possible existence of causal links between observed variables of risk and 
risk management, and, why they existed. 
In the next Chapter 4 the results of the pilot study are presented and discussed. Chapter 5 
deals with the results of the main study questionnaires. Chapter 6 is the follows with the 
results of the RepGrid analysis. Chapters 7 and 8 deal with the research objectives, further 
theory development, discussion, literature synthesis and the summary and conclusions.  
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 The Pilot Study Chapter 4.
4.1 The purpose and structure of the pilot study 
During the course of the pilot study certain limitations became evident in the way the 
questionnaires, used to elicit information from Board members, were originally structured. 
In order to clarify this process, the main steps in the evolution of the questionnaires used in 
the pilot study are described below: 
 For the initial group of pilot interviewees, the pilot study was initially based on a 
Risk Readiness Questionnaire, a Risk Aversion Questionnaire (these questionnaires 
are shown in Appendix C (pilot study)), and a RepGrid interview 
 After initial pilot interviews it became apparent that a new Risk Bias Questionnaire 
was required and that additional questions required to be added to the Risk 
Readiness Questionnaire and Risk Aversion Questionnaire all of which are shown 
in Appendix B (main study).The development of the main study questionnaires 
(Appendix B), therefore arose during the course of the pilot study. 
 Further pilot study interviews were then conducted with a second group of pilot 
interviewees, using the full set of Appendix B (main study) questionnaires  
 At the end of the Pilot Study these Appendix B (main study) questionnaires were 
adopted for the main study without further amendment. 
The purpose of the pilot study was: 
 To test the design, methods and techniques planned for the empirical stage and to 
modify them in the light of the findings of the pilot study. 
 To gauge responses relating to Risk Readiness of the Boards (Appendix C (pilot 
study)) interviewed and to gauge whether this methodology was sound. 
 To gauge responses to the Risk Aversion Questionnaire (Appendix C (pilot 
study)) and assess the results. 
 To test the Risk Bias Questionnaire (Appendix B –main study questionnaire 
derived during the course of the pilot study) by gaining an understanding of how 
Boards responded to risk and uncertainty. 
 To identify, for the main study, a key set of common elements which would 
encompass all the broad areas of risk a business might face; and to fulfil a 
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procedural objective of choosing how best the grids may be constructed and 
analysed. 
4.2 The procedure for the pilot study  
The pilot study consisted of a 2 Part face-to-face interview conducted with 9 individual 
Board members of different companies from different industries during which a series of 
questionnaires described in 4.1 were completed. These Board members were chosen from a 
list of companies with whom the researcher had a close connection, and from organisations 
involved in a range of different industrial sectors. Interviews were conducted in 2 Parts.     
Part 1- The Risk Readiness Questionnaire and the Risk Aversion Questionnaire; and   
Part 2 – A RepGrid interview was conducted.  
The construction and source of the questionnaires were discussed in Chapter 3. The results 
of the pilot study are discussed in detail in the rest of this section below: 
4.3 Pilot Study sample 
9 pilot study interviews were conducted in total. The following Table 4.1 shows the 
numbered interviews which took place. Only 7 completed the questionnaires, the remaining 
2, (8 and 9) provided an interview to discuss corporate risk issues and their main concerns 
around risk management. Information from these latter 2 interviewees were used to gain 
additional understanding of corporate risk issues, and aided in the selection of elements of 
risk used in the RepGrid study. 
 Table 4.1 Details of the interviewees for the Pilot Study 
1 CEO- a major listed hospital group  
2 Chairman Audit Committee- a major international courier company  
3 CFO- a large listed plastics manufacturer and mining supplies conglomerate  
4 CEO- a large listed plastics manufacturer and mining supplies conglomerate  
5 CEO – South African subsidiary of major global bank  
6 CEO – large listed healthcare group  
7 Director of Risk (Ph.D.) – Big Four Accounting firm 
8 CEO – world’s largest international healthcare insurer  
9 Senior partner – large accounting firm  
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4.3.1 Other questions posed on Risk Readiness Questionnaire (Appendix C pilot 
study) 
Other questions were posed to the interviewees as per the Risk Readiness Questionnaire 
with the following results in parentheses: 
 What risks are monitored by the audit committee (mostly operational, 
compliance, financial; only one respondent indicated audit committee was 
responsible for risk oversight of all risks). 
 The highest level of reporting of the CRO (2 were to the CEO, 2 to the CFO and 
in 3 cases there was no CRO). 
 Reasons for increased focus on ERM vary (new FD, unanticipated events 
causing distress for competitors, best practice decision). 
 Main barriers to ERM implementation (mainly that ERM adds bureaucracy, 
competing priorities and a lack of perceived value). 
 The current state of ERM in the organisation (2 indicated partial 
implementation, 1 indicated no formal process in place, others indicated varying 
states of readiness). 
Table 4.2 sets out the full set of results of the Risk Readiness Questionnaire (Appendix C 
pilot study questionnaires). 
4.3.2 Summary of the results of the Risk Readiness Questionnaire (Appendix C pilot 
study) 
The following main conclusions can be drawn from the above table of results: 
History 
 Over the previous 5 years companies experienced an increase in risk and complexity 
and experienced unexpected operational surprises. 
Current level of risk management maturity 
 Companies were immature with respect to their risk oversight obligations, and had 
improved marginally in terms of their reporting and disclosure around risk issues 
How well does the company manage its risk? 
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 The average score under this category of Risk Readiness Questions was slightly 
below 7, where 6 is the mean score on the scale from 1 to 11. Thus generally the 
Board members interviewed did not feel that they managed their risk very well. 
 
Table 4.2 Results of the Risk Readiness Questionnaire (Appendix C) 
 Pilot Study Interviewees 
 
Codes given to interviewees        
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Av 
lh Tnt Wg ww Db ho kp   
History         
To what extent has the risk and complexity of your business  
increased over the past 5 years       
10 9 6  n/a 7 9 7  8 
To what extent has your business faced an operational surprise in 
the last 5 years 
8 5 7  n/a 5 9  4 7 
Current level of risk management maturity         
What is the level of maturity of the company with respect to a fully 
functioning ERM King III process (current regulatory standards) 
8 8 3   n/a 9 3  7 6 
How has the level of reporting and disclosure on risk issues 
increased over the past year 
10 8 8   n/a 6 9  7 8 
How well does the company manage its risk         
Indicate the extent to which you are confident that overall risks are 
being managed in an effective manner 
7 7 7   n/a 4 5  8 6 
Indicate the extent to which the company maintains strategic risk 
inventories to counter supply line/ industrial disruption 
3 7 8   n/a n/a 9  n/a 6 
Indicate the extent to which the company assesses supply chain 
risks 
10 7 4   n/a n/a 3  5 5 
Indicate extent to which top risk exposures are formally discussed 
by the Board when strategic issues are discussed 
9 8 6   n/a 5 9  9 7 
Indicate extent to which existing risk exposures are considered 
when evaluating possible new strategic initiatives 
8 9 5   n/a 4 10  7 7 
Indicate extent to which risk appetite has been articulated in the 
context of strategic planning 
10 7 7   n/a 7 9  7 8 
Indicate extent to which the company has carried out a formal 
assessment of market risk 
8 8 7   n/a 5 7  10 7 
Indicate extent to which company has carried out a formal 
assessment of industry risk 
3 8 8 n/a   8 2  10 6 
Indicate extent to which company has carried out a formal 
assessment of political risk 
8 5 6   n/a 1 10  7 6 
Indicate extent to which company has carried out a formal 
assessment of regulatory/legal risk 
9 8 8   n/a 9 10  11 9 
Indicate extent to which company has carried out a formal 
assessment of IT risk 
10 9 4   n/a 9 5  11 7 
Indicate extent to which organisation uses qualitative means to 
assess risk 
7 9 7   n/a 6 9  9 8 
Indicate extent to which organisation uses quantitative means to 
assess risk 
9 6 7   n/a 8 9  7 8 
In assessing risk does the Board actively considers risk 
probabilities 
2 7 7   n/a 3 10  8 6 
Indicate extent to which Board believes compensation structures 
contribute to excessive risk taking by management 
2 6 3   n/a 8 1  2 4 
Indicate extent to which risk exposures are considered when 
making capital allocations 
10 9 8   n/a  8 11  6 9 
Board tolerance to source dependence         
What is companies attitude to strategic risk eg M&A(1=intolerant) 8 n/a 3   n/a 9 5  8 6 
What is companies attitude to operational risk (1=intolerant) 4 n/a 6   n/a 5 2  1 4 
What is companies attitude to financial risk (1=intolerant) 2 n/a 3   n/a 5 7  2 5 
What is companies attitude to market risk (1=intolerant) 2 n/a 3   n/a 8 2  7 4 
Influence of budgetary performance on Board attitude to risk          
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 Companies felt that they had adequately assessed their legal and regulatory risk, 
with an average score of 9. 
 Interviewees were most confident that compensation structures did not adversely 
affect the risk of the business by for example having share options schemes which 
encouraged risky behaviour. 
 On average companies did not score above the mean in terms of being able to 
manage the company’s risks in an effective manner.  This average was borne out by 
the mediocre assessment across other measures of risk management in this sub-
section.  
 The results were fairly inconsistent across all respondents, indicating varying 
degrees of risk readiness. 
Board tolerance to source dependence 
Board members seemed to have a different attitude to risk depending on the source of risk, 
being most intolerant to market and operational risk, and most tolerant to strategic risk, 
though there was overall a relatively low degree of tolerance to all risks, the scores varying 
between 4 and 6. Interestingly, members indicated a low degree of tolerance to market risk 
(4), yet in the previous section the average score for the extent to which they carried out a 
formal assessment on market risk was only 7. Thus low tolerance for risk did not translate 
into an appropriate formal assessment of the risks. 
Influence of budgetary performance on Board attitude to risk  
There was a high degree consistency between attitudes to risk irrespective of the company’s 
performance, suggesting that there was no sensitivity to risk around budget performance. 
The reflection effect predicted by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
indicates there is a switch in attitude to risk when risky prospects offering gains are 
replaced by risky prospects offering losses. In this small sample the reflection effect did not 
seem to apply to companies – see responses to the last 2 questions.  According to Prospect 
Theory, Board members should have been more risk tolerant when facing losses as opposed 
Does company become more risk seeking when company reaches 
its targets 
8 n/a 5   n/a 7 9  2 7 
Does company become more risk averse when company misses its 
targets 
8 n/a 5   n/a 9 10  2 8 
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to gains. This result did however reinforce the outcome of the Risk Averse Questionnaire 
and the Risk Bias Questionnaire of the pilot analysis. 
 
4.3.3 Results of Risk Aversion Questionnaire (Appendix C – pilot study) 
These questions were based on the questions posed by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) and 
were intended to gauge the risk aversion of the Board by requiring the interviewer to select 
the option he would choose (on behalf of the company) amongst pairs of hypothetical risk 
based projects.  
The results of all 7 interviewees are shown in Table 4.3. Interviewees were required to 
choose between X and Y on the basis that the decision was to be made in the context of the 
company, and not their own personal situation. The first 4 questions were framed as gains. 
The second 4 questions were framed as losses. One of the Risk Aversion Questionnaires 
was not completed (due to time constraints). 
4.3.4 Summary of the Pilot Study Risk Aversion Questionnaire results-Response of 
interviewees when facing gains – Prospects 1-4: 
The results in Table 4.3 indicate that the interviewees had different attitudes to risk when 
facing gains, indicated by their preferences for the alternatives under each of the first 4 
prospects when facing gains.  
Interviewee 1 preferred the higher payoffs in each case and was prepared to accept 
the risk of loss. 
Interviewees 2 and 3 chose the less risky prospect in all but one of the cases. 
Interviewees 5, 6 and 7 chose the less risky options in all cases. 
While this sample may have been too small to produce reliable results, it is interesting to 
note that, when facing gains, one respondent was actively risk seeking, and the others were 
partially or wholly risk averse. 
It is interesting to note that Interviewee 1 recorded his company as having a very risk 
averse approach to their strategic decision making, while he himself chose 5 out of 8 risk 
seeking selections. 
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Out of 24 possible answers from all respondents, 6 choices were for the riskier prospect, 
indicating general risk aversion when facing gains, as predicted by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1992).                           
Table 4.3 The results of the Risk Aversion Questionnaire 
This questionnaire gauges whether the company exhibits risk averse behaviour when 
facing gains (Prospects 1 – 4), and whether the company is risk tolerant when facing losses 
(Prospects 5 - 8). A indicates Risk Aversion. T indicates Risk Tolerance. 
                                                                                                       Prospect choice by the 7 pilot interviewees 
Facing Gains  Payoff 1 Probability       
p 
Payoff 
2 
Probability                       
1-p 
Expected
value 
1   
Lhc 
2    
Tnt 
3   
Wing 
4        
Winw 
5 
Db 
6 
Ho 
7 
Kp 
Prospect 1 X 10 .2 0 .8 2  A A Na A A A 
 Y 30 .2 -5 .8 2 T       
Prospect  2 X 10 .5 0 .5 5  A A Na A A A 
 Y 30 .5 -20 .5 5 T       
Prospect 3 X 30 .2 0 .8 6     A A A 
 Y 50 .2 -5 .8 6 T T T Na    
Prospect 4 X 25 .55 0 .45 14  A A Na A A A 
 Y 50 .55 -20 .45 11 T       
Facing 
Losses 
             
Prospect 5 X 0 .2 -5 .8 -4     A A A 
 Y -30 .2 0 .8 -6 T T T Na    
Prospect 6 X -10 .55 -5 .45 -3 A A A Na A A A 
 Y -20 .55 0 .45 -11        
Prospect 7 X -20 .2 -10 .8 -12 A A A Na A A A 
 Y -50 .2 0 .8 -10        
Prospect 8 X -40 .55 -10 .45 -27 A A A Na  A  
 Y -50 .55 20 .45 -19     T  T 
Payoff represents the possible gain from the gamble with the respective probability.                             
Expected value = Payoff 1 x p  +  Payoff  2 x (1-p) where p is the probability of Payoff 1. A indicates a risk 
averse choice. T indicates a risk seeking choice.  Na indicates no response from interviewee. 
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4.3.5 Summary of the Pilot Study Risk Aversion Questionnaire results-Response of 
interviewees when facing losses – Prospects 5-8: 
When facing losses interviewees 1, 2 and 3 chose the riskier option on Prospect 5, in spite 
of the fact that the expected loss was higher on the chosen option X than the alternative Y. 
Interviewees 5, 6 and 7 chose the less risky Prospect 5. 
On Prospect 6 all respondents chose the first less risky option X.   
On Prospect 7 all respondents also chose what appeared to be the less risky option X, even 
though the expected value of the option was greater than under the alternative Y. 
On Prospect 8 four of the 6 respondents chose the less risky prospect X, in spite of the fact 
that the expected loss on X was significantly higher than the apparently risky alternative.  
Out of 24 possible answers from all respondents facing losses, in only 5 cases was the 
riskier Prospect chosen, indicating an intense level of risk aversion when facing losses.  
Combining the results from the negative and positive prospects, respondents selected 11 
risk seeking options out of a total of 48 responses, indicating a high degree of risk aversion. 
While the sample chosen is small, these indicative results appear to be inconsistent with 
Prospect Theory, which postulates that when facing gains people are risk averse, and when 
facing losses people tend to become risk tolerant.  
An interesting insight emerged from interviewee 3, who indicated that his response to 
questions about risk would alter depending on the likely impact the outcome was likely to 
have on different aspects of the business. Thus for example when faced with liquidity 
issues, this particular interviewee was likely to adopt a far more risk averse position to this 
risk than to any other risk.  This introduces a potentially interesting angle to the study of 
risk management in companies, which Kahneman and Tversky referred to as the source 
dependence effect. When questions are framed in the context of risk to individuals, source 
dependence has been shown to apply (Heath and Tversky, 1991). It would be interesting to 
establish if Boards in general display source dependence. If so this would seem to be 
contrary to normative expectations that Boards should be equally risk averse irrespective of 
the source of risk.  
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In light of these comments from interviewee 3, a number of further questions were 
introduced into the Risk Readiness Questionnaire, as shown in Appendix B  (Note: During 
the course of the pilot study additional questions were introduced into the Appendix C Risk 
Readiness Questionnaire resulting in the Appendix B version used in the main study, as 
discussed below).  These questions tested the attitude of the Board member to various 
sources of risk. The results in Table 4.2 tested members’ attitudes to strategic, operational, 
financial and market risk. As can be seen from the response to these questions towards the 
end of Table 4.2 there was considerable variation in the attitudes of individual board 
members to these sources of risk. There was also considerable variation between companies 
in terms of their attitudes to these risks. RepGrid interviews were expected to cast 
additional light on this issue. 
4.3.6 Changes to the questionnaire   
To overcome the problems set out above, the following changes to Appendix C (pilot 
study) were made. The changes were incorporated in Appendix B (main study 
questionnaires):  
 Additional questions (27 to 30) have been included in the Risk Readiness  
Questionnaire as shown in Appendix B, designed to assess the effect of 
source bias on the way Boards construe risk.  
 8 further questions have been added to the Risk Aversion Questionnaire, 
making a total of 16 questions overall. These additional questions will 
increase the reliability of the responses, and will also provide greater 
information on the degree of risk aversion. This expanded Risk Aversion 
Questionnaire is in line with the prospects presented by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1992).  These Risk Aversion Questions have also been 
reformatted, simplified and extended to assist in understanding them more 
readily by using actual numerical amounts rather than percentages. This is 
also in keeping with Kahneman and Tversky (1992).See Appendix B.  
 The Risk Bias Questionnaire - see below - comprised a full set of additional 
prospect questions in line with the methodology employed by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1992).See Appendix B. 
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To summarise, the revised, reformatted Risk Readiness, Risk Aversion and the Risk Bias 
Questionnaires used in the main study are shown in Appendix B. 
Table 4.4 below summarises the differences between the pilot Appendix C questionnaires, 
and the Main Study Appendix B and the Kahneman and Tversky methodologies. 
4.3.7 The S-shaped probability weighting functions 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the results of the averaged responses from pilot interviewees who 
completed the Risk Bias Questionnaire. The Reader will recall from 4.1 that a new Risk 
Bias Questionnaire was introduced after several interviews were concluded. The results of 
the Risk Bias Questionnaire shows the S-shaped probability weighting functions as 
proposed by Kahneman and Tversky. The mathematics behind Prospect Theory was briefly 
discussed in 2.2.8 above. The curves plot the given probability under each prospect (along 
the X –axis) with the construed probability of the Board member. Thus Boards will tend to 
overweight low probabilities, and underweight high probabilities. Boards construe risk 
differently when facing gains as opposed to losses. This is evident in the difference in 
curves between Figures 4.1 (facing gains) and 4.2 (facing losses). 
Figure 4.1 Probability weighting function for positive prospects 
 
The probability weighting function w(p) = p
a 
/(p
a 
+(1-p)
a
)
1/a
, plots w(p), the weighted 
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line of nil bias, and the deviation of the red line from the line of nil bias indicates the degree 
of distortion between the normative, rational probability estimation, and the Board’s 
elicited construed measure of risk. 
Figure 4.2 Probability weighting function for negative prospects  
 
The probability weighting function plots w(p), the weighted probability against p, the given 
probability. The slight curvature indicates the minor degree of distortion between the 
normative, rational probability estimation, and the Boards’ elicited construed measure of 
risk.  
4.3.8 The probability weighting function 
Figure 4.3 below shows the value weighting function derived from median data (in line 
with Kahneman and Tversky (1992) from interviewees 1, 5 and 7, using the Risk Bias 
Questionnaire in Appendix B*. The curve plots the value v (the value attached to the 
prospect by the interviewee) against the gain (the expected value of the prospect).This plot  
demonstrates that the S-shaped value function (see Figure 2.3) is not evident, suggesting 
that based on these 3 interviews, there was no risk aversion for gains, nor was there risk 
tolerance for losses. There does however seem to be a small amount of loss aversion, 
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though not nearly as pronounced as in the case of the students investigated by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1992). 
*Note: The reader will recall that during the course of the pilot study a new questionnaire was introduced – the Risk Bias 
Questionnaire – which was tested for interviewees 1,5,7 in the pilot, and used in the main study as shown in Appendix B. 
Figure 4.3 Value weighted function showing the data points v(x) (diamond shapes), 
the fitted K and T curve (blocks) and a linear regression line 
 
A full summary of the techniques used in the prospect theory part of this pilot study is 
included in Appendix D. 
4.3.9 A Summary of the Differences between the pilot study and main study 
questionnaires  
A comparison between the analysis techniques of the pilot study, the main study and those 
employed by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) is set out in Appendix E 1. A summary of the 
differences is shown in Table 4.4 below: 
Table 4.4 Summary of the differences in the questionnaires used  
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Replication of 
Kahneman and Tversky 
methodologies 
Not fully – no value 
function 
Fully Fully 
Number of questions 8 56 56+ 
Test for Risk Aversion  Yes Yes Yes 
Test for Risk Bias No Yes Yes 
4.3.10 Summary of the Risk Bias Questionnaire  
In summary, in valuing risky prospects using students as subjects, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1992) plotted construed value against actual value, revealing a concave curve above the 
origin (referred to as the reference point), and a convex curve below the origin, giving rise 
to an asymmetric S-shaped curve. The concavity above the origin indicates risk aversion 
(people attach lower incremental value to increasing gains), and the convexity below the 
origin indicates risk seeking behaviour (people become increasingly inured to losses as they 
grow). Further the prospect curve is far steeper below the origin, than above the origin. This 
is indicative of loss aversion.  In the words of Kahneman and Tversky (1992, p. 303) 
“losses loom larger than gains”. 
The results of the pilot study indicated that the 3 Board members interviewed, in their 
capacity as Board members, did not exhibit risk features of the student populations chosen 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992). As the regression plot is a straight line with a 
gradient of close to 1, the risk aversion/tolerance did not increase with the magnitude of the 
prospect, nor was there evidence of loss aversion. 
The Pilot Study revealed that Boards generally: fell short of their compliance obligations;  
did not weight probabilities to the same extent; and were generally not as risk averse or risk 
seeking as individuals drawn from the Kahneman and Tversky (1979,1992) sample 
population.    
4.4 The Repertory Grid Pilot 
4.4.1 Summary of the repertory grid interviews – choice of elements 
Interviewees were first introduced to the specific research topic, and were assured that all 
information was confidential and could not be linked to them or their companies directly. 
The process by which a repertory grid interview is conducted was discussed in Section 1.2 
above. Interviewees were requested to try and identify a set of risk factors, or elements (the 
terminology used in this thesis – see Glossary) which potentially faced their businesses, and 
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which were of equal weight and potential impact on the business if such risks were to 
materialise. Elements were required to be chosen at the same level of “hierarchy”, so that 
the elements of risk identified by the interviewee were at the same “high end” level of 
detail as discussed by the Board in their risk management program.  Attention was paid to 
ensuring that chosen elements did not overlap, and did not form subsets of one another.  
Different interviewees identified slightly different sets of risk during their grid interviews, 
but there was substantial overlap between them, such that a common set could be identified, 
to be used for all subsequent interviews. This ensured that all main sample interviewees 
would focus on the same field of discourse. Table 4.5, below, shows this selection of 
elements. The 4 pilot interviews elicited 26 elements of risk, which have been incorporated 
into 9 broad elements summarised and grouped as follows in Table 4.5: 
Table 4.5 Summarised elements of risk elicited from the first 4 pilot interviews 
 Political risk 
An issue which clouds the South African economic landscape and 
encapsulates issues such as political instability, political interference, 
business unfriendly legislation, social unrest and labour militancy.  
Black economic empowerment falls under this broad grouping and 
satisfies the hierarchical criterion 
Supply side risk 
Includes energy, supplier pricing and over-dependence on suppliers 
and difficulties in accessing and holding raw materials. 
Regulatory risk 
Incorporates political regulation, also encompass environmental 
issues, corporate governance, accounting standards, tax and law on 
competition. 
Resources risk Includes staffing issues and access to capital goods.  
Operational 
procedure risk 
Encompasses all internal processes, proprietary techniques, and 
operational risk issues such as product failure. 
Systems risk 
Includes all hardware and software designed to measure and control 
outcomes and includes all IT systems risk (hardware, software and IT 
systems support ) and all administrative and financial systems to 
control process flow.  
Strategic risk 
Covers the risk of decisions regarding corporate activity, capital 
investment and generally decisions which do not relate to day to day 
operational issues, and which may change the scale, scope and nature 
of the business. 
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Market risk 
Encompasses a large number of issues relating to product pricing, 
competitive activity, anti-competitive behaviour and legislation, 
corporate M and A, technology issues. While these may well have 
different impacts on the business, in terms of the hierarchical principle 
they will be grouped into one element. 
Financial risk 
Includes operational gearing, financial gearing, liquidity, access to 
capital, interest rate risk, risk of financial fraud and reporting will be 
defined as financial risk. 
 
4.4.2 Results of the repertory grid interviews   
The repertory grid interviews were designed to assess how Boards construe risk. 
In the first 4 interviews respondents were first asked to state the main elements of risk. 29 
elements of risk were recorded, from which 9 main elements were chosen, as defined in 
Table 4.5 above. In the next 3 interviews, respondents were provided with these 9 elements. 
In the final 3 interviews a “catch all” supplied construct was provided which asked 
interviewees to rate the importance of each element of risk to their organisation. 
While there is insufficient data to carry out a thorough components analysis of the results of 
the interviews, an “eyeball” analysis was adopted, the results of the interviews were 
carefully scrutinised and the following main conclusions were drawn: 
 There was some considerable consistency between the constructs offered by the 
respondents.  
 Boards were concerned about the following issues which were common to all of 
them: 
   Short and long term impacts of risk 
   Costs of mitigating risk 
   To what extent is the source of risk volatile 
   To what extent is the risk foreseeable 
   The effect of risk on on-going viability of the company 
   To what extent is risk under the control of management. 
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 It appears that the areas of risk which receive high management attention are those 
with which the Board is familiar. Boards do not seem to ponder the unlikely, which 
is where unexpected events are likely to emerge. For example the CEO of the 
Hospital Group anticipated little market risk, as they had 35% market share and felt 
that their competitors faced the same environmental issues. Their argument is that 
all market participants are subject to the same common external and internal 
influences, and hence they would all suffer/benefit to the same extent; and therefore 
were unlikely to lose market share. Clearly this would represent an area of high 
unexpected risk and potential high volatility if participants were to adopt different 
future strategies. 
 Each business had some unique constructs relevant to their own operations. In these 
areas management attention was keenly focussed on these core areas. 
4.4.3 Results of the “Intact Boards” interviews 
As discussed in Section 2.4.5 and 2.4.7, for the main study it was intended to identify and 
interview different members of the same Board (referred to as an intact Board) in order to 
understand how different Boards, as a group, responded collectively to risk and uncertainty. 
In this pilot study, 2 respondents (viz. the CEO and the FD/CRO) were employed by the 
same company, a listed industrial group. Whilst these 2 respondents didn’t constitute the 
entire Board, because of their executive roles, and the proximity in which they work, the 
detailed analysis of their repertory grid interviews was of interest. The first item of interest 
to note is the differences in the elements offered by the two interviewees. These results are 
summarised in Table 4.6, which has been arranged to highlight the points of difference. 
While there is appreciable agreement in the nature of the risks anticipated by both parties, 
there are 7 non-overlapping areas. It is clear that the 2 most senior executive directors have 
different perceptions of their risk exposures, and the degree of severity which each of the 
shared elements has on the business. They also focus on different time horizons with 
respect to risk. 
The RepGrid analysis indicated that Interviewee 3 perceived that the above elements of risk 
were far less co-dependent than Interviewee 4.  This means there was a mismatch in 
perception relating to the overall risk to the business, and the extent to which these risks 
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were interrelated. Interviewee 3’s perception was that the risks were more spread and less 
concentrated than believed by his counterpart. 
In terms of the perceived impact on the business from the various sources of risk set out 
above, again Interviewee 3 believed that the nature (as opposed to each source) of risk has 
more facets to it than believed by Interviewee 4. 
For example, the former recognized that the uninsurable risks present far greater risks to the 
business as a whole than the insurable elements. The latter on the other hand perceived that 
a high degree of management time ought to be spent on the unexpected risks and to explore 
these more carefully.    
Table 4.6 Elicited elements of risk from 2 members of the same Board (Interviewees 
3and 4) 
Interviewee 3 – CRO/FD 
Elements 
Interviewee 4 –CEO 
Elements 
IT System Risk - 
BEE Risk (affirmative action) - 
Staff/skills shortage risk Skills shortage risk 
Strategic risk Strategic risk 
Market/customer risk Market risk 
Supplier dependency risk Interruption of raw material supply risk 
Supplier pricing risk (R/$) Instability of raw material prices risk 
Technology risk Lack of future innovation risk 
Product failure risk 
- 
Energy cost risk - 
- Political risk 
- Future of the mining industry risk 
- Lack of future product diversification risk 
 
Interviewee 3 stated that his “perception of risk depends on the nature of the risk”. This 
implied source dependence. 
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The differences in the way these interviewees construed risk suggested that an investigation 
into intact Boards was likely to lead to interesting results.   
4.4.4 Testing for element reliability and the introduction of the departure from 
reality element  
Further interviews 8 and 9 
Further investigations and interviews were done to establish the comprehensiveness and 
inclusivity of the chosen elements for the repertory grid part of the interview process. 
Details of interviewees 8 and 9 are: 
8 Chief Risk Officer and COO – the world’s largest international medical insurer 
9 Senior Partner – major accounting practice 
Interviewee 8  
Interviewee 8 was requested to state the major elements of risk their organisation faced, 
without having sight of the shortlist obtained in Table 4.5 above. The response received is 
set out below with the corresponding elements which have been selected in Table 4.5 above 
in bold italics: 
  The risks associated with operating in an adverse economic climate (Market risk)  
The risk associated with managing significant change (Strategic risk) 
The risk that we do not maintain a good relationship with our insurance regulators in key 
markets (Regulatory risk) 
The risk of changes in Government policy impacting the current healthcare models in 
our key markets (Political risk and Regulatory risk) 
The risk of management overstretch (Resources risk and Operational risk – part of this 
risk is also addressed in 8.3 below)  
Key person dependency (Resources risk) 
The risk of damage to the company brand through clinical incidents or data loss 
(Operational risk and System risk) 
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The risks associated with the implementation of Solvency II and required capital levels 
(Financial and Regulatory risk) 
The risks associated with environmental issues (Operational risk) 
The risks associated with political incidents impacting the business (Political risk) 
These elements match exactly with those set out in Table 4.5 above, with the exception of 
“Risk of management overstretch”. This provides further confirmation that the choice of 
elements is reliable; but that consideration should be given to the inclusion of an additional 
element covering Board overstretch. 
 
 
 
Interviewee 9 
This interviewee is the senior partner of a major accounting practice. He has advised 
companies on risk management for over 30 years. He was asked to state the elements of 
risk he felt Boards faced. His list of risk elements matched the list set out in Table 4.5 with 
one very important addition. He stated that in his view additional major risks Boards faced 
were: 
 losing touch with the key operational risks within the company; 
 and not keeping sufficiently abreast with important market trends.  
These risks arose as a result of long chains of command within large organisations resulting 
in Boards suffering from a “loss of reality” (sic). 
This additional element of risk is similar to the “Management overstretch” risk advanced by 
interviewee 8. 
Second interview with Interviewee 1 (CEO Hospital Group)  
Interviewee 1 (CEO – large listed hospital group) was requested to comment on the validity 
of this extra “Management stretch” risk element within the context of their own 
organisation. During the interview this was highlighted as a major concern on the part of 
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the Board. The CEO agreed that this element should form part of the RepGrid interview. It 
is worthy of note that this particular element was not raised in the first interview, as it is not 
specifically covered in King III as an item of risk on which Boards are required to report. 
Psychology of ‘remoteness from risk reality’ phenomenon 
It is possible that when faced with highly complex issues Boards may resort to altering their 
perception of reality, in order to develop responses to risk which are perceived to be soluble 
with greater certainty and confidence Schwenk (1984). 
Kahneman (2013) also describes the role of various cognitive biases in risk sensemaking, 
and states that “[t]he world in our heads is not a precise replica of reality” (p.138), and “the 
affect heuristic simplifies our world by creating a world that is much tidier than reality” 
(p.140). These statements lead to the question whether businesses too, do not see the world 
as it really exists from a risk viewpoint, and whether they also suffer from the affect 
heuristic. (The affect heuristic can be described as a form of cognitive bias in which 
humans make judgements - in this case about risk - based on their personal emotions and 
by implication in the absence of logic).  
From the  literature review chapter, Yazdipour, Constand (2010, pp. 96-97) argue that in 
the area of financial distress and failure it is not possible to focus purely on business 
operations to explain the reasons, but also to include human, managerial and decision 
making issues, to explain corporate failure. Their article highlights the systematic bias of 
Boards when faced with risk:  
    “... findings from the fields of cognitive psychology and neuroscience have 
fundamentally changed the way we now look at how financial decisions are made. An 
entrepreneur may assign a low risk assessment to an otherwise high risk project and 
subsequently take on a riskier project than the potential return justifies.” (p.96).  
It would appear important therefore to assess whether Boards are able to overcome this 
form of cognitive bias and whether indeed they are unaware of the reality of the risks they 
face. 
Addition of an extra element of risk 
131 
 
 
Having established the validity of this extra element of risk raised by interviewees 8 and 9, 
and from the second interview of 1, and from the literature quotations as discussed above, 
the number of elements will therefore be extended to include “Risk arising from remoteness 
of the Board from operational and market reality”.  
Great care was taken in the selection of the elements for this study. After the final 
interviews of the pilot study, further research was conducted into the work of Wright R.P. 
(2006) in respect of RepGrid analysis, particularly with respect to the choice of elements. 
This process was discussed more fully in Chapter 3. The following additional notes are 
relevant to the final choice of elements.   
The final choice of elements to be used in the RepGrid analysis 
To summarise, in RepGrid analysis an element is one of the basic examples of the 
particular topic which is being investigated. The research question is: 
Why do South African Boards, in spite of strict corporate governance regulations governing 
the management of risk, exhibit varying degrees of effectiveness in developing strategies to 
deal with their enterprise risk management (ERM)?  
Boards attempt to construe and make sense of their risk issues. The elements chosen were 
therefore all the individual sources of risk which together comprised the full spectrum of 
risk which faced the organization (Jankowicz, 2004). A detailed discussion on the process 
which led to the present selection of elements was dealt with in the preceding sections of 
the Pilot Study and in Section 3.6 above. 
In this research the elements from the pilot study were used; an additional element was 
added; and the existing elements were converted into doing phrases as discussed in Section 
3.7, as Table 4.7 below shows. 
4.4.5 Further support for validity of the elements 
The following additional comments and citations are relevant in terms of the elements 
chosen for the main study. 
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Recent research carried out in South Africa by Deloitte (reported in the Sunday Times 
newspaper Business section, September 11
th, 2011, p.8) carried out amongst 447 CFO’s of 
South African companies, highlighted the following risk issues as being of prime 
importance in firms’ strategic plans: market risk, supply side risk including labour issues, 
financial risk, regulatory and political issues. Surprisingly, CFO’s cited risk management, 
regulation and compliance, planning and forecasting amongst others as being low on their 
list of priorities. This report added further important validity to the choice of elements for 
the main study. 
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Table 4.7 Set of elements and definitions to be used in the main study 
Understanding political 
risk 
An issue which clouds the South African economic landscape and encapsulates 
issues such as political instability, political interference, business unfriendly 
legislation, social unrest and labour militancy.  Black economic empowerment 
falls under this broad grouping and satisfies the hierarchical criterion 
Developing strategies  to 
deal with supply side 
risk 
Includes energy, supplier pricing and over-dependence on suppliers and 
difficulties in accessing and holding raw materials. 
Implementing 
Regulatory risk 
countermeasures 
Incorporates political regulation, also encompass environmental issues, 
corporate governance, accounting standards, tax and law on competition. 
Identifying and 
managing resources risk 
Includes staffing issues and access to capital goods. 
Managing operational 
procedure risk 
Encompasses all internal processes, proprietary techniques, and operational risk 
issues such as product failure. 
Carrying out the risk 
management process the 
way you prefer 
Invites the Board member to consider  other ways in which more effective risk 
management strategies may be used 
Managing systems risk 
Includes all hardware and software designed to measure and control outcomes 
and includes all IT systems risk (hardware, software and IT systems support) and 
all administrative and financial systems to control process flow. 
Identifying and 
managing strategic risk 
Covers the risk of decisions regarding corporate activity, capital investment and 
generally decisions which do not relate to day to day operational issues, and 
which may change the scale, scope and nature of the business. 
Identifying and 
managing market risk 
Encompasses a large number of issues relating to product pricing, competitive 
activity, anti-competitive behaviour and legislation, corporate M and A, 
technology issues. While these may well have different impacts on the business, in 
terms of the hierarchical principle they will be grouped into one element. 
Identifying and 
managing financial risk 
Includes operational gearing, financial gearing, liquidity, access to capital, 
interest rate risk, risk of financial fraud and reporting will be defined as financial 
risk. 
Remoteness risk  due to 
the Board being distant 
from operational and 
market reality 
Encompasses the risks from Boards losing touch with the realities of the business, 
either by not keeping abreast of changes to the internal and external environment, 
or through a process of delusion or through the loss of accurate information 
being fed up and down the chains of management command within the 
organisational structure. 
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4.5 Outcomes of the Pilot Study 
4.5.1 Summary of the pilot study 
A pilot study was carried out in accordance with the procedure and objectives laid out in 
the research proposal. 9 Pilot Study interviews were conducted in total, (of which 7 
completed the questionnaires), after which the Risk Readiness Questionnaire was extended, 
8 questions were added to the Risk Aversion Questionnaire and a new Questionnaire, the 
Risk Bias Questionnaire was added. These main study questionnaires are shown in 
Appendix B.  
The new Risk Bias Questionnaire tests the validity of Prospect Theory in a Board 
environment, and follows the procedure of Kahneman and Tversky (1992). Respondents 1, 
5 and 7 provided answers to the Risk Bias questionnaire to provide an initial insight as to 
whether Board members were biased when faced with risky alternatives as predicted by 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1992). These responses generated surprising 
results (Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3) which do not entirely reflect the fourfold 
characteristics of choice proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1992), namely: 
 loss aversion – the interviewees were not noticeably more risk averse facing losses 
than facing gains 
 risk aversion when facing gains – the curve was not concave above the reference 
point 
 risk tolerance when facing losses – the curve was not convex below the reference 
point 
 the underweighting*/overweighting of high and low probabilities. Prospect Theory 
suggests an S-shaped curve where interviewees overweight low probabilities, and 
underweight high probabilities. The probability weighting curves produced by the 3 
interviewees were slightly S-shaped for gains, but were almost linear for negative 
prospects. This indicates that, when facing losses, Board members are less likely to 
distort given probabilities.* in the context of Prospect Theory underweighting of 
probabilities describes a human tendency to attach a lower probability to a given 
event than is justified.       
In the RepGrid part of the interview process, a total of 29 elements of risk were elicited, 
from the first 3 respondents, from which 9 were chosen. 3 respondents (1, 5 and 7) were 
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asked to comment on the adequacy, spread and comprehensiveness of the elements in terms 
of covering all aspects of business risk. In all cases the respondents confirmed that the list 
was comprehensive. 
A further 2 interviews were conducted to confirm the reliability of the chosen elements. 
One more element was added. Further review of the literature (Wright R.P.2006) 
highlighted advances in the use of heterogeneous elements, and the value of verbalising the 
elements into language familiar to executives. This resulted in the choice of 11 elements 
which were considered sufficiently exhaustive to cover the spectrum of risks which 
companies face. These 11 elements, as shown in Table 4.7 above, were used in the main 
study.  
Finally, 2 members of the same Board were interviewed. Their results demonstrated a 
difference in perception of the risks facing their company, as well as the degree of risk from 
various elements. 
4.5.2 Conclusions drawn from the pilot study 
The risks facing companies are deep and complex. Boards are faced with a bewildering 
array of risks which constantly shift and change in their intensity in line with the external 
environment. More and more, regulators are increasing requirements on Boards to devote 
greater and more detailed attention to risk issues. 
This research of risks at Board level required a multi-faceted approach. The combination of 
a series of questionnaires, RepGrid interviews and the study of intact Boards and how 
Boards make their decisions provided insight into how Boards construed elements of their 
risk oversight obligations. Within the broad procedures devised to address the objectives 
and research question outlined in Section 1.1 above, the pilot study identified the following 
areas which seemed to merit further investigation, and the methodological techniques 
adopted to carry out this research: 
 To assess the readiness of Boards to meet their corporate governance obligations in 
terms of risk oversight.(Risk Readiness Questionnaire based on Beasley et al., 
2010). 
 To interview and understand how Boards construe risk, which may provide an 
insight into how companies deal with risk and uncertainty (RepGrid Techniques 
were chosen to understand how Boards make sense of their risk). 
136 
 
 
 To assess whether Boards adhere to Kahneman and Tversky’s descriptive theory of 
choice under risk (The Risk Aversion and Risk Bias questionnaires were based on 
the empirical studies of Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1992).   
 To assess how intact Board members co-operate and interact when faced with risk 
and uncertainty (RepGrid techniques were used to elicit Boards’ constructs, and 
these constructs were to be fed back to Boards to understand how  they interacted). 
 To understand whether Boards exhibit source dependence when faced with risk, and 
whether Boards violate normative rational behaviour when assessing risk from 
different sources (These questions are contained in the Risk Readiness 
Questionnaire). 
4.5.3 Objectives and achievements of the pilot study 
A pilot study was carried out to hone the techniques to be applied in the data gathering 
phase of the main study, and to provide sample results which were of assistance in refining 
the aims and objectives of the research. 9 interviews were conducted, using questionnaires 
and a RepGrid interview, the results of which were analysed as shown in the pilot study 
report, which is contained in this section. 
The pilot study achieved the following main objectives in establishing the feasibility, 
practicality and usefulness of the techniques employed: 
 By testing the Risk Readiness Questionnaire to assess the level of readiness of the 
Board in terms of corporate governance regulation. 
 By testing the Risk Aversion Questionnaire to assess the extent of human biases 
each Board member exhibited when faced with questions around risk proclivity and 
aversion. 
 By testing the Risk Bias Questionnaire to assess individual Board members 
Prospect Theory profile in terms of risk aversion facing gains, risk tolerance facing 
losses, loss aversion and the underweighting of high probability opportunities, and 
overweighting of low probability opportunities. 
 By testing the use of RepGrid techniques to elicit valuable information from Board 
members relating to their attitudes to risk and uncertainty. 
 By demonstrating that 2 senior members of one Board had very different views of 
the risk facing their company. This led to the decision in the main study to attempt 
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to conduct interviews with 3 intact Boards, 2 of which appeared to be well managed 
in terms of their ERM, and 1 of which was less so.    
  
138 
 
 
4.6 Synthesis of the pilot study and literature review results 
The synthesis of the pilot study results and the literature review are summarised in Table 
4.8 below: 
Table 4.8 Summary of the synthesis of the pilot study and the literature review 
Area of 
interest 
Results of literature 
review 
Results from the pilot 
study 
Comments on the relative 
outcomes 
Prospect 
Theory 
Humans are subject to a 
large number of individual 
biases. In particular, when 
faced with risk and 
uncertainty individuals 
exhibit risk aversion facing 
gains, risk tolerance facing 
losses, loss aversion, and 
underweight/overweight 
high/low probabilities 
respectively 
While only 3 Board  
members were interviewed, 
the results suggest that the 
extent of the bias may be 
considerably reduced  
There is not a great deal of 
literature on the bias  
Boards exhibit in terms of 
Prospect Theory. There is 
considerable evidence that 
Boards exhibit certain biases 
such as optimism bias, 
isolation effect bias, recency 
bias, but not much work in 
how Boards distort the true 
risks facing the firm  
Corporate 
Governance 
Worldwide, Boards exhibit 
a varying degree of 
readiness in terms of 
corporate governance 
regulation 
In South Africa governance 
legislation appears to be 
more onerous than UK, 
European or USA legislation. 
South African  companies are 
relatively well prepared  
Board members commented 
that legislation in South 
Africa was becoming too 
onerous, and that the costs of 
compliance may not warrant 
the results. This implies that 
there may be no further 
reduction in risk from 
increased regulatory 
requirements  
Board 
structure and 
knowledge 
base 
Boards consist of 
individuals driven by a 
desire to improve their 
stature, and increase their 
wealth. Boards consist of 
cognitive factions with 
differing perceptions and 
levels of understanding of 
the internal and external 
risk environment. Only 
certain senior executive 
members of the Board have 
“core” knowledge 
encompassing most of the 
risk issues of the firm.  
Different Board members 
consider their levels of risk 
readiness to be different, 
exhibit different tendencies 
towards risk, have different 
perspectives on the nature 
and extent of risks facing the 
firm, and construe these risks 
differently. There appears to 
be evidence of source 
dependence, whereby Board 
members will in the face of 
similar size threats, treat risks 
from different sources 
differently. Different 
members of the same Board 
construe their overall risks 
differently. 
Board members’ financial 
packages may engender  
different risk attitudes. 
Different cognitive factions 
will compete for their views 
in terms of risky decisions. 
Boardroom politics in terms 
of leadership, knowledge and 
power will influence the final 
outcome.  
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4.7 Research Question Final Form 
From the literature and pilot study results there are 5 major areas of risk management which 
lead to convergence towards the research question, as shown in Table 4.9 below. 
 Table 4.9 Developing the Research Question 
      Review          Area of risk  1           Area of risk 2           Area of risk 3          Area of risk 4        Area of risk 5 
Factors which 
influence the 
way Boards 
view risk 
Understanding 
and awareness of 
the internal and 
external 
environment 
The natural 
human biases 
people are subject 
to when faced 
with risk and 
uncertainty 
Corporate 
Governance 
regulation, 
implementation 
and adherence 
Boards 
comprise 
individuals with 
their own 
ambitions and 
agendas 
The way Boards 
interact iro 
Boards 
construction, 
leadership,, 
“Groupthink” and 
collaboration 
What does the 
literature and or 
pilot study say 
or not say 
Boards try and 
make sense, they 
use technology 
and they obtain 
and analyse data 
Individuals 
exhibit multiple 
biases in their 
thinking. Little 
literature on 
Board bias when 
faced with risk 
and uncertainty. 
No investigation 
of Prospect 
Theory at a group 
level    
Most companies 
do not fully 
comply with their 
corporate 
governance 
obligations. The 
most compliant 
companies 
outperform their 
less compliant 
peers 
Executives risk 
proclivity is 
linked to their 
salary and 
incentive 
structures 
Only the most 
senior executive 
Board members 
have “core” 
knowledge of the 
operations of the 
company; 
cognitive factions 
exist within the 
Board 
The research 
question from 
each area of 
risk 
Are Boards able 
to make sense of 
and perceive 
internal and 
external threats 
accurately  and 
can RepGrid 
improve risk 
mitigation  
Are Boards biased 
in their thinking, 
and how does 
corporate 
governance 
regulation 
influence this bias  
Does corporate 
governance 
regulation reduce 
risk as intended 
Does executive 
compensation 
influence the 
risk taking 
behaviour and 
bias towards 
risk of the 
Board  
Are Boards as 
“cognitive 
entities” effective 
at identifying and 
managing risk  
  
 
The Research Question 
Why do South African Boards, in spite of strict corporate governance regulations governing the management of risk, 
exhibit varying degrees of effectiveness in developing strategies to deal with their enterprise risk management 
(ERM)? 
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The research question is re-stated below, together with the aims and objectives of the 
research:  
The research question 
Why do South African Boards, in spite of strict corporate governance regulations governing 
the management of risk, exhibit varying degrees of effectiveness in developing strategies to 
deal with their enterprise risk management (ERM)?  
The aim of the research is: 
To examine why Boards, in spite of strict corporate governance guidelines, deal with the 
myriad risk issues facing the company, to different effect, in developing strategies to deal 
with enterprise risk management. 
The objectives of the research, with the techniques to be used in the research are: 
O1:  To investigate to what extent Board members of companies which apply corporate 
governance regulations are liable to human bias in risk estimation. 
The quantitative and qualitative data derived from the interviews (Appendix B Risk 
Readiness; Risk Aversion and Risk Bias Questionnaires) provided answers to this 
question. 
O2: To investigate to what extent Boards which are less subject to individual human 
biases are more effective in developing strategies to deal with ERM. 
Levels of risk readiness were compared with levels of human bias (Appendix B 
questionnaires (Risk Readiness; Risk Aversion and Risk Bias Questionnaires)). 
O3:   To investigate to what extent Boards that adhere to corporate governance are more 
effective in developing strategies to deal with ERM. 
Levels of risk readiness were compared with measures of corporate governance 
implementation (Appendix B questionnaires (Risk Readiness; Risk Aversion and 
Risk Bias Questionnaires)). 
O4:   To examine the ways in which the estimation and personal construing of risk differs 
     between highly compliant and less compliant Boards. 
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The Risk Readiness, Risk Aversion and Risk Bias questionnaires and the elicitation 
of information during the RepGrid interviews and a scorecard were used to gauge 
whether Boards became more aware of their risk exposures and obligations; and 
hence more effective in implementing measures to identify and mitigate risk. 
In summary, the techniques, Questionnaires and a RepGrid interview with members of the 
Board, were used to obtain an understanding of how Board members think about and 
construe risk.      
4.8 Conclusion 
 Is it possible that corporate governance regulations engender a sense of false security 
amongst Board members? King III is highly prescriptive in terms of the activities the Board 
must carry out in order to achieve compliance. There are mechanical processes the 
executive must follow. For example, a probability must be allocated to the range of 
identifiable risks the firm faces. But who is to check whether all the risks are covered in the 
risk schedule, and who is to check the validity of such a risk measure? Are Boards capable 
of being realistic in doing so? The non-executive members of the Board certainly may not 
have a full understanding to appreciate the nuances of each situation. And once the risk 
values are attributed, then in the Board’s mind, and those of the auditors who have to report 
on the corporate governance readiness, are the Board’s governance obligations complete? 
Thus Boards, and the firms they represent, may be lulled into a false sense of security – a 
form of corporate governance moral hazard.  
Understanding and conveying knowledge relating to risk exposure is in itself a complicated 
task. Complexity in the knowledge structure refers to the amount of information or the 
number of elements within a knowledge structure (Lyles and Schwenk, 2009). The amount 
of work executives face may not be conducive to having “think tanks” devoted to 
identifying and assessing risk measures. Thus peripheral knowledge relating to risk is not 
enhanced. The understanding of risk may reside solely with the CEO and the Financial 
Director who are “closest to the action”.  It is possible that increased complexity around 
risk and uncertainty may result in an “inner core” level of knowledge – i.e. the executive 
directors possess inner core elements of a knowledge framework relating to risk about 
which there is an absence of detailed knowledge. This inner core knowledge is not 
142 
 
 
communicated to the management team, though is not withheld. These sentiments relating 
to risk reside deep within the cognitive processes of all but the leading executives of the 
management team. This is not to state that these executives are accurate in the perceptions, 
or that they clearly foresee or understand all the risks. But they have access to the most 
information, their jobs prescribe their risk oversight obligations, and by virtue of who they 
are, are likely to have the cognition to be able to “get their minds around” these complex 
risk issues.  And that is why the empirical work is focused on the way in which Boards 
construe risk. 
4.9 Details of the Chapters which follow. 
The research now turns to the analysis and discussion of the results of the main study.  
 Chapter 5 will deal with the analysis of the results of the Risk Readiness, Risk 
Aversion and Risk Bias Questionnaires.  
 Chapter 6 will be the main results chapter, devoted primarily to the analysis of 
data derived from the RepGrid interviews. 
 The aims and objectives will be discussed and analysed in Chapter 7, and an 
important new theory will be presented.  
 Chapter 8 will summarise, conclude and answer the research question.  
 
 
 
  
143 
 
 
 The Results of the Risk Readiness, Risk Aversion Chapter 5.
and Risk Bias Questionnaires 
This Chapter presents and analyses the results of the 3 Questionnaires. Further data 
obtained from the results of the RepGrid interview are discussed in Chapter 6. The Board 
members of 3 companies (QD, BINS and VGOLD) were interviewed individually, and 
each member completed these 3 different questionnaires as set out in Appendix B: 
 Risk Readiness Questionnaire 
 Risk Aversion Questionnaire 
 Risk Bias Questionnaire 
5.1 Further Signposting 
In Section 1.4 a chapter summary was provided to assist the reader in following the overall 
structure of this thesis. At this point it is worthwhile reviewing the remainder and most 
important part of the thesis. 
As stated before, this thesis is concerned with how South African Boards construe risk. 
There are many aspects to how Boards construe and make sense of their risk. In order to 
understand this complex process more clearly it is necessary to approach this research from 
several different points. This is more clearly demonstrated in Figure 5.1 below. 
The use of moving cogs is intended to highlight several important aspect of making sense 
around risk issues as discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2. 
 Companies are in a dynamic state of sensemaking. 
 There are many factors both internal and external which affect companies decisions 
when faced with risk such as regulatory exigencies around risk management and 
corporate governance, Board diversity, knowledge and cognitive interactions, and 
communication and collaboration. 
 Companies, as cognitive entities, are susceptible to various forms of bias, and there 
are different levels of understanding of, and tolerance towards, risk.  
 All the internal and external factors impact to a greater or lesser extent on the 
sensemaking and decision making process. 
 The cogs do not always turn in concert, but often there are conflicting issues, with 
opposing forces impacting on the risk sensemaking process. 
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This research attempts to understand the issues around construing risk at a Board level, and 
measure as many of these factors as possible and then draw conclusions and possible causal 
relationships where they exist.  
Figure 5.1 Dynamic state of risk management
 
The questionnaires and RepGrid interviews are designed to elicit as much information as 
possible regarding the way Boards respond to risk. The results and discussions follow in the 
remainder of the thesis, and will now be discussed in detail.  
 
 
Knowledge and 
experience, 
Board 
collaboration 
and 
sensemaking  
Cognitive 
bias when 
faced with 
risk 
Internal and 
external risk 
environment 
 
How Boards 
construe risk  
Legislation 
regarding risk 
management 
and corporate 
governance 
Board 
attitude  
to risk  
aversion 
Level of risk 
preparedness 
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5.2 The Results of the Risk Readiness Questionnaire 
Question 26 taken from the Risk Readiness Questionnaire (Appendix B) was used to 
provide an indication whether the 3 companies were similarly prepared to manage their risk 
in terms of an overall ERM system. The results are summarised in Table 5.1 below.  
 
Table 5.1 The Risk Readiness Questionnaire (Question 26 Risk Readiness 
Questionnaire, Appendix B) to indicate whether the companies are similar in 
terms of their overall Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) systems in place 
  BINS ACTUAL  QD ACTUAL VGOLD ACTUAL  
1 No ERM system currently in place 0 7 0 
2 Investigating concept of ERM; no 
planning in place 
2 1 1 
3 No formal ERM in place; steps 
being taken 
3 0 1 
4 Partial ERM in place 6 0 1 
5  Fully functioning ERM in place 0 0 0 
 
Table 5.1 compares the responses from the 3 companies’ members relating to their view of 
the extent to which their respective companies conform to the legal requirements around 
the introduction of an effective ERM system.  
Table 5.2 below shows the scores derived from the Risk Readiness Questionnaire 
(Appendix B). As stated earlier, the 11 point scale was used in order to achieve consistency 
with Beasley et al., (2010, 2011, 2012) on which the Risk Readiness questionnaire was 
based. 1 indicated lack of compliance, while 11 indicated full compliance. The following 
indicative observations may be drawn from Table 5.2 where ū and s are the mean and 
standard deviation of the observed results for each question. 
Increase in Risk Intensity over past 5 years 
 All 3 companies had experienced an increase in complexity and operational 
surprises over the previous 5 years. 
State of Risk Readiness relative to King III and in terms of overall risk process in 
place 
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 The Board of QD recognized that its own level of maturity of risk management was 
less well developed than the Boards of BINS and VGOLD believed to be the case. 
How well does the company manage its risk? 
 The Boards of all 3 companies had strongly different views relating to the extent to 
which they believed they managed their risks effectively. The QD Board (Mean 4.0 
on a scale from 1 to 11) believed they were much less effective at managing risk, 
than the Board of BINS believed (Mean 7.4 on a scale from 1 to 11) or VGOLD 
(Mean 5.7 on a scale from 1 to 11). 
 This would lead to the possible conclusion that QD managed its risk less 
effectively, unless of course the Board of QD and VGOLD were much more 
confident of their risk management capability in responding to the questionnaire. 
147 
 
 
 
  
Table 5.2 Summary of the Results of the Risk Readiness Questionnaire 
 BINS QD VGOLD 
ū S ū S ū S 
Increase in Risk Intensity over past 5 years        
1 To what extent has the risk/complexity of your business increased over the past 5 years 9.1 0.9 7.3 2.9 7.7 1.5 
2 To what extent has your business faced an operational surprise over the past 5 years 6.6 2.2 8.6 1.8 6.7 3.5 
Average 7.9 1.6 8.0 2.4 7.2 2.5 
State of Risk Readiness relative to King III and in terms of overall risk process in place 
3 What is the level of maturity of your organization’s approach to a fully functioning King III risk management process  7.3 1.8 2.9 1.5 6.3 2.1 
 Average 7.3 1.8 2.9 1.5 6.3 2.1 
How Well the Company Manages its Risk 
4  How has the level of disclosure and reporting of risk increased over the past year 7.9 2.1 5.0 5.4 6.7 0.6 
5 Are you confident the overall risks the organization faces are being effectively managed 7.8 2.3 4.3 1.9 6.0 1.0 
6 Does the company maintain risk inventories to counter supply/industrial disruption 6.6 1.7 3.1 1.7 6.7 0.6 
7  Do what extent does the company formally assess supply side risks 6.3 0.9 3.6 2.9 5.0 2.0 
8 To what extent are top risk exposures discussed when the Board meets to discuss existing strategic plans 8.4 1.8 4.9 2.8 2.7 2.5 
9 What is the extent to  which existing risk exposures are considered when evaluating new strategies 8.0 2.2 6.5 1.9 5.7 3.2 
10 Indicate the extent to which company has articulated its appetite for risks in the context of strategic planning  6.6 2.3 4.1 1.9 7.6 0.6 
11 Indicate extent to which company has carried a formal assessment of market risk 7.1 2.1 3.8 2.3 4.0 2.6 
12  Indicate extent to which company has carried a formal assessment of industry risk 7.7 2.0 3.5 1.9 3.7 1.5 
13 Indicate extent to which company has carried a formal assessment of political risk 5.7 2.1 2.0 1.1 5.3 3.5 
14 Indicate extent to which company has carried a formal assessment of regulatory risk 8.8 2.9 4.6 3.3 7.0 1.7 
15 Indicate extent to which organization has carried a formal assessment of IT risk 9.2 1.7 4.6 2.6 5.7 1.5 
16 Indicate extent to which organization uses qualitative means to assess risk 7.6 1.6 3.9 2.2 5.7 3.2 
17 Indicate extent to which organization has used quantitative means to assess risk 7.8 1.2 3.4 1.9 4.0 2.0 
18 In assessing risk, to what extent does the Board actively consider risk probabilities 6.9 1.8 3.6 1.8 7.3 0.6 
19 Indicate extent to which Board believes existing compensation arrangements contribute excessively to risk 6.0 2.7 3.4 1.8 3.0 1.0 
20  Indicate extent to which risk exposures are considered when making capital allocations to functional units 7.4 2.1 4.3 2.3 5.6 1.8 
Average 7.5 2.1 4.0 2.3 5.7 2.1 
Board tolerance to  source dependence 
21 How would you describe your companies attitude to strategic risk  (1=intolerant) 7.8 2.0 5.5 2.5 6.3 3.1 
22 How would you describe your company’s attitude to operational risk (1= intolerant) 6.8 2.6 5.3 2.4 3.7 1.5 
23 How would you describe your company’s attitude to financial risk (1= intolerant) 6.2 2.7 5.8 2.6 3.3 1.5 
24 How would you describe your company’s attitude to market risk (1= intolerant) 6.9 2.7 7.0 2.6 6.3 1.5 
Average 6.9 2.5 5.9 2.5 4.9 1.9 
Influence of budgetary performance on Board attitude to risk  
25 Does your company become more risk seeking when it achieves its targets/budgets(1=no) 5.9 2.3 5.3 2.6 6.7 2.1 
26 Does your company become more risk averse when it underperforms its budgets(1=no)  5.4 2.3 6.0 2.7 7.7 2.3 
Average 5.7 2.3 5.7 2.6 7.2 2.2 
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Board tolerance to source dependence                                                                              
 The Board of QD appeared to be less tolerant of risk (see heading in Table 5.2 
“Board tolerance to source dependence”) than BINS (5.9 vs 6.9), which was 
surprising in that QD was much less prepared for risk management than BINS, 
which is a risk in itself. The Board of VGOLD was the most intolerant of risk (4.9). 
 Interestingly there appeared to be an element of source bias, which meant that 
companies had varying degrees of tolerance for risk, based on the source of the risk. 
QD for example was more intolerant of financial risk than say its market risk, 
whereas VGOLD had a high degree of intolerance for its financial and operational 
risk, and was more tolerant of its strategic and market risk. This is deemed irrational 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992). The source of risk should not determine whether 
the company is more or less tolerant to its possible impact. BINS on the other hand 
appeared to adopt a more consistent approach to risk overall, irrespective of source. 
In each company a Friedman Rank Test (to assess the independence of view within 
companies in terms of Risk Readiness (Ho: Members of each Board think similarly about 
risk issues within their respective companies) as shown in Table 5.3 below. Details of the 
rank calculations are shown in Appendices K, L and M. 
Table 5.3 Friedman Rank Test for independence of view within companies in terms of 
Risk Readiness 
Ho: Members within each Board think similarly about risk issues  
H1: Members within each Board think differently about risk issues  
Company No 
Members 
r  
Number of 
Questions (Table5.2)                                          
c            
No 
of df
c-1      
FR Test 
Statistic 
p χ²  Test Outcome 
BINS 10 26 25 68.13 0.005 46.93 at 25 df Reject  Ho 
QD 8 26 25 57.19 0.005 46.93 at 25 df Reject  Ho 
VGOLD 3 26 25 36.80 0.075 36.01 at 25 df Reject Ho 
Friedman Rank Test Statistic FR = 12/rc(c+1)*∑j=1,c R .j
2 – 3r(c+1) where R .j
2 = Square of the total of ranks for question j, 
(j=1…c) c= number of questions=26, r= number of members in each group. 
FR can be approximated by a χ² distribution with c-1 df.  
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Table 5.3 shows that the null hypotheses  
Ho: Members within Boards think similarly about their risk readiness vs  
H1: Members within Boards think differently about their risk readiness issues  
can be rejected in each case using the Friedman Rank Test. Thus 
BINS Board members think differently about their risk issues FR >χ
2
, 25 df, p<.005 
QD Board members think differently about their risk issues FR >χ
2
, 25 df, p<.005 
VGOLD Board members probably think differently about risk issues FR >χ
2
, 25 df, p<.075 
Within each Board, members therefore tended to think differently about risk readiness 
issues relating to their company. It is interesting to consider whether the three companies 
chosen for this research think differently as intact Boards, about Risk Readiness, as shown 
in Table 5.4 below, using the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. From prior inspection of the data, 
a one-tailed test was chosen as it appeared that BINS>VGOLD>QD. Further, the data 
sample was sufficiently large (>10) to use the normal approximation to the Wilcoxon 
distribution.  
A test was also carried out to assess whether the companies had similar views in respect of 
attitudes to source dependence. In this regard it was not possible to determine a priori 
whether any of the pairs of companies taken in turn showed any preference, so a 2 tailed 
test was used, also shown in Table 5.4 below. The sample sizes in this test were small, so 
the tables produced by Wilcoxon for small sample sizes were used. Details of the ranks 
appear in Appendix J.  
In Table 5.4 the hypotheses shown were tested amongst each pair of companies taken in 
turn to test whether there was any similarity in views on their risk. The null and alternative 
hypotheses are as follows: 
Ho: Pairs of companies have similar views on their level of risk preparedness vs 
H1: Pairs of companies have different views on their level of risk preparedness 
Ho:BINS =QD 
Ho:BINS>QD 
Ho:VGOLD=QD 
H1:VGOLD>QD 
Ho:BINS= VGOLD 
H1 BINS>VGOLD 
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Table 5.4 Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test for independence of view across companies in 
terms of Risk Readiness – see Appendix J 
Ho: Each pair of companies have similar views in terms of Risk Readiness for each group 
of questions as shown in Table 5.2  
Hypothesis 
Ho:BINS =QD 
Ho:BINS>QD 
Ho:VGOLD=QD 
H1:VGOLD>QD 
Ho:BINS= VGOLD 
H1 BINS>VGOLD 
Result 
Questions Wa Test 
p=.005 
wa Calc 
 
Wa Test 
p=.005 
wa Calc 
 
Wa Test 
p=.005 
wa Calc 
 
 
State of Risk Readiness with 
respect to King III , and how 
well the company manages its 
risk (These two questions 
combined) 
Z 0.995                 
=2.58 
z=5.03 Z 0.995 
=2.58 
z=3.88 Z 0.995 
=2.58 
z=3.62 Reject 
all  Ho 
Hypothesis 
Ho:BINS =QD 
Ho:BINS>QD 
Ho:VGOLD=QD 
H1:VGOLD>QD 
Ho:BINS= VGOLD 
H1 BINS>VGOLD 
Result 
Board tolerance to source 
dependence 
Wa =26 
na=nb=4 
wa=23 Wa =26  
na=nb=4 
wa=20 Wa =26 
na=nb=4 
wa=24 Accept 
all Ho 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test Statistic wa = the sum of ranks of company  a. For larger samples na > 10 
use the normal approximation µa = na(na+nb+1)/2, σa=√ (na. nb (na+nb+1)/12).                                
P(Wa > wa)≈ P(Z > z) where z = (wa -ua)/ σa and Z is the relevant percentile of the standard normal 
distribution .  
For smaller samples where 4 ≤  na  ≤  10 use the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Table. 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.4 in terms of:  
State of Risk Readiness BINS>QD, VGOLD > QD, BINS > VGOLD  P(Z>z) <.005 
Board tolerance to source dependence BINS=VGOLD=VGOLD, P(Wa>wa) >0.005  
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The following Table 5.5 indicates the reasons the different Boards members gave for 
barriers which acted as an impediment to having an effective risk management system in 
place.  
Table 5.5 Barriers to implementing an effective ERM strategy 
Which of the following barriers most act as an impediment 
to implementing an effective ERM strategy 
BINS QD VGOLD 
Competing priorities 3 1 0 
Insufficient resources 4 3 0 
Lack of perceived value 0 0 1 
Perception ERM adds to bureaucracy 2 1 2 
Lack of Board or senior executive ERM leadership 1 3 0 
Legal or regulatory barriers 0 0 0 
Total Number of Members (*1 member failed to answer) 10* 8 3 
 
The above Table 5.5 indicates the number of members of each Board who indicated various 
reasons for their lack of ERM (Enterprise Risk Management). While most Board members 
saw the value of an ERM strategy, QD blamed their lack of leadership in ERM, and BINS 
members cited competing priorities and insufficient resources as the main reasons for their 
lack of ERM. VGOLD was more concerned about the cost of additional bureaucratic 
processes as being a limiting obstacle to better ERM. 
 
The relative levels of risk readiness by each Board, taken from Table 5.2 “How Well does 
Your Company Manage its Risk”, are shown in Figure 5.2 below. These relative levels will 
in future be referred to as the Risk Readiness Index (“RRI”). 
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Figure 5.2 Relative levels of Risk Readiness between BINS, QD and VGOLD derived 
from the Risk Readiness Questionnaire Table 5.2 Question 3 Risk Readiness  
 
 
From this Figure 5.2 it is clear that while QD (Electronics Manufacturer) had virtually no 
risk management system in place, both VGOLD (Gold Mining Company) and BINS 
(Insurance Company) were far more advanced in terms of their risk management processes.    
It is surprising to note that both BINS and VGOLD operated in separate yet highly 
regulated industries, yet both companies considered themselves relatively unprepared in 
terms of their risk readiness. Under King III (2009) both BINS and VGOLD should be 
close to 11 in terms of their ratings, and while QD is in a relatively unregulated industry, it 
nevertheless operated well below acceptable levels of risk management in terms of King III 
(2009). While King III applies equally to all industries and size of company, it is generally 
accepted that smaller regulated companies will take longer to reach full compliance. 
However companies such as BINS operating as an insurance company ought to be further 
advanced in terms of its compliance.    
5.3 The Results of the Risk Aversion Questionnaire 
The detailed results of the Risk Aversion Questionnaires are shown in Appendices F 1, F 2 
and F 3. The Risk Aversion questions attempted to establish whether members of the 
respective Boards were either risk averse, risk neutral or risk tolerant when faced with 
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possible events leading to either gains or losses. Members were asked to choose between a 
series of two hypothetical projects, the one project being low risk with a low payout/loss 
and the other being high risk with a high payout /loss. The purpose of this questionnaire 
was to establish if there were any consistent trends across the different Boards. The 
summarised results of the Risk Aversion Questionnaire are shown in Table 5.6 below. 
Table 5.6 Showing how the Boards behave in terms of Risk Aversion  
Entity BINS QD VGOLD  CEO’s 
only* 
Individuals 
Kahneman and 
Tversky (1992) 
No of respondents 11 8 3 8 26 
Entity response to a 
possible gain event 
Risk 
Neutral 
Risk 
Neutral 
Risk 
Averse 
Risk 
Neutral 
Risk Averse 
Entity response to a 
possible loss event 
Risk 
Tolerant 
Risk 
Tolerant 
Risk 
Neutral 
Risk 
Tolerant 
Risk Tolerant  
 
In Table 5.6 are also included, for interest, the averaged results of the CEO’s* (BINS, QD 
and VGOLD CEO’s, plus the 5 CEO’s interviewed in the pilot study). The results 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) predicted for individuals are also shown in the last column. 
Prospect Theory predicts that individuals will be risk averse when facing gains, and risk 
tolerant when facing losses. The results from Table 5.6 are: 
 when facing an event leading to possible gains, BINS, QD and the CEO group 
appeared to be risk neutral, that is they did not exhibit risk tolerant or risk averse 
behaviour, unlike VGOLD which appeared to exhibit risk averse behaviour, as 
predicted by Prospect Theory.  
 when facing losses all entities exhibited risk tolerant behaviour, this time in line 
with Prospect Theory, except for VGOLD which appeared to adopt a risk neutral 
approach.  
 this was also a surprising result in that all 4 groups of Board members (except for 
VGOLD) operating across different industries, at a different level of risk 
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management maturity and facing different issues were risk neutral when facing 
gains. 
  by contrast the Boards were risk tolerant when loses loomed, in line with Prospect 
Theory.  Thus the Boards appeared to be realistic when facing gains and tended not 
to take riskier options than necessary, yet would consider risky solutions when 
facing losses. This observed natural tendency (when facing losses) for the Boards to 
adopt a riskier stance than they otherwise might (perhaps as a desperate measure to 
ensure the survival of the business) may in itself be the undoing of the business 
ultimately leading to its collapse. The Boards therefore ought to recognise this 
tendency and evaluate their options more carefully when facing losses. 
5.4 Results of the Risk Bias Questionnaire  
The detailed results of the data and the processing models used to produce the results set 
out in this section are shown in Appendices G 1, G 2, G 3 and G 4. There are 2 sets of 
results emerging from this questionnaire, as discussed in Section 5.4.1 below.  
5.4.1 The Probability Weighting Function and the Value Function 
Each will be dealt with separately in turn. The summarised results are as follows: 
The Probability Weighting Function 
The probability weighting function simply defines the relationship between a true 
probability, and the subjective perceived value of that probability by an independent 
observer, in this case the member of a Board. Whereas the Risk Aversion Questionnaire 
provides a hypothetical choice for the member when faced with 2 risky alternatives, the 
Risk Bias Questionnaire is able to measure the degree of bias by asking the member to 
attach a monetary value to a series of hypothetical projects.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) proposed that individuals distort their view of actual 
probabilities when faced with risk and uncertainty, and the extent of this bias varies with 
the actual given probability, and whether the observer is in a mental state expecting either a 
positive or negative outcome, such as a gain or loss. (For example a low probability of 
winning the Irish Sweep is optimistically viewed by many, however unlikely a positive 
outcome may be).    
The results shown in Table 5.7 indicate that:  
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 all 3 Boards underestimated risk irrespective of whether the risk was a high or low 
probability event, when the outcome was expected to be positive (gain). Thus when 
a positive outcome was expected, all Boards were more pessimistic or cautious than 
they needed to be. An example of this irrational behaviour may be the Board’s 
attitude to an uncontested tender submission where there is a high probability of 
winning the tender on favourable terms, and the Board fails to prepare sufficiently 
well for its outcome;  
 similarly, the  Boards also underestimated risks of high probability events, when the 
outcome was expected to be negative (loss). In this case when a highly probable 
negative outcome was expected, Boards were more optimistic than they ought to 
have been, and would possibly devote insufficient attention to dealing with the  
consequences;  
 the notable exception was that BINS, unlike the other 2 Boards, overestimated risk 
events when there was a low probability risk event and the outcome was expected to 
be a loss.  This divergence of behaviour faced with low probability outcomes was 
probably one of the most important distinctions in risk behaviour between the 2 
Boards. The occurrence of multiple low probability high impact events can cause 
companies to fail. BINS was pessimistic about such events and was therefore more 
able to anticipate such events.  
 The data derived clearly indicates that members of the 3 Boards as a group did not 
exhibit the same characteristics as those derived by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) 
for individuals when facing low probability gains.  
The highlighted text in Table 5.7 indicates where entities did not subscribe to the main 
views of the sample taken as a whole. 
The results of the Risk Bias Questionnaire are shown in graphic detail, in Figures 5.3 and 
5.4 below, to highlight the degrees of distortion of risk perception over the full range of 
probabilities [0, 1]. 
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Table 5.7 How Boards responded to low and high probability events when faced with 
gains and losses respectively (probability weighting function) 
Entity BINS QD VGOLD Individual 
(K and T, 1992) 
Entity 
response to 
low probability  
gain event 
Board 
underestimates 
risk 
Board 
underestimates 
risk (pronounced) 
Board 
underestimates 
risk 
Individual 
overestimates 
risk 
Entity  
response to 
high 
probability 
gain event 
Board 
underestimates 
risk 
Board 
underestimates 
risk (pronounced) 
Board 
underestimates 
risk 
Individual 
underestimates 
risk 
Entity 
response to 
low probability  
loss event 
Board 
overestimates 
risk 
Board 
underestimates 
risk (pronounced) 
Board 
underestimates 
risk 
Individual 
overestimates 
risk 
Entity 
response to 
high 
probability 
loss event 
Board 
underestimates 
risk 
Board 
underestimates 
risk (pronounced) 
Board 
underestimates 
risk 
Individual 
underestimates 
risk 
 
In Figure 5.3 the black line indicates the line of nil bias. Ideally Boards’ perceptions of risk 
should lie along this line; Boards ought to see risks for what they are. The red dotted line 
indicates the predictions made by Kahneman and Tversky (1992).  It is evident from Figure 
5.3 that when facing events which lead to a possible gain, all 3 companies underweighted 
both high and low probabilities. QD had the most distorted view of probability, deviating 
most from the black line, particularly at the 60% to 80% probability level. Thus when the 
prospect of gain is between these levels, the QD Board will most underestimate risk. For 
example if the true risk is 60%, the Board would assume that there is only a 30% 
probability of the event occurring, which represents a considerable degree of distortion. As 
most strategic business decisions are likely to lie within this range of probabilities, QD was  
likely to undervalue most positive projects. This may be due to a history of failed projects 
which appeared promising at the time. Overall, QD and VGOLD appeared to be more 
conservative than BINS.  
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Figure 5.3 The probability weighting function for positive prospects 
 
The x-axis is the given or true probability, and the y-axis is the probability construed by the 
Board. 
Figure 5.4 below shows how Boards react to risky situations which are likely to lead to 
losses. An example of such a situation may be a company sued for non-performance; there 
will be some cost to the company, either for example a full damages settlement, or at best 
potentially costly litigation.  
It is very interesting to note that when facing potentially loss making events, BINS 
distorted probabilities almost exactly in line with the predictions of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1992) below, where the BINS weighted probability curve lies almost perfectly on the 
Kahneman and Tversky derived curve.  There are 2 points of interest to note.  When faced 
with risky loss making situations, BINS behaved almost exactly as predicted by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1992). The other 2 Boards underweighted probabilities at all levels, though 
the level of distortion was less pronounced than when facing gains. This means that QD and 
VGOLD underestimate risks in the face of losses, resulting perhaps in a more relaxed view 
than they ought to adopt, particularly at the mid-range probabilities. 
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Figure 5.4 The probability weighting function for negative prospects 
 
The x-axis is the given or true probability, and the y-axis is the probability construed by the 
Board. 
Being unduly conservative is, however, not necessarily a business virtue, and may be a risk 
in itself. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (Jensen, Black, Scholes, 1972) states that the 
return on an investment is proportional to its beta, defined as the systematic (non-
diversifiable or necessary) risk of the investment (See Glossary). If a Board habitually 
underestimates the systematic risk of an investment, it may unintentionally be avoiding 
risky projects whose betas may lend themselves to good returns. Similarly, if the Board 
habitually underestimates risks when losses loom, then there may be a tendency to prepare 
inadequately for such eventualities.   
The Value Function 
The Reader will recall that the Value Function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992) proposes 
that individuals exhibit behavioural characteristics when faced with risky choices as shown 
in the Prospect Curve Figure 2.3. Individuals will attach a perceived Value or Utility to a 
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given Gain. Concavity of the curve above the x-axis indicates risk aversion facing positive 
gains suggesting that recipients are considered to become increasingly circumspect and 
attach increasingly lower values to marginal gains. Similarly, below the x-axis the curve is 
convex, indicating risk tolerance.  Whereas the Probability Weighting Function discussed 
in the previous section highlights Boards’ bias when faced with probabilistic decisions, the 
Value Function indicates how Boards, in this research, attach perceived Value (or Utility) 
to the expected Gains from risky projects.   
Figure 5.5 below provides a graphical indication of the Value Function derived from the 
results of the Risk Bias Questionnaire (Appendix B). The black line indicates the line of 
Zero Risk Sensitivity to losses and gains. Boards which adhered to this Zero Risk 
Sensitivity line would for example apply the same risk discount rates to all projected 
potential cash flows irrespective of the size of such cash flows; all projects would carry 
equal weight irrespective of the size of the project. For positive gains the curves of all 
companies lie below this line, and above the Prospect line (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992). 
It is possible to conclude from this data that the Boards were slightly risk intolerant facing 
gains, but not as risk intolerant as individuals might have been.      
Similarly below the x-axis the curves of all companies lay on, or above, the line of Zero 
Risk Sensitivity, indicating that generally Boards were risk tolerant when facing negative 
gains (losses). 
QD was most risk averse facing gains, and most risk tolerant facing losses.     
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, Kahneman and Tversky identified a behavioural 
phenomenon they referred to as “loss aversion”, described as the propensity to bear losses 
with far greater discomfort than the sense of comfort or elation from a similar sized gain. In 
graphical terms evidence of loss aversion would occur if the slope of the curve immediately 
below the origin were far steeper than above the origin.  From Figure 5.5 it is clear that 
there is no evidence of loss aversion. 
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Figure 5.5 The value weighting function showing how the Boards perceive the value 
(utility) of risky choices against expected gains  
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*In Figure 5.5 the Kahneman and Tversky curve does not exhibit a convex shape perhaps because the size of 
the Prospects proposed to Board members lay within practical financial limits relevant to the size of each 
company. There was no point in presenting Prospects to companies which lay outside their financial limits. 
Furthermore it was necessary to scale the prospect values to suit the size in terms of financial turnover to 
make the results between companies of different sizes comparable. 
In this Figure 5.5 it is possible to draw broad conclusions relating to the degree of 
sensitivity to gains and losses by assessing the divergence (from the line of Zero 
Sensitivity) of the Boards’ assessment of Value relative to given Gains. The greater the 
divergence of the Value from the black line, the greater the degree of risk aversion (for 
gains) and the greater the degree of risk tolerance (for losses).The conclusions which may 
be drawn from Figure 5.5 are tabled below in Table 5.8.  
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Table 5.8 Characteristics of Choice when faced with Risky Prospects 
Characteristic 
of choice 
BINS QD VGOLD K and T 
Facing gains Linear relationship 
above the origin  
between perceived 
gains and value 
indicating 
moderately 
increasing 
sensitivity to 
increasing gains  
(moderately risk 
averse facing 
gains) 
Linear relationship 
above the origin  
between perceived 
gains and value 
indicating 
moderately 
increasing 
sensitivity to 
increasing gains  
(moderately risk 
averse facing gains) 
Linear relationship 
above the origin  
between perceived 
gains and value 
indicating 
moderately 
increasing 
sensitivity to 
increasing gains  
(moderately risk  
averse facing 
gains) 
Concave 
curve above 
the origin 
indicating 
increasing 
sensitivity to 
risk as gains 
increase(risk 
averse facing 
gains) 
Facing losses Linear relationship 
below the origin  
between perceived 
gains and value 
indicating no  
sensitivity to 
increasing losses 
(neutral risk stance  
facing losses) 
Linear relationship 
below the origin  
between perceived 
gains and value 
indicating 
moderately  
diminishing  
sensitivity to 
increasing losses  
(moderately risk 
tolerant facing 
losses) 
Linear relationship 
below the origin  
between perceived 
gains and value 
indicating slightly 
diminishing  
sensitivity to 
increasing losses 
(slightly risk 
tolerant  facing 
losses) 
Convex curve 
below the 
origin 
indicating  
diminishing 
sensitivity to 
risk as losses 
increase (risk 
tolerant 
facing losses) 
Loss aversion No evidence No evidence No evidence For 
individuals 
there is a 
marked 
degree of loss 
aversion; the 
pain of a 
given loss is 
about 2.25 
times more 
intense than 
the elation of 
a similar gain. 
 
If these results accurately reflect the way Boards in general would behave when faced with 
risky choices, the ramifications for Boards are as follows: 
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 Boards are slightly risk averse as the size of a potential project increases. This was 
borne out by the CEO of BINS Insurance who stated that “it is not the size of 
project that matters (within reasonable limits) but the opportunity for good ROI’s 
(Returns on Investment) that is important”. Thus for the types of projects faced by 
BINS say, the degree of risk aversion is not dependent on project size, but on return. 
There is a consistent approach (linearity) across all positive project sizes indicating 
that while Boards attach a premium to risk, they do not become increasingly risk 
averse as the project size increases. 
 BINS and VGOLD were slightly risk averse for losses, and there was no evidence 
of increasing risk tolerance as the size of the project increased, contrary to 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992). There was some indication that Boards treated 
losses and gains differently. 
 QD on the other hand was more risk averse facing gains, and exhibited greater risk 
tolerance facing losses. Thus QD would possibly underestimate the full gravity of 
the consequences of a loss making position, and ignore safeguards to protect itself 
fully. 
 Loss aversion, observed by Kahneman and Tversky (1992, p.168) suggests that for 
individuals “losses loom larger than gains”. This research shows that the opposite 
applies. That is that Boards appear to be slightly risk averse when facing gains (in a 
sense casting aside any caution) and are more risk tolerant when facing losses than 
predicted by Kahneman and Tversky (1992). This means Boards may underestimate 
the true value of losses, leading to potentially serious consequences in terms of 
providing inadequate funding for such losses, and not acting quickly enough to 
develop countermeasures. 
Table 5.9 below indicates the results of a methodological triangulation validity comparison 
between the results of the Risk Aversion Questionnaire and the results of the Risk Bias 
Questionnaire. Facing gains, we can conclude that there is evidence for believing that 
Boards are generally neutral or risk averse, while facing losses there is evidence of Boards 
being neutral or risk tolerant. The highlighted sections show consistency of results across 
the 2 techniques mentioned. The purple shading indicates strong consistency of results. The 
green shading indicates mild consistency of results across the 2 techniques. 
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Whether the extent of Risk Readiness is an influence in the way Boards respond to Risk 
Aversion will be examined later.    
Table 5.9 Summary of the methodological triangulation to assess the validity of 
Board’s risk aversion behaviour 
Entity BINS QD VGOLD Pilot 
Study 
Individuals 
(K and T) 
Entity attitude to risk when facing an event leading to potential gains 
Risk Aversion 
Questionnaire 
(Table 5.1) 
Risk Neutral  Risk Neutral  Risk Averse Averse Risk Averse 
Risk Bias 
Questionnaire 
(Table 5.8) 
Moderately  
Risk  Averse 
Moderately  
Risk Averse 
Moderately 
Risk Averse 
Neutral Risk Averse 
Entity attitude to risk when facing an event leading to potential losses 
Risk Aversion 
Questionnaire 
(Table 5.1) 
Risk Neutral  Risk Tolerant Neutral Averse Risk Tolerant 
Risk Bias 
Questionnaire 
(Table 5.8) 
Risk Neutral  Risk Tolerant Slightly Risk 
Tolerant 
Neutral Risk Tolerant 
 
5.5 Practical problems with the data analysis 
During the course of the research several practical problems arose, particularly in applying 
Prospect Theory.  The problems will be fully discussed in this Section 5.4: 
5.5.1 Prospect Theory 
This research mainly concentrated on the original Prospect Theory developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and not the subsequent Cumulative Prospect Theory 
developed later (Kahneman and Tversky 1992). While the concept of Cumulative Prospect 
theory was utilised insofar that there are distinct probability weighting functions depending 
on whether the outcome is positive or negative, cumulative probabilities were not derived 
due to paucity data. There were insufficient data points to arrive at meaningful results. This 
is unlikely to have had any significant impact on the results or conclusions, which are in 
any event very broad and intended to be indicative.     
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5.5.2 Scaling 
Kahneman and Tversky used uniform bets to develop their theories, that is to say that each 
cohort of respondents was given the same set of questions using the same monetary values. 
In this research the size of company varies. It was thus necessary to scale the monetary 
values in an attempt to arrive at consistent comparable responses across all 3 companies. 
The numbers used in the Risk Aversion Questionnaire were chosen to reflect high value, 
medium value and low value projects relative to the size of each company. Fortunately in 
the case of QD and BINS the size of companies was similar. However in the case of 
VGOLD, a Gold Mining Company, the company was around 8 times larger. Conveniently, 
their revenue is dollar based and the Rand/Dollar exchange rate was 8 to one. Thus the 
questions were presented to the VGOLD Board in Dollar terms. This meant that a single set 
of numerical questionnaires could be applied to all three companies. 
5.5.3 Negative probabilities and profit margin 
When asked to attach a cash value to a set of prospects, often the respondent would provide 
an answer which gave rise to a negative probability. For example in the first question A of 
the Risk Bias Questionnaire respondents were asked to attach a value to a project with 
payoffs of 10m and 3m with probabilities of 20% and 80% respectively. The minimum 
payoff in this example is 3m, and maximum payoff is 10m. The statistical expected value is 
4.4m. Some respondents gave answers well below 3m. The theoretical probability which 
provides a payoff of any result below 3m is negative, which is clearly undefined. In these 
cases the minimum value which did not give rise to a negative probability was chosen. Part 
of the reason for this choice by respondents was due to the “risk” profit margin built into 
the respondents’ answers. The subjective inconsistency built into such profit margins by 
respondents within and across companies is a flaw in the Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 
1992) methodology as applied to this research.     
5.5.4 Mean vs. median 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) used the median results from the responses derived from 
their student populations.  In this study the median was also used. A test was done to check 
that there was no significant difference in results from using the mean.  It must however be 
pointed out that the mean of a set of results from a Board may be more subject to bias than 
a set of median results from a group of students whose decisions are completely 
independent. In a Board some members are likely to be far more influential than others, and 
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the CEO may have the casting vote. The degree of bias may change with different project 
types or issues where the knowledge or conviction of Board members vary. This bias is 
also highly likely to vary across Boards. Thus neither the median nor the arithmetic mean 
may reflect the decision making outcome of the group.  
5.5.5 Mixed prospects 
For mixed prospects, that is where the questions in the Risk Bias Questionnaire have a 
positive and a negative payoff, a decision needs to be taken as to whether the prospect is 
indeed positive or negative. In this study it was assumed that the sign of the expected value 
of the prospect determined whether it was positive or negative. 
5.6 Summary   
In this Chapter 5 the results of the Risk Readiness, Risk Aversion and Risk Bias 
Questionnaires were presented. The results can be summarised as follows: 
 The 3 companies exhibited varying degrees of Risk Readiness, with BINS being 
most Risk Ready, and QD being least Risk Ready. 
 Companies exhibited varying degrees of Risk Aversion facing gains with all 3 
companies varying between neutrality and slight risk aversion. Facing losses, the 
results were more clear cut, with BINS and QD being risk neutral, and QD 
exhibiting risk tolerant tendencies.   
 The Risk Bias Questionnaire showed that for all 3 companies there was a linear 
relationship between gains and perceived value suggesting that Boards did not face 
diminishing sensitivity in the face of losses and gains to the extent predicted by 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992). 
 There did not appear to be evidence of loss aversion, whereby Boards would value 
gains and losses differently.      
This concludes the summary of the results of the Risk Readiness, Risk Aversion and Risk 
Bias Questionnaires. In Chapter 6 below the results of the RepGrid analysis will be 
discussed. Chapter 7 deals with further theory development. In Chapter 8 the main results 
will be summarised. 
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   Main Findings and the Repertory Grid Analysis Chapter 6.
In Chapter 5 the results of the questionnaires were presented and discussed. In this Chapter 
the results of the RepGrid interviews are presented. The Chapter will be broken down into 
the following sections: 
 Results of the RepGrid analysis 
 Content analysis of the RepGrid (Jankowicz, 2004) 
 Differential Analysis of the 3 Boards 
 Further analysis of Characteristics obtained from the RepGrid analysis  
6.1 Results of the RepGrid Analysis 
As discussed in techniques section of the Methodology Chapter 3, and the Pilot Study 
Chapter 4, each member of the Board of QD, BINS and VGOLD were separately 
interviewed, and the Repertory Grid method was used to elicit each member’s personal 
constructs relating to how they made sense of risk in their businesses. Each member was 
presented with a number of permutations of 3 elements of risk (out of a total of 11 as 
described in Chapter 4), and the Kellyan question posed was: 
 “When you think of risk in your company, how do 2 of these elements of risk presented to 
you vary from the third element, and in what way”.  
6.2 The Content Analysis process 
In conducting the Content Analysis (Jankowicz, 2004), the QD Board (lowest level of 
regulatory compliance) and the BINS Board (highest level of regulatory compliance) were 
chosen in order to maximize the possible differences in results. At this stage VGOLD 
(medium level of compliance) was excluded from the analysis. In the Content Analysis 
phase 208 constructs were elicited using the 11 elements of risk described earlier. Of the 
208 constructs, 1 miscellaneous construct was discarded, 24 were supplied (mainly the 
supplied construct of the form “Overall a greater source of risk to the business” (19 
constructs) and “Overall we manage this risk well” (5 constructs) leaving 183 elicited 
constructs. These constructs were then Content Analysed (Jankowicz, 1994), by 
undertaking a process of pooling all the constructs and grouping them in similar clearly 
defined Categories to facilitate comparison across the 2 companies.   In order to ensure 
reliability of the Categories the following steps were taken: 
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1. A common set of Categories was defined by the present author; and 2 separate 
judges were requested to assist in the categorisation and definition process. 
2. The first judge (referred to as PC) - a retired businessman - was requested to 
separately categorise these constructs, and provide category definitions. These 
category definitions were used as a benchmark for a further reliability step. 
3. A second judge (referred to as DM) – a management consultant – was also 
separately requested to categorise the constructs. The comparison between the 
author’s content analysis and those of DM are shown in Appendix H 1. 
4. The results of DM were compared with those of the author, and two reliability tests 
were carried out to establish the degree of reliability of the categorisation as shown 
in Table 6.1 below:  
 Cohen’s Kappa (Perrault and Leigh, 1989, p. 137). This test yielded a 
reliability score of 82% which was lower than an acceptable score of 90%.  
 Perrault and Leigh measure (Perrault and Leigh, 1989, p.140) yielded a 
reliability score of 90%, in line with the recommended minimum level of 90%.  
Table 6.1 Reliability assessment tests (Perrault and Leigh (1989) 
N= Total number of judgements agreed by the judges 183 
Fa=Number of judgements on which judges agree 152 
k= the total number of Categories (see Table 6.2) 13 
Fc = Number of agreed judgements which are expected by chance (N/k) 14 
Cohen’s Kappa K=  (Fa-Fc)/(N-Fc) .82 
Leigh and Perrault’s I= √(Fa/N-(1/k))(k/(k-1))  .90 
 
5. The author and DM then negotiated a final selection of Categories, their definition, 
and finally the allocation of constructs to each Category. The benchmark 
categorisation of PC was referred to in this discussion. The author and DM were 
able to reach total agreement (100% on the categorisation and its definitions; this 
process took around 5 working days). These final Content Analysed results are 
shown in Appendix H 2. It is important to note that the Categories and Construct 
definitions were fed back to Board members individually, and also on a Group 
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basis. The report of the intact Boards feedback is discussed in more detail in Section 
6.8 below.   
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Table 6.2    Categories derived from the reliability exercise, and their definitions  
Category Positive Pole Definition Negative Pole 
Actual Control 
Achieved 
Board is in greater control over these risks Indicates the extent to which the Board is in control over the risk in terms of putting in place 
measures to bring the risk to within manageable tolerance levels 
Board has less control over these risks 
Actual Control 
Potential 
The risk is identifiable, predictable, stable and independent, and 
potentially highly controllable and easy to manage as part of an 
ERM strategy 
Measures the extent to which management feel that it is possible within  the reasonable and 
necessary level of resources available to the company to identify and control the risk to within 
acceptable tolerance levels 
The  risk is not  controllable and is 
difficult to manage as part of an ERM 
strategy 
 Controllability Board should be more actively involved in  controlling the risk Defines the extent to which members of the Board feel that it should have greater control over the 
risk, but can’t due to possible blind spots, resource limitations, or the inability to manage, or the 
complexity of  managing, the risk 
Board does not need to have more control 
over the risk 
Potential 
Riskiness 
High potential impact  on viability of company Indicates the extent to which the source of risk presents a real danger to the profitability or on-going 
viability of the firm 
Low potential source of risk to the 
business 
Knowledge External knowledge is important to manage the risk To what extent knowledge of the external environment necessary in order to mitigate risks External knowledge is less important to 
manage the risk 
Actual Cost High cost to manage this risk Indicates the extent to which additional financial resources require to be allocated to manage the risk Does not need high cost outlay to manage 
risk 
Resources Company requires a high degree of operational input to  manage 
risk 
The extent to which there are sufficient suitable skilled operational staff  within the current business 
to control and mitigate risk  
High operational input is not required to 
manage risk 
Return on cost High return on cost of mitigation Indicates the extent to which the resources allocated to risk management produce a return in line 
with the systematic risk cost of capital used by the firm in allocating funds to capital projects in the 
normal course of its business.  
Low return on cost mitigation 
Term of Risk Long term risk Is this risk a short term risk, or a long term risk Short term risk 
Style and 
Approach 
Management style and company attitude has a high impact on 
the risk of the business 
Indicates the extent to which the persona of the business affects the company’s risk in terms of 
levels of risk tolerance and aversion and attitudes towards responsibility, discipline, reporting, team 
work and loyalty to the company.   
Management style and company attitude 
has a low impact on the risk of the 
business 
Freedom of 
Choice 
High degree of choice in selecting best risk mitigation strategy What choice does the Board have in selecting an appropriate risk mitigation strategy to deal with 
risk.  
Little choice in selecting best risk 
mitigation strategy 
Techniques Higher levels of technology can reduce risk Indicates the extent to which the introduction of greater technology, and less reliance on manual 
intervention, can reduce risk in the organisation. 
Higher levels of technology will not 
reduce risk 
Consensus High degree of consensus  on the nature of the risk facing the 
company 
Indicates the extent to which Board members agree on the type of risk, its frequency and potential 
impact on the company 
Low degree of consensus on the nature of 
risk 
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6.3 Results of the Content Analysis 
The Constructs derived from the RepGrid interviews are shown in Appendices H 3 to   
H 5 split into the Categorisations as summarised with their definitions in Table 6.2 
above.  
The reader’s attention is drawn to the fact that the Categorisation of constructs was 
based on the data from the BINS and QD interviews. The constructs from the VGOLD 
interviews were subsequently allocated to their respective Categories, as shown in Table 
6.3 below, which also shows the percentage range of total constructs split into 3 groups 
(Intense, Moderate and Slight) with the order of constructs rearranged according to the 
priority of each Board. 
Table 6.3 Percentages and Cumulative Percentages of Total Constructs 
BINS QD VGOLD  
                           %    Cum%                            %    Cum%                            %    Cum%  
Actual Control 
Achieved 
26.0 26.0 Controllability 20.7 20.7 Actual Control 
Achieved 
40.0 40.0 
In
ten
se 
Actual Control 
Potential 
18.8 44.8 Actual Control 
Achieved 
16.1 36.8 Controllability 13.3 53.3 
Potential 
Riskiness 
10.4 55.2 Actual Control 
Potential 
16.1 52.9 Potential 
Riskiness 
13.3 66.6 
Controllability 9.4 64.6 Potential 
Riskiness 
11.5 64.4 Actual Control 
Potential 
10.0 76.6 
Knowledge 8.3 72.9 Actual Cost 9.2 73.6 Actual Cost 10.0 86.6 
M
o
d
erate 
Return on Cost 6.3 79.2 Resources 8.0 81.6 Term of Risk 6.7 93.3 
Term of Risk 5.2 84.4 Knowledge 5.8 87.4 Knowledge 3.3 96.6 
Resources 4.2 88.6 Style and 
Approach 
5.8 93.2 Return on Cost 3.3 100.0 
Actual Cost 3.1 91.7 Return on Cost 2.3 95.5 Resources 0.0 100.0 
Freedom of 
Choice 
3.1 94.8 Freedom of 
Choice 
2.3 97.8 Freedom of 
Choice 
0.0 100.0 
S
lig
h
t 
Techniques 3.1 97.9 Term of Risk 1.1 98.9 Style and 
Approach 
0.0 100.0 
Consensus 2.1 100.0 Techniques 1.1 100.0 Techniques 0.0 100.0 
Style and 
Approach 
0.0 100.0 Consensus 0.0 100.0 Consensus 0.0 100.0 
Total 100.0   100.0   100.0   
Table 6.3 shows the order of importance the various Boards attach to the Categories 
when considering risk issues, split for convenience into Intense, Moderate and Slight 
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emphasis. All 3 Boards attach most importance to a common set of 4 Categories, though 
the order and emphasis is dissimilar. These Categories are: 
 Actual Control Achieved 
 Actual Control Potential 
 Potential Riskiness 
 Controllability 
There is virtually no emphasis on the Slight Categories. Table 6.3 shows that while 
Boards considered a broad range of issues when faced with risk, they appeared to focus 
most intensely on a consistent narrow range of Risk Categories in trying to make sense 
of their risk.  
6.4 Differential Analysis across all 3 boards 
After completing the Content Analysis and arriving at the results in Tables 6.3, the 
RepGrid results from the VGOLD Board interviews were similarly categorised 
according to the Table 6.2 Definitions of Categories derived from the Content Analysis.  
This procedure resulted in the following results for all three Boards, as summarised in 
Table 6.4 below.   
Within each category a Z test was carried out to see whether there were any significant 
differences in views between BINS, QD and VGOLD relating to their perceptions of 
risk according to the Categories defined in Table 6.2 above, by testing a series of 
hypotheses about the difference in population proportions between the 3 companies, as 
shown more fully in Appendix H 6, and as tabulated below in Table 6.4. 
In Table 6.4, it was not clear a priori in which direction the relative proportions of 
constructs in each Category lay, so a series of 2 tail Z tests were carried out to establish 
whether the proportions in each Category were different.  
6.4.1 Testing for relative proportions of Constructs 
Test between BINS and QD to assess whether the proportions in each Category were 
different: 
Ho: BINS = QD 
H1: BINS ≠ QD 
Test between QD and VGOLD to assess whether the proportions in each Category were 
different: 
Ho: QD = VGOLD 
H1: QD ≠ VGOLD 
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Test between BINS and VGOLD to assess whether the proportions in each Category 
were different: 
Ho: BINS = VGOLD 
H1:  BINS ≠ VGOLD 
Table 6.4 Summary of the Construct Categories indicating whether there is 
similarity between the companies in terms of their thoughts on risk 
Category Total 
Constructs 
Percentages of 
Total Constructs 
2 Tail Z tests                                     
See Appendix H 6  
 B Q V B Q V Ho: B=Q Ho: Q=V Ho: B=V 
Actual Control Achieved 25 14 12 26 16 40 Accept Reject p<.01 Accept 
Actual Control Potential 18 14 3 19 16 10 Accept  Accept Accept 
Controllability 9 18 4 9 21 13 Reject p<.015 Accept Reject p<.01 
Potential Riskiness 10 10 4 10 11 13 Accept Accept Accept 
Knowledge 8 5 1 8 6 3 Accept Accept Accept 
Actual Cost 3 8 3 3 9 10 Accept Accept Reject p≈.05 
Resources 4 7 0 4 8 0 Accept Accept Accept 
Return on Cost 6 2 1 6 2 3 Accept Accept Accept 
Term of Risk 5 1 2 5 1 17 Accept Accept Accept 
Freedom of Choice 3 2 0 3 2 10 Accept Accept Accept 
Style and Approach 0 5 0 0 6 0 Reject p<.01 Accept Accept 
Techniques 3 1 0 3 1 0 Accept Accept Accept 
Consensus 2 0 0 2 0 0 Accept Accept Accept 
Total Constructs 213 96 87 30 100 100 100  
 
The levels of significance are shown in Table 6.4 for each pair of Categories in which 
the null hypothesis was rejected. Thus: 
BINS and QD do not attach the same level of importance to “Controllability” (p<0.015) 
and “Style and Approach” (p<0.01); 
QD and VGOLD do not attach the same level of importance to “Actual Control 
Achieved” (p<0.01); and 
BINS and VGOLD do not attach the same level of importance to “Controllability” 
(p<0.01) and “Actual Cost” (p<0.05). 
6.4.2 Test on the location of Construct Categories 
In addition a χ² (p<.025) test was carried out to establish the following hypotheses on 
the combined data to establish whether there was any association of the overall location 
of constructs between the 3 companies as shown in Appendix H 6:  
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Test between BINS and QD to assess whether the overall location of Constructs was 
different: 
Ho: BINS = QD; 
H1: BINS ≠ QD 
Test between QD and VGOLD to assess whether the overall location of Constructs was 
different: 
Ho: QD = VGOLD;  
H1: QD ≠ VGOLD 
Test between BINS and VGOLD to assess whether the overall location of Constructs 
was different: 
Ho: BINS = VGOLD; 
H1:BINS ≠ VGOLD 
The null hypotheses was accepted in all 3 cases (χ², p>.975) indicating that essentially 
all 3 companies overall attach similar weights to their various Categories of Risk when 
considering risk issues.  The results are also shown in Appendix H 6. 
6.5 Review of the construct relationship between BINS and QD 
From earlier results in Section 5.1, BINS was more risk ready than QD. Table 6.5 shows 
for BINS and QD, the total number of constructs elicited from the 2 Boards, together 
with the frequency and percentage of the 183 constructs chosen in total by the 2 
companies. Table 6.3 shows that most constructs fell into the Category “Actual Control 
Achieved” (21% of all constructs elicited) and the least number of constructs fell into 
the “Consensus” Category (2% of all elicited constructs). When considering risk issues, 
the Boards of BINS (highly compliant) and QD (less compliant) may therefore tend to 
focus their attention on whether the risk in question is actually under control, and 
Boards may be least likely to pay attention to whether there is “Consensus” amongst 
Board members in considering risk issues.  
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Table 6.5 Categories and Total Frequencies of BINS and QD Board 
No Category Total number of constructs elicited 
from BINS and QD Boards by 
Category 
Percentage of total number of 
constructs within each 
Category  
1 
Actual Control 
Achieved 
39 21% 
2 
Actual Control 
Potential 
32 17% 
3 Controllability 27 15% 
4 Potential Riskiness 20 11% 
5 Knowledge 13 7% 
6 Actual Cost 11 6% 
7 Resources 11 6% 
8 Return on cost 8 4% 
9 Term of Risk 6 3% 
10 
Style and 
Approach 
5 3% 
11 Freedom of Choice 5 3% 
12 Techniques 4 2% 
13 Consensus 2 2% 
 
Total number of 
constructs 
183 100% 
 
6.6 Differences between Boards on the scope of their risk repertoires 
A more detailed analysis of Table 6.4 will be broken down into the sub-headings as 
follows: 
Initial observations across all 3 companies 
In addition to the observations drawn from the RepGrid interviews as shown in Table 
6.3 which highlights the consistent way in which the Boards focused on a defined 
narrow range of constructs when faced with risk, from Table 6.4 it is also clear that 
from the data derived from the RepGrid interviews, the Boards of all 3 companies 
would nevertheless attach different levels of priority with respect to “Controllability”, 
“Actual Control Achieved”, “Actual Cost” and “Style and Approach”. BINS and 
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VGOLD were the more compliant of the 3 companies, applying similar weightings to 
all Categories of risk except “Controllability” and “Actual Cost” (at p<.01 and p≈.05 
levels of significance respectively). BINS and VGOLD prioritised “Actual Control 
Achieved”, “Actual Control Potential”, “Controllability” and “Potential Riskiness” 
whereas QD prioritised “Controllability”. When members considered risk, in general 
they subconsciously applied a hierarchy of categories of risk issues in order of 
importance. For example in considering the various elements of risk, BINS and 
VGOLD prioritised thoughts around whether “Actual Control is Achieved”, followed 
by “Actual Control Potential” and so on. One of the most important issues is clearly “Is 
Actual Control Achieved”, and Categories such as “Consensus” at the bottom of Table 
6.4 were relatively remote concepts in their minds at the time the Boards were tackling 
risk issues.  
In the highlighted cases in Table 6.3, where the Boards did not agree on the level of 
priority relating to the choice of Categories, it was the QD Board which prioritised 
Categories differently from the other 2 Boards.  
The 4 major Categories of risk 
As stated earlier, generally the 4 Categories which were most important to all three 
companies appeared to be: 
 Actual Control Achieved 
 Actual Control Potential   
 Controllability 
 Potential Riskiness 
The above 4 Categories comprised 65%, 64% and 77% of the total number of constructs 
chosen by BINS, QD and VGOLD respectively.   
These results would suggest that when faced with a risky situation, the 3 Boards are 
likely to prioritise in their minds whether the risk issue presented is actually under 
control, whether it is possible to control the risk, whether there is a need to control the 
risk, and what the potential risk is, followed by other Categories. However each Board 
will vary in the order in which they consider these and the remaining Categories, as can 
be seen by the number of constructs allocated to each category in Table 6.4.  
Actual Control Achieved 
VGOLD (40% of all constructs), and secondly BINS (26%) attached the greatest 
importance to this construct, while QD placed relatively little emphasis (16%) on it. 
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This construct defines the extent to which the Board is in control over risk in terms of 
putting in measures to bring the risk to within manageable tolerance levels. This 
difference may be explained by the higher perceived levels of risk readiness by the 
respective Boards in their organisations. While VGOLD believed that it had achieved 
better control at an individual level, in the feedback sessions members admitted that in 
fact their mental reference point was the degree of control achieved at the operational 
level, as that was where their focus lay. The VGOLD Board thus appeared to succumb, 
at an individual level, to heuristic bias- the propensity to focus on issues which come 
most readily to mind – and should have focused more as a group on risk matters. BINS 
were most realistic and consistent individually, and during the group feedback sessions 
in terms of actual control achieved. This was due to the much higher level of regulatory 
controls and processes in place, and because risk was much more deeply ingrained into 
the psyche of the Board, explainable by their insurance status. Risk issues were more 
‘front of mind’ in Board and senior management meetings, so that there was greater 
consistency in the views of the individual members and the Board in terms of the level 
of controls achieved. The lower score of  BINS compared to VGOLD was due to the 
more realistic approach of what risk was being well managed, and what still needed to 
be done to improve risk measures. QD recognised that there was little risk management 
in place with a consequently low level of control achieved. This view was shared by all 
QD Board members, including the CEO, who however felt more confident in his own 
ability to manage risk.    
Actual Control Potential 
All 3 Boards (BINS 19%, QD 16%, and VGOLD 10%) were consistent in their views 
on the relative importance of the “Actual Control Potential” when faced with risk. This 
is the second choice of Category for both BINS and QD, and the third choice for 
VGOLD. Thus when confronted with risk, all 3 companies tended to question whether, 
and the extent to which, such risk could be controlled. It would be expected that high 
scores on the previous Category would be associated with lower scores on this category, 
and vice versa. This is evident in the case of all three companies. However it is not clear 
from this answer whether the members had considered actual control potential and 
dismissed its importance, or whether they felt that there was little benefit in evaluating 
potential means of reducing risk. BINS was best placed to understand more fully the 
extent of further risk management potential, whereas VGOLD, and to a greater extent 
QD, struggled with understanding and coming to grips with the full extent of risk 
measures which might be applied. 
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Controllability vs. Actual Control Achieved  
There was an important difference between the respective Boards in terms of their 
“Controllability” and the “Actual Control Achieved”.  BINS and VGOLD were more 
highly compliant businesses than QD. These Boards felt less “Controllability”, whereas 
the QD Board which oversaw a less regulated company, indicated that it had need for 
greater “Controllability” of the business. Overall the individual members and the intact 
Board saw the need for greater control.  
Potential Riskiness 
All 3 companies attached similar weights to “Potential Riskiness” in the strategic 
decision process, though this Category did not appear to be the most important. 
Intuitively it would seem reasonable to expect Boards to consider the potential riskiness 
of a given strategic decision, say, as the most important priority, and this did not appear 
to be the case. BINS management readily foresaw potential riskiness from a number of 
internal and external sources, though didn’t take sufficiently aggressive steps to deal 
with it. For example they were highly dependent on a small IT company for their 
systems support, yet did not have plans to deal with the risk, which could potentially  
prove devastating to the company. This risk was recognised at an individual and group 
level. Similarly, VGOLD assessed high potential risk issues particularly political risk, 
and the many ways this could adversely impact the business. In some ways the Board 
was able to deal with these effectively, and took great pains to address them (failure to 
adhere strictly to, and implement, health and safety measures, which in the South 
African Mining industry is a politically charged issue, has serious consequences in 
terms of possible closure, heavy fines or industrial action), but adopted a resigned 
attitude to issues over which they had little control. The issue of political risk aversion 
on the part of foreign investors led to difficulties in raising fresh capital, which in turn 
weakened the capacity for growth. QD was able to articulate, at an individual level, the 
high potential risks to the business, but seemed unable at a Board level to develop 
coherent strategies to deal with them. Examples were: addressing product failures in 
production; the effects of competition; repeated mistakes in the R and D program; and 
repeated mistakes of a strategic nature. Individually issues were clear, and became 
clouded in uncertainty at a Board level.  
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Knowledge 
QD was most, and VGOLD least, preoccupied with “Knowledge” around risk issues 
when considering risk strategy. In the feedback session QD referred to lack of 
knowledge of risk as a prime factor for its poor risk management strategy.  Knowledge 
relating to the nature, severity, incidence and type of risk are fairly low down the order 
of priority, raising the question whether Boards have sufficient knowledge of the risk 
itself in trying to deal with it effectively, or whether they make a conscious and 
systematic effort to gather more information. Thus QD, to its credit, realised at an 
individual level that it lacked the knowledge to deal effectively with risk. At Board level 
the CEO felt that the company had experience and knowledge of its risk, but this did not 
translate into coherent and systematic strategies to deal with risk. VGOLD Board 
members had extensive practical experience of running a mining company, and most of 
the senior management had worked together for a decade or more. Knowledge around 
risk was concentrated in operational issues, with little experience in major non-
operational strategic issues such as listing processes. BINS also possessed considerable 
knowledge around its risk, and had a more rounded view of risk, its ramifications, and 
how to deal with issues.  
Actual Cost of Risk Mitigation 
For QD the “Cost of Risk Mitigation” appeared to be important in all decision areas 
which impacted their risk, and to a lesser extent for BINS and VGOLD. BINS placed a 
high priority on the “Return on Cost” when considering strategic risk issues, unlike QD 
and VGOLD who were less pre-occupied with the concept of return on the cost of risk 
mitigation. These results suggest perhaps that Boards will take steps to deal with the 
risk without undue concern of the cost or how efficient the risk mitigation steps are at 
curbing risk. In particular VGOLD identified skills shortages as a major source of risk, 
yet were reluctant to actively recruit new engineers with the skills to manage 
operational risk. 
Resources 
Unlike the other 2 Boards, VGOLD did not place any emphasis on “Resources” when 
considering risk issues, in spite of the fact that during the interview process the CEO 
cited lack of skilled resources as a major obstacle to the future growth and stability of 
their business. QD members recognised the need for high quality staff, yet were 
reluctant to change, and BINS identified the need to keep “upskilling” its staff which it 
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regarded as its most important resource. Loss of key personnel was identified as a major 
risk by BINS. 
Term of Risk 
Interestingly BINS and VGOLD placed higher emphasis on “Term of Risk” in 
considering their risk issues, unlike QD which did not focus as much on this issue. 
Clearly both BINS and VGOLD were faced with long and short term risk challenges, 
and felt it important to distinguish between short and long term in developing their risk 
mitigation strategies. 
Freedom of Choice 
“Freedom of Choice” was not part of VGOLD’s repertoire of considerations in 
approaching their risk management issues. This may be due to the greater rigidity in 
VGOLD’s risk management processes, or may be due to the fact that VGOLD viewed a 
rigid approach to risk as a necessary pre-requisite to running its business efficiently. 
QD’s Board was more creative in considering different ways of dealing with risk when 
high and medium risk impact situations loom.  BINS considered “Freedom of Choice” 
when the risk issue was likely to have a lesser impact on the business. This 
demonstrated an underlying rigidity of attitude to risk management. This may be due to 
the greater degree of regulatory prescription and lack of latitude insurance companies 
have in risk management. The tightly knit Board of BINS was able to alternate between 
significant rigidity in applying risk management procedures, and an entrepreneurial 
approach to other strategic issues, such as the establishment of a high risk business in 
Australia, which proved a disaster.  The VGOLD Board exhibited similar characteristics 
to those of BINS in this regard. QD appeared to have considerable freedom of choice is 
choosing risk management strategies, perhaps to their detriment, as they lacked 
structure in their formulation. 
Techniques 
Surprisingly, BINS and QD attached some importance to “Techniques” when thinking 
of risk, while VGOLD paid no attention to risk mitigation techniques available to them 
when considering risk.   
Consensus 
The BINS Board relied on a consensual approach to risk, though the MD was able to 
force decisions in his favour on certain strategic issues (such as expanding into 
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Australia based on unfounded commitments of local partners) unlike the QD Board 
where the issue of “Consensus” around risk management appeared to be very low, 
perhaps explainable by the fact that risk issues were rarely discussed at Board level. 
VGOLD decision making was characterised by a robust approach to discussions and 
decision making. Years of operational experience resulted in a consensual approach to 
operational risk. In areas of strategic risk the CEO dominated the decision and acted 
largely in isolation.  
The relative importance of these various Categories will be further discussed later. 
6.7 Conclusions from the Repertory Grid interviews 
 From the above data and subject to the issues of reliability and validity discussed 
earlier, we can possibly draw the following conclusions based on our small sample of 
three boards. 
 There is a surprisingly high degree of similarity in the weighting Boards give to 
the various Categories of risk, given that the Boards interviewed had different 
levels of risk maturity, operated in different industries and were faced with 
different challenges relating to risk, and had different levels of knowledge and 
experience to deal with risk. 
 Apart from the “Controllability” and “Actual Costs”, BINS and VGOLD agree 
on the relative importance of the various Categories. 
 QD differs in respect of 3 Categories where the relative importance of those 
Categories varies from BINS and VGOLD.  Thus the QD Board which is less 
prepared to deal with its risk in terms of its corporate governance regulations 
senses it has a greater “Controllability”. This seems consistent with the fact that 
QD are less prepared to deal with risk than the other 2 companies. 
 The Categories “Actual Control Achieved”, “Actual Control Potential”, 
“Controllability” and “Potential Riskiness” were the 4 most important 
Categories for all 3 Companies. 
 For QD the “Controllability” is the most important Category, whereas “Actual 
Control” achieved is more important for both VGOLD and BINS. 
 VGOLD appears to disassociate itself from thought processes around overall 
risk to the business more rapidly than BINS and QD, as the importance of 
Categories diminish. This can be seen by looking at the cumulative percentages 
of constructs within the Categories as one progresses down Table 6.3.    
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6.8 Feedback Sessions with the various Boards 
There does not appear to be any literature on the approach adopted in this research, with 
respect to working with intact Boards. The concept of studying intact Boards was 
summarised briefly in the pilot study (Section 4.4.3) with initial findings in Section 
4.4.2. While many grid studies aggregate individual results as done in the above 
sections 6.1-6.6, Boards tend not to be involved in collaborative feedback of grid-based 
material. 
A series of informal follow up meetings was conducted with members of the various 
Boards. Not all members were able to attend the follow-up sessions. The purpose of the 
follow-up sessions was twofold: 
 to present individuals with their constructs and elicit a group discussion 
comparing the different meanings given to the different constructs. 
 to understand how different individuals construed their risks differently. 
The main challenge of the feedback sessions (which was accompanied by a complete 
schedule of the raw data together with a report which summarised the findings) was to 
get members to focus on the details of the different constructs and their meanings. There 
was however more interest in having a general discussion around their risk issues. Some 
unanswered questions presented to certain members were subsequently answered by e-
mail. Generally Board members were intrigued by: 
 the sheer volume of data generated 
 the degree of bias they were subject to at a strategic level, though they agreed 
that it existed  
 the nature of the conclusions which were able to be drawn 
 the variation and complexity of issues around risk management, particularly QD 
members 
 disagreement amongst themselves (refer to the BINS issues relating the  
influence of the CEO, and concern around the distance from reality of the CEO) 
 appreciation for the work carried out and the insight the process afforded them 
to understand their risk construing process 
 the differences amongst members relating to the degree of focus on risk issues   
Due to the time constraints and the desire of Boards to have more of a general 
discussion around risk it was not possible to delve systematically or exhaustively into 
how individual members construed each of their risks differently. The main points of 
the feedback sessions are summarised in Table 6.6 below. 
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Table 6.6 Summary of the feedback sessions with the Boards  
Main Issues  BINS QD VGOLD 
Main Overall 
Response from 
Board 
Do we have adequate 
systems, processes and 
controls to minimize risk? 
We are wholly 
unprepared to deal with 
risk! 
We do not spend enough time on 
clinically assessing specific areas of 
our risk, though in some areas 
(operational) our response is good 
People issues Do we have the right people 
in place? 
We do not have the right 
people in place to 
understand/ 
manage/control risk 
People discipline around risk issues 
leads to risk containment. Technical 
Management drives operational risk 
control. More good people needed. 
Having good people leads to a 
reduction in risk  
Boards’ 
perceived major 
risk issues 
facing firm 
Systems failures and 
underwriting losses. CEO 
stated that continuity risk is 
major challenge 
Financial, market and 
technical (product and 
design) failure risk 
Operational and political risk. Too 
much of an ad hoc approach to risk, 
not systematic enough  
Major Risks  
from RepGrid 
analysis 
Regulatory, Systems, 
Strategic, Market 
Supply Side, Systems, 
Market, Financial 
Political, Supply Side, Resources, 
Financial 
Researcher  
perceived major 
risk issues 
facing firm 
Over concentration of 
power in CEO, and inability 
of other Board members to 
stand up to CEO, leading to 
strategic risk. Lack of 
business strategic input 
from NED’s.  Over-
concentration of risk in 
hands of a single IT 
development/support 
engineer. Market risk from 
competitors 
Financial risk and lack of 
entrepreneurial skill and 
vision by Board. Board 
remoteness from reality. 
Over concentration of 
power in CEO due to 
weak managers 
Operational and political risk; lack of 
focus on over concentration of risk in 
one product; a long history of below 
market performance and poor 
strategic decision making; high 
concentration of power in the CEO. 
Mining rights may not be renewed, 
thus high degree of political risk. 
Examples of 
where strategic 
risk and 
constructs 
conflicted 
Australian expansion 
proved disastrous based on 
inaccurate claims data 
provided by their insurance 
partner. Strategic risk cited 
as third most important 
element of risk. In spite of 
past experience, Board has 
not changed its strategic 
stance  
Board recognizes the past 
poor strategic decisions 
around product 
developments having 
squandered R and D 
budgets over successive 
years on poorly 
considered and poorly 
executed developments, 
leading to financial risk. 
Company sold off loss 
making divisions. Very 
little discussion in 
RepGrid interviews 
around poor strategic 
management, and not 
cited as a major source of 
risk.   
Board takes a different view to 
political risk which requires careful 
strategic input. There have been 
significant past errors based on poor 
strategic analysis such as the 
incorrect listing of the company on 
the NASDAQ, and then having to 
move the listing to Australia. There 
were significant costs in setting up 
the Zimbabwe operation which had 
to be closed. 
All members were neutral regards 
“Political Risk” in spite of these past 
problems and in spite of the highly 
politicized nature of the mining 
industry in South Africa, and 
particularly in view of the fact that 
new order mining rights have still not 
been granted to them by the 
Government 
Overall Board’s  
stated risk  
frame of mind 
Overall is risk 
seeking/tolerant; and more 
optimistic than pessimistic 
Board is in a risk averse 
state of mind 
Board is in a risk averse state of mind 
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Boards 
response to 
interviewer 
assertions 
We must be practical when 
approaching risk, 
particularly on product 
development. Retraction by 
senior members that CEO 
was the central focus of 
risk. Major efforts to try and 
keep up with regulatory 
requirements which are 
evolving quickly  
State of denial, mainly 
from CEO, that vision and 
entrepreneurial skill is a 
problem 
Past problems do not affect the 
future; focus on the current problems. 
Too few resources to manage ERM 
differently. 
Gap between 
RepGrid and 
feedback 
Denial of reality of poor 
strategic planning, and 
conflict over issues of CEO 
dominance   
In feedback Board 
focused on actual 
problems, whereas in 
RepGrid interview there 
was more focus on 
theoretical/potential 
issues 
While the Board is highly capable of 
strategizing around risk issues, and is 
highly capable of grasping the risk 
issues, many decisions are taken on 
the spur of the moment, particularly 
in operational issues which the CEO 
cites as the highest source of risk. 
Thus there is a gap between 
awareness of risks, and the reality of 
day to day treatment of these risks in 
the face of driving production 
volumes.  
Main Response 
to Interview 
process 
We focus well on some 
risks (financial,regulatory), 
and poorly on others 
(operational, product and 
client management) 
Made us realize we don’t 
understand risk 
This confirmed our suspicions that 
we focus well on some risk issues, 
but not others (evidence of source 
dependence) 
Overall 
interviewer 
assessment of 
ERM process 
High overall risk control 
capabilities. Have made 
strategic errors 
Satisfactory operational 
and procedural controls. 
Poor at assessing strategic 
and market risk 
High degree of operational risk 
controls; Board poor at foreseeing 
high impact, low probability events 
based on history of strategic errors 
Attitude to cost 
of ERM 
Aware, and funds/resources 
available 
Not aware, no funds 
/resources available 
Aware, funds and resources 
available, but not main priority 
Attitude to 
return on cost 
of  ERM 
No process in place to 
consider/measure risk return 
on cost of risk management 
No process in place to 
consider/measure return 
on cost of risk systems 
No process in place to consider or 
measure return on costs of risk 
systems. High return on people costs. 
Main 
contradictions 
between 
Boards’  
constructs and 
feedback 
session 
Remoteness from reality 
cited by most Board 
members, and negated in 
the feedback session, 
mainly due to presence of 
CEO. Constructs showed 
operational aspects well 
under control, but some 
doubt of this in the 
feedback. Serious mistakes 
have been made in terms of 
strategic risk assessment, at 
significant cost to company 
by being over trusting and 
under analytical in 
assessing opportunities  
High level of 
contradiction between 
levels of perceived 
strategic risk management 
capability by individuals 
and their assessment by 
non-executive directors 
Contradiction between the 
company’s reliance to manage 
operational risk by having good 
people, and their unwillingness on 
grounds of cost to implement a plan 
to deal with the issue. Discrepancy 
between size of threats and degree of 
focus. 
Further contradiction in the “Term of 
Risk”. Directors state that mining 
requires a long term vision, but 
attached little importance to the term 
of risk. 
  
Main 
contradictions 
between Board 
members’ 
Lack of understanding of 
relative levels of strategic 
risk between CEO and 
others due to lack of 
NED’s* state that 
“Remoteness of the 
Board” is an important 
contributory factor to 
Board members disagree on the 
relative levels of “Overall Risk to the 
Business”. Members stated that they 
will have different assessments of 
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individual  
interpretation of 
constructs 
information (concentrated 
in hands of CEO) and lack 
of experience in strategic 
management issues. 
The CEO is the driver of 
business development and 
engages in high risk 
options, yet in the risk 
aversion questionnaire he 
consistently stated his 
aversion to risk  
 
company risk. The CEO 
interprets this as meaning 
the extent to which the 
company is in touch with 
all current facts and issues 
which are relevant to the 
business. The CEO 
therefore is concerned 
with “knowns” whereas 
the NED’s* are concerned 
more about the “known 
unknowns” as well as the 
“unknown unknowns”.   
their views on risk and the elicited 
constructs because of different levels 
of interpretation, knowledge and 
understanding of the elements of risk.  
 
*NED’s = Non-Executive Directors of the QD Board 
 
6.9 Summary of the feedback results 
The results in Table 6.7 highlight many of the problems Boards experience in making 
sense of their risk. Risk arises in many forms and guises; there is some experience and 
knowledge of past risk issues; some risks arise unexpectedly, other risks are more 
foreseeable; cognitive bias and interaction amongst Board members results in greater 
focus in some areas and less in others (source dependence); people wish to focus on the 
areas with which they feel more comfortable.  
The summary in the above table highlights certain aspects of risk sensemaking amongst 
the Boards interviewed. A few further comments are relevant: 
 In the feedback sessions, the emphasis on certain risk issues had changed since 
the time of the first interview. The group feedback produced a different slant on 
many issues. In BINS’s case for example, the CEO dismissed suggestions of 
over concentration of control / risk in his hands while during the RepGrid 
interviews this point was raised by at least 2 other senior directors. In the 
feedback,  BINS CEO’s assessment of the major risk facing BINS was one of 
continuity, yet in the RepGrid interview Political, Regulatory, Resources, 
Systems Risk were all given equal prominent weightings; the word ‘continuity’ 
did not appear once in his repertoire of  constructs. 
 VGOLD directors spoke of long term vision and long term planning in the 
RepGrid interviews, but did not raise this point in the feedback sessions. 
 The members of the VGOLD Board are driven by different objectives. The CEO 
is highly driven by production targets and profits. Production is an area of major 
risk to the company (accidents, major equipment failure, loss of key personnel, 
labour issues). Risk management in this area is ‘day to day’ business, and is not 
185 
  
formally dealt with on a structured risk assessment basis. ‘From experience’ and 
a ‘hands on approach’ are terms used to describe much of the way risk is 
managed. The CEO and senior staff have experience of what is likely to work, 
and what is likely to cause disruptions.   
 QD’s Board was unprepared to deal with risk. The non-executive directors 
believed that the CEO was unprepared to deal with risk, while the CEO believed 
that he had a clear understanding of risk matters. Experience has shown that the 
CEO has made fundamental strategic mistakes. It would seem that VGOLD and 
QD management adopted the same hands-on approach but there was a greater 
awareness of risk issues per se in VGOLD than QD. 
 BINS’s Board dwelt on the issues of predictability of risk at some length, in line 
with the emphasis on “Potential Riskiness” in the Construct Categories. One of 
the senior Board members averred “Our business faces a spectrum of risks from 
predictable (sic) insurance product losses -for which premiums and probabilities 
can be calculated – to largely unpredictable events such as changes in economic, 
political or legislative issues. Some risks can be controlled.” The FD stated 
“Risks are in nature not predictable. I want as many controls as possible”. There 
is thus a fundamental difference in the way the 2 members of the Board 
construed the Construct Category Potential Riskiness.       
6.10 Further commentary on the feedback sessions and comparison of results 
from the initial interviews 
Boards are subject to considerable institutional pressure, and lag ERM implementation 
as envisaged by regulators. They struggle to make sense of their endogenous and 
exogenous risk elements. In the three cases studied in this thesis, Boards complied to 
varying degrees with their ERM obligations, they all suffered from collective cognitive 
biases in assessing risk,  and appeared to present similar constructs in terms of 
construing their risk issues. However the emphasis Boards placed on certain constructs 
changed over time, as Kelly (1955/1991) predicted in terms of his personal construct 
theory. It is evident from the 3 cases studied in this thesis, that  between the initial 
interviews and the feedback sessions Boards changed the way they viewed risk issues  
over time (organisation corollary); contradicted themselves over time (fragmentation 
corollary); varied their views as they successively constructed and reconstructed their 
risk environment; Board members differed from each other in terms of their 
construction of events, (individuality corollary); and Board  members played a role in 
the construction of other Board members’ views of risk (sociality corollary). Overall it 
is possible to conclude that Board processes rely on the creation of internal 
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representations of the elements of risk they encounter, in order actively to predict future 
events in line with the fundamental postulate asserted by Kelly (1955/1991) in his 
personal construct theory. In many observable ways Boards behave with human like 
qualities in managing their risk. In Weick’s (1995) terms a Board is therefore likely to 
makes sense of its risk, and behave as a cognitive entity. 
6.11 How the Repgrid results and feedback loop add to the general body of 
knowledge as to how Boards understand their risk 
In this section the latest reviews and recommendations for further research on corporate 
governance, ERM, institutional logic and strategic issues around risk will be considered 
in the light of the results of the feedback session. The purpose of this section is to 
demonstrate that many of the current research questions in this field have been touched 
on in this research. 
Table 6.7 RepGrid Results and feedback loop compared to the major 
contemporary research questions 
ERM 
Power, 2009, p. 854 Regulators and Companies focus primarily on capital as opposed to risk appetite and 
asserts that the reasons for the credit crisis are that regulators were more concerned about process than 
encouraging companies to develop an overview of the risk environment. 
BINS QD VGOLD 
BINS was highly focussed on risk 
process, and less on the risks 
around appetite, confirmed by the 
ventures into Australia. Bins 
Board more focussed as 
individuals on high level strategic 
issues, than as a Board which 
tends to focus more on 
institutional issues. 
QD had no formal risk 
management process in place, 
was not compliant in terms of 
King III, and focused on neither 
risk appetite nor process to 
manage risk. There was slight 
evidence of operational risk 
management in terms of quality 
control and minimising product 
breakdown and returns. Risk 
issues were not articulated at 
Board level. 
VGOLD more focussed on 
operational risk, and similarly 
blind to risk appetite. Issues 
around risk relate mainly to 
operational issues, and little in 
way of formal risk analysis  
 
Beasley et al., 2005 , p. 530 Board and senior management leadership on ERM is critical to extensive 
ERM deployment 
BINS QD VGOLD 
Bins has strong leadership risk 
operational issues. Board is 
QD leadership does not 
demonstrate strong leadership 
VGOLD leadership very strong 
in operational risk management, 
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focussed on operational risk 
issues, is aware of other elements 
of risk, but strategic risk lies 
firmly under control of the CEO.  
or knowledge regarding ERM. 
Members of Board unanimous 
that leadership on risk was a 
problem. In feedback session no 
open criticism of leadership. 
which is effective. There is 
unanimity of thought on 
operational risk issues. 
Controllability of risk could be 
enhanced by greater human 
resource concentration on 
operational risk.  No formal 
strategic risk management 
process in place. 
Hagigi , Sivkumar, 2009, p.293. 
The CEO should realise that  effective risk management is not just a reduction or elimination of risk and 
should consider the various elements of risk, both exogenous and endogenous 
BINS QD VGOLD 
BINS – The CEO seems to be 
fully aware that risk management 
is not just about reduction or 
elimination of risk. This 
understanding is equally shared 
between the members of the 
Board, but to a lesser extent, due 
to cognitive  limitations amongst 
Board members relating to their 
risk. CEO believes that his 
experience and knowledge 
sufficient to determine extent and 
appetite for risk issues, though 
there is no formal analysis of risk 
on strategic matters. 
QD CEO has a poor holistic 
view of risk, or of  risk 
management. This is mirrored 
in the approach of the Board to 
risk matters. There is no formal 
delineation of risk across 
internal and external issues. 
VGOLD CEO has a realistic 
view of operational risk, and does 
have an attitude to overall risk 
which is more focused on 
reduction or elimination of risk. 
On other risk issues - the several 
errors made in the listing process 
– demonstrate that the CEO is not 
able to deal with all risk issues. 
 
Hagigi , Sivkumar, 2009, p.294. 
Future research should attempt to integrate the effects of multiple elements of risk while examining 
exogenous elements of risk like country risk, political risk and studying them as a system of risk rather 
than as independent elements of risk 
BINS QD VGOLD 
BINS were able to integrate and 
synthesise the elements of risk 
into an overall impact assessment, 
particularly as regards operational 
risk. 
QD – most Board members did 
not demonstrate any detailed 
knowledge of individual 
elements of risk. 
In this research empirical data 
was used to assess the overall 
impact of multiple elements of 
risk. The Board of VGOLD 
clearly understood the impact of 
multiple risks relating to the 
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external environment such as 
political risk, and the possible 
impact on the overall risk to the 
business. 
VGOLD was able to integrate 
and synthesise the elements of 
risk into an overall impact 
assessment. The emphasis by 
different members of the Board 
was different as shown by their 
differences in “Overall a greater 
source of risk to the company” 
compared to others. 
Greenwood et al., 2011 
’Institutional logics- Institutional pressure give rise to inflexibility and hindered competitiveness., 
BINS QD VGOLD 
BINS – subject to considerable 
institutional pressure due to 
changes in the regulatory 
requirements affecting general 
insurance companies relating 
particularly to reporting and 
solvency. These changes required 
an extensive commitment in 
terms of management time and 
additional resources. These 
additional pressures did not 
translate into inflexibility and 
lack of competitiveness, but more 
seen as an opportunity. 
 
QD – this acts as a drain on 
already limited resources  
 
VGOLD – poor response by 
regulators hinders development 
and raises risk return 
considerations governing future 
investment. Additional pressure 
regarding health and safety 
regulation seriously affected 
competitiveness due to high costs 
of implementation, increasing the 
gold price break-even point. 
These points were well 
articulated in the personal 
constructs, and the feedback 
session. 
 
CEO and Board relationship 
Boyd et al., 2011, p.1917 
Research is needed into the relationship between insider directors and non-director members of the top 
management team, that between the CEO and outsider directors, and the issues surrounding the external 
directorships. 
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BINS QD VGOLD 
Non-executive directors and 
senior managers felt isolated from 
board making decisions and felt 
that they were unable to comment 
on certain aspects of the 
company’s strategic direction and 
risk. This is evident from the 
absence of answers in certain of 
the questionnaires. “Knowledge” 
and “cognitive exclusion” 
resulted in a less efficient 
decision making process on all 
matters including risk issues. 
CEO dealt with Board on certain 
strategic issues on a “need to 
know basis”. Board intimidated 
by CEO and not assertive in this 
area. Non-executive members 
were retained more from a 
compliance point of view than  
regarded as providing 
constructive input into the 
decision making process.   
A gap between strategic and 
operational approach to 
management exists between the 
CEO and non-executive 
directors. There is 
unwillingness on the part of the 
non-executive directors to rock 
the boat and deal forcefully and 
directly with myriad issues 
facing the company. This is due 
to the “absence” factor –the 
existing non-executives are 
often too busy and too distant to 
become too directly involved, 
and rely on “providence” in the 
hope that the business will be 
properly run. It is also difficult 
to fully understand the detailed 
issues involved, resulting in a 
“distance” factor. Non-
executives tend to focus on the 
headline results, and are not 
fully able to absorb the 
important details of strategic 
and operational issues, so that 
decision making is often 
inefficient. Often there is a 
frustration amongst QD non-
executive directors that they 
would do things ‘their way”, 
but go along with the 
CEO/Board decision making 
structure. In the case of the 
financial non-executive director 
this does not apply. He is much 
more involved in the financial 
process, and does not need to 
understand the operations to 
follow the numbers.  Thus from 
QD perspective FD financial 
The one non-executive director 
interviewed stressed in his 
individual interview that his 
primary concern around strategic 
risk was the political factor. This 
he agreed was a situation largely 
beyond the control of the Board 
and the company. His concerns 
related primarily to a) 
undervaluation of South African 
Gold Mining assets by foreign 
investors who had a more 
pessimistic view of the South 
African political environment. b)  
The adherence to corporate 
governance and regulation in its 
entirety. The executive directors 
were more focussed on 
operational issues and their 
attitude to regulatory issues 
varied (source based risk and 
dependence) and adopted the 
overall attitude that partial and 
financially manageable 
compliance would suffice. 
Overall compliance was deemed 
overly onerous in managerial 
terms.  
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control is much better than non-
financial control and input by 
the NED’s. 
 
 
Organizational Behaviour 
Arnold et al., 2011, p.187 
Organisations are complex entities and substantial research is required to uncover the myriad of complex 
interrelationships that drive organisational behaviour and performance 
 
BINS QD VGOLD 
Organisational behaviour is 
premised on a strong 
intellectually competent CEO 
who takes the lead and overrides 
resistance. However there is 
generally a collective awareness 
and competency around non-
operational regulatory issues 
Organisational behaviour is 
premised on a strong 
intellectually competent CEO 
who takes the lead and 
overrides resistance. However 
there is a collective 
unawareness and incompetency 
around non-operational 
regulatory issues. Second tier 
cognitive factions exist within 
the Board, that interact and 
discuss strategic issues at 
mainly an operational level, and 
generally adopt the views of the 
CEO on major strategic issues. 
Efforts by the second tier to 
assert their views on strategic 
matters are invariably thwarted. 
In QD the board fulfils a mostly 
operational role. 
The organisational dynamic 
which characterises VGOLD is 
more in the form of a strategic 
collective with fully recognised 
competencies and intellectual 
respect between members of the 
Board. The Board members were 
equally matched in terms of 
competency and mental 
assertiveness and participated in  
multifaceted and robust 
discussions. This results in more 
efficient discourse and more 
effective solutions in dealing 
with risk.  
Van Ees  et al, 2009, p.316 
Further research on behavioural perspectives of Boards and corporate governance should focus on 
decision making processes rather than structures and outcomes. 
BINS QD VGOLD 
The entire attitude of the Board is In the case of QD there is Operational decisions are made 
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focussed on shared beliefs in the 
future strategy of the company. 
Past experiences are clearly 
articulated in terms of past errors 
and how to overcome these. Past 
experience serves as a useful 
guide to avoiding future 
operational mistakes. At a 
strategic level the CEO is 
dominant and high level strategic 
decisions are cognitively ring- 
fenced so that other members of 
the Board’s views are effectively 
neutralised. Personal constructs 
are more clearly articulated 
outside the Boardroom than 
inside.   
considerable reliance on past 
behaviour which although 
shown to be flawed is 
entrenched in the current 
decision making behaviour. 
Thus in spite of previous 
adverse experience, certain 
mistakes continue to occur such 
as: over budgeting sales, under 
budgeting on expenses, 
miscalculating the reality of 
strategic decisions. (Bias).  
on the spur of the moment due to 
intense production deadlines and 
output volume targets. Managers 
are highly skilled and 
knowledgeable of the mining 
environment. Decisions around 
non-operational issues where lack 
of similar skills and operational 
insight are awkward, pedantic 
and poorly structured. Decisions 
in these cases are unstructured, 
based on urban legend and 
ineffective advice. Prime 
examples are past decisions taken 
by the Board (consisting mainly 
of mining engineers) on issues 
relating to listing jurisdiction, 
market capitalisation and 
financial structuring without 
strong financial director input. 
Financial strategy is led by the 
CEO. 
Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 357 
While the extant literature has highlighted how shifts in logics … affect organisations across a field, much 
less systematic attention has been paid to how individual organisations experience and respond to the 
complexity that arises.  
BINS QD VGOLD 
BINS has experienced a 
considerable shift in institutional 
logic as a result of new legislation 
affecting corporate Boards. This 
trend was reflected in South 
Africa in the Insurance Laws 
Amendment Act (ILAA), the 
FAIS General Code of Conduct, 
SAM/Solvency II, the Consumer 
Protection Act and various 
conflict of interest issues. The 
response was characterised by a 
comprehensive and integrated 
overall reaction and re-
Since the introduction of King 
III in 2009, QD has not 
responded to the corporate 
governance or ERM exigencies. 
The legislative requirements are 
completely “off the radar”. One 
issue which may explain the 
significant differences in 
response to the regulatory 
exigencies between QD and 
BINS may be the differences in 
threat of sanction presented by 
non-compliance. Failure on the 
part of BINS would result in an 
VGOLD is subject to Australian 
Stock Exchange listing 
requirements and Australian 
mining law, in particular 
“Australian Code for Reporting 
of Exploration Results, Mineral 
Resources and Ore Reserves”. In 
addition to other Australian 
company law relating to 
corporate governance, and 
company law, VGOLD is also 
subject to South African 
company law, King III 
requirements on corporate 
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formulation of risk management 
processes. There was 
considerable evidence of 
diffusion of thought and process 
throughout the organisation. This 
was evident in the detailed 
constructs relating to compliance 
which arose during the course of 
the interviews, and in the 
feedback session. While the new 
institutional pressure imposed on 
the firm resulted in additional 
costs, operational complexity, the 
legislation was palpable, which 
enabled the company to respond 
with a clear plan and cohesive 
purpose.  
immediate withdrawal of their 
insurance licence, while 
compliance with King III does 
not carry the same force of law. 
The pressure of operational and 
other field based challenges 
served as a pre-occupation by 
the CEO and other 
operationally focused members 
of the Board. A form of 
disjointedness was evident in 
the way the QD Board dealt 
with issues.     
governance, and most 
importantly the current South 
African mining legislation 
promulgated under the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (2004). 
VGOLD thus can be considered 
to suffer under multiple 
institutional logics, a highly 
complex set of regulatory 
requirements spanning to 
different countries’ regulatory 
regimes. Many of the regulatory 
issues facing VGOLD lie outside  
its control, in particular the 
legislation regarding mining 
rights. VGOLD’s response to this 
regulation has been characterised 
by the appointment of specialists 
and senior Board members who 
have experience of these various 
issues, and who are able to bring 
their knowledge and skill to bear 
in guiding the business through 
the various regulatory hoops. 
Unlike BINS where the CEO was 
dominant and provided the 
leadership around regulatory 
issues, in the case of VGOLD the 
CEO was instrumental in 
identifying senior leaders in the 
gold mining industry to provide 
the necessary Board level 
knowledge and skill to develop 
responses to the “multilevel 
institutional logics”.  
 
6.12 Further discussion on the feedback sessions and literature synthesis 
This section will deal further with the results of the feedback sessions. This research has 
shown that Board members think differently, and their views coalesce into group 
collaborative constructs. Board members have individual views about company risk as 
described in their personal constructs. These constructs have arisen from the result of 
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knowledge and experiential learning, which, as Kelly (1955/1991) states is a continually 
evolving internal representation of their risk environment. Thus knowledge acquisition 
is dynamic (Pandza, Thorpe, 2009, p. S128). Board members at the same time suffer 
from cognitive limitations in making sense of the risk environment, and are in a 
continual state of flux regarding the assimilation of new knowledge.      
It is to be expected then that individual Board members will therefore in the 
collaboration process change their individual constructs as they gather fresh information 
during the Board process:    
 QD continually made persistent errors in their research and development 
program, believing that they would be on time and within budget, which they 
have never achieved. The Boards reframes every new project situation, and 
throughout the project encounters similar situations as before. The Board 
underweights the very high probability of cost / time overruns. New issues are 
continually reframed in the light of this over-optimism.  
 BINS is subject to strict regulatory requirements, which require a continual re-
assessment of its risk profile. It embarked on a venture in Australia, 
underestimating the high risks of entering into a new territory, in spite of ample 
evidence that this was to be the case. Confirmation bias led the Board to believe 
that their relationships with their South African insurance partners would be as 
functional in Australia as in South Africa. They were supplied incorrect claims 
data, on which they based their premiums. In the reframing process, there was 
conviction amongst the South African Board that past troubles were behind 
them, and they kept drifting from reality, with the result that the business 
required substantial re-capitalisation.  
 VGOLD had similar issues. They listed on the NASDAQ believing that this 
would be a good home for a junior South African gold miner. Most other similar 
companies were listing in Canada, where there was a greater risk appetite for 
emerging market extractive industry listings. The lack of USA investor interest 
forced the Board to reframe and reconsider its position. The company was de-
listed in the USA, and the company sought a new listing in Australia. Again the 
reframing process overlooked the reality of fresh, yet different, challenges in 
Australia, where the company was similarly unsupported, finding it difficult to 
raise capital because of the political uncertainty around South African  mining 
companies against the background of political threats of nationalisation. The 
continual risk bias in the reframing process resulted in the VGOLD Board 
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continually drifting away from political reality. As further evidence of this 
intrinsic flaw the present author refers to as ‘reality drift’, (the harmatia referred 
to in the opening paragraph of this thesis) VGOLD experienced similar political 
issues in its Zimbabwean operations, resulting in the closure of its mine there.   
If the Common / Variable Hypothesis outlined in Chapter 7 applies, a company that is 
not ready to deal with risk, may exhibit poor behavioural characteristics. It would seem 
that the implementation of risk management itself results in a change in behaviour 
towards risk issues. Put more profoundly, the introduction of risk management measures 
not only fortifies the company itself from risk, but engenders a change in risk behaviour 
amongst Boards which provides additional “group sensemaking” protection in terms of 
their decision making processes. 
6.13 Specific South African political issues 
The issue of political risk was dealt with in the RepGrid interviews, and was defined in 
Table 4.7 as: 
 
In many ways the South African corporate governance landscape differs from those of 
other emerging and developed countries. Aspects of South African legislation in terms 
of corporate governance requirements exceed those of many other countries.  King III 
lays down specific guidelines relating to how companies are required to manage their 
risk, for example by requiring companies to produce a risk matrix setting out causes and 
probabilities of incidence of risks believed to face the company. Companies are also 
required to produce specific reports on issues such as IT risk. Sarbanes-Oxley for 
example does not specify risk management in this kind of detail. King III is also a more 
flexible form of corporate governance regime requiring firms to “comply or explain” 
whereas Sarbanes-Oxley requires firms to “comply or else”.  
One other feature which merits discussion in South Africa is the impact of Broad-based 
Black Economic Empowerment (B-BEE) on risk issues, and risk perceptions.  
Understanding 
political risk 
An issue which clouds the South African economic landscape and 
encapsulates issues such as political instability, political 
interference, business unfriendly legislation, social unrest and 
labour militancy.  Black economic empowerment falls under this 
broad grouping and satisfies the hierarchical criterion 
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B-BEE is a means of redressing the imbalances of the past by requiring companies to 
engage in a range of measures to broaden the participation of previously disenfranchised 
(under Apartheid) and excluded Black, Indian and Coloured people from access to the 
economy (Andrews, 2012). 
 A recent survey by the South African Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, 2012) 
defines B-BEE as:  
“The B-BBEE process includes elements of human resource development, employment 
equity, enterprise development, preferential procurement, as well as investment, 
ownership, and control of enterprises and economic assets” (p.5). 
The DTI (2012) also itself recognises the high cost of B-BEE: 
“Costs [to enterprises] are also relatively high especially over the short to medium term. 
Costs of achieving policy objectives including financing and investment costs (new 
enterprises and ownership transfers) will continue to strain financial resources of banks, 
private sector, and government. Implementation costs include training procurement 
staff, amending procurement procedures, amending contracts where necessary, and 
changes to reporting systems. There is a risk of reduced investment [in firms’ capacity]  
if firms consider the amendments stringent and resource sapping” (p.16). 
It is possible to conclude that there is a high likelihood that B-BBEE adds to the risk of 
business underperformance in South Africa as a result of the diversion of otherwise 
productive assets to achieve political ends. 
The political and economic aspects of corporate governance reform in South Africa 
appear to be little understood, and their effects in terms of cost to the economy largely 
unclear, and the impact on global competitiveness of corporate South Africa largely 
unresearched (Diamond and Price, 2012, p. 57). 
Other aspects which require brief mention are the high levels of corruption and crime 
which are a net cost to the economy and result in uncompetitiveness, and inefficiencies. 
During the course of the RepGrid interviews, crime and corruption were not singled out 
as specific sources of risk. 
6.14 Triangulation of results of this thesis and other published work 
In Table 5.9 methodological triangulation was considered to assess the validity of 
Boards’ risk aversion behaviour. This brief section compares the results of this thesis 
with other work done in this field as shown in Table 6.8 below. 
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Table 6.8 Comparison of results from this thesis with other published work 
Topic Findings of this thesis Other published work 
Risk Readiness This research finds that 
Boards are not ready to 
deal with risk 
FSA (2010); Beasley et al., (2010,2011,2012); Deloitte 
(2012); Boards are not ready to deal with risk. 
Risk Aversion  Boards are  neutral/ risk 
averse when facing gains, 
and risk tolerant when 
facing losses 
Yue-Fang Wen (2010);  when corporate governance is  
introduced risk aversion facing gains is reduced, and risk 
tolerance is increased when facing losses 
Risk Bias Boards underweight high 
and low probabilities 
facing gains. The evidence 
is less conclusive when 
facing losses. Boards are 
slightly risk averse facing 
gains, and very slightly 
risk tolerant facing losses, 
the degree of which is 
directly related to the level 
of risk readiness  
Kahneman and Tversky, 1992; Prospect Theory shows 
individuals underweight high probabilities and 
underweight low probabilities for gains as well as losses. 
Lant (1992 p.641) found systematic bias towards 
optimism amongst Boards. Figenbaum and Thomas 
(1988) indicated there is substantial evidence that faced 
with uncertainty Boards behave in line with the biases 
predicted under Prospect Theory, viz., risk aversion 
when facing gains, risk tolerance when facing losses, 
loss aversion and over/underweighting low/high 
probability events. Schwenk (1984 p.112) describes the 
cognitive simplification process Boards undertake in 
deriving strategic decisions when faced with uncertainty. 
The decision making process is characterised by “lack of 
structure ... and by novelty, complexity and 
openendedness”. 
 
Board members 
think differently 
Members of Boards think 
differently about risk 
issues 
Daft and Weick 1984; Tegarden et al., 2009; Boards 
think differently and there are cognitive factions. Allison 
(1971) finds that Boards are likely to behave like their 
individual members. Wallach et al. (1962) groups take 
riskier decisions than the average of their counterparts 
How Boards 
construe 
elements of their 
risk 
Boards appear to give 
prominence to certain 
Characteristics of risk such 
as Actual Control 
Achieved, Controllability, 
Control Potential and 
Potential Riskiness in 
making sense of their risk.  
Schwenk (1984 p.112) describes the cognitive 
simplification process Boards undertake in deriving 
strategic decisions when faced with uncertainty. The 
decision making process is characterised by “lack of 
structure ... and by novelty, complexity and 
openendedness”. 
Behavioural 
form of moral 
hazard 
Compliance with corporate 
governance requirements 
engenders a false sense of 
protection from risk 
Much literature on moral hazard and how to avoid. No 
literature on the moral hazard at a group level, and moral 
hazard of Boards. Engau and Hoffman (2011, p.1) the 
higher the level of regulatory uncertainty, the greater the 
firms response. 
Reality Drift Due to cognitive bias and 
incorrect data  Boards may 
systematically drift away 
from reality as they 
continually reframe their 
Sections 6.6 and 9.1 of this thesis support this view from 
the results of the intact Boards interview. Klein et 
al.,(2006) continual preservation of existing concepts, 
the elaboration and discoveries of new data,  and the 
reframing learning process. The arrival of fresh data 
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views of risk results in a reframing process influenced by a form of 
cognitive bias referred to as confirmation bias, in which 
respondents seek support to a view, rather than seeking 
evidence which might disprove their view. Schwenk 
(1984) when faced with highly complex issues, Boards 
may resort to altering their perception of reality, leading 
to Boards dealing with perceived problems and not 
actual ones. Power (2009, p.854) states that ERM has 
served an advisory world well by establishing a 
conceptual foothold for accounting knowledge in 
strategising discourses. Yet within the ERM frameworks 
the objectives of a business which are ‘at risk’ are more 
or less an exogenous input into the model with the 
consequence that it is hard to enlist such a framework in 
challenging the objectives themselves, and ERM is 
unlikely avoid risk such as ambiguity, drift or 
transformation in their core objectives.     
Unique/Variable 
Hypothesis 
Boards appear to exhibit  
consistent  behaviour  
regarding certain elements 
of their risk, and a 
different set of behavioural 
Characteristics of risk, the 
degree of difference in 
emphasis being directly 
related to the extent of risk 
readiness  
Little literature found. Daft and Weick (1984) different 
Boards will react differently to different external 
environments. Lyles and Schwenk (1992)  knowledge 
within a company consists of core knowledge which is 
constant and reflects the key elements of the company’s 
ethos and strategy, and peripheral knowledge which is 
more variable and responds to changes in the internal 
and external environment. 
 
6.15 Conclusion 
Chapter 6 sets out the various results of the data collection process. Three 
questionnaires were completed by the members of 3 Boards and RepGrid interviews 
were conducted. The results for each questionnaire and the RepGrid results were 
individually analysed in detail.  
In Chapter 7 the Aims and Objectives will be presented and discussed, and an important 
new theory will be proposed.  
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   Research Objectives and Further Theory Chapter 7.
Development 
In Chapters 5 and 6 the results of the following 4 sources of data were presented and 
discussed in detail: 
 Risk Readiness 
 Risk Aversion 
 Risk Bias 
 Repertory Grid Construct Analysis 
It is now necessary to return to the main research question and the aims and objectives 
of the research. 
As part of this discussion, the possible existence of any possible relationships between 
aspects of response and behaviour towards risk which can be drawn between these 3 
groups will be considered, bearing in mind that data were collected from only 3 groups 
(BINS, QD and VGOLD). All results shown are strictly intended to be indicative, and to 
stimulate further research. 
7.1 Relationships between Risk Readiness and other behavioural Characteristics 
For convenience, the results of the Risk Readiness Questionnaire which will be referred 
to in this Chapter are summarised from Table 5.2, as shown below in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1 Summarised Results of the Risk Readiness Questionnaire (from Table 5.2) 
 BINS QD  VGOLD 
ū  s ū  S ū  s 
Increase in Risk Intensity over past 5 years   7.9 2.1 7.9 2.4 7.2 2.5 
State of Risk Readiness relative to King III and in terms of overall risk process in 
place 
7.6 1.9 3.9 2.4 6.5 1.3 
How Well  the Company Manages its Risk    7.5 2.1 4.0 2.3 5.7 2.1 
Board Tolerance to Source Dependence  6.9 2.5 5.9 2.5 4.9 1.9 
Influence of Budgetary Performance on Board attitude to risk – achieves budget 5.3 2.6 5.9 2.3 6.7 2.2 
Influence of Budgetary Performance on Board attitude to risk – underperforms 
budget  
6.0 2.6 5.7 2.3 7.2 2.2 
ū  and s are the sample mean and standard deviation respectively.       
7.2 Main Research Aims and Objectives 
The main research results will now be presented and reviewed. At this stage, for 
convenience, the aims and objectives of the research are re-stated. 
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The research question 
Why do South African Boards, in spite of strict corporate governance regulations 
governing the management of risk, exhibit varying degrees of effectiveness in 
developing strategies to deal with their enterprise risk management (ERM)?  
The aim of the research is: 
To examine why Boards, in spite of strict corporate governance guidelines, deal with 
the myriad risk issues facing the company, to different effect, in developing strategies to 
deal with enterprise risk management (ERM). 
The 4 objectives of the research are set out below together with the research results.  
7.3 The objectives of the research 
The 4 objectives are discussed in turn: 
O1:  To investigate to what extent Board members of companies which apply 
corporate governance regulations are liable to human bias in risk estimation. 
The sources of information for this objective are Table 5.2 and 5.7 and Figures 5.3, 5.4 
and 5.5. The information in Table 5.7 shows that all Boards underweighted high and 
low probabilities facing gains and losses except for BINS which over-weighted low 
probabilities when facing gains. In terms of the overall level of underweighting it is 
possible to say that QD was the most extreme in underweighting probabilities, followed 
by VGOLD, and then by BINS, as can be seen in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. 
In Figure 5.5 a similar pattern emerges. QD is most risk sensitive to gains, and most 
tolerant to losses, and less so for VGOLD and BINS respectively. This can be seen by 
the distance of the respective curves from the Line of Zero Sensitivity. 
The degree of application of corporate governance principles is taken from Table 5.2 
“How well the company manages its risk”.  The results are shown in Table 7.2 below. 
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Table 7.2 Relationship between corporate governance and risk bias 
 Characteristic Source Table 
or Figure 
BINS QD VGOLD 
Application of corporate governance 
principles – how well the company manages 
its risk 
Table 5.2 High Low Medium 
Underweighting of risk probabilities Figures 5.3;5.4 Low High Medium 
Risk aversion to gains Figure 5.6 Low High Medium 
Risk tolerance to losses  Figure 5.6 Low High Medium 
From Table 7.2 it is clear that there is a direct inverse relationship with corporate 
governance and the degree of risk bias. The direction of the causal relationship is not 
known (i.e. it is not possible to determine which is the independent variable) and there 
is insufficient data to quantify or test the strength of the relationship.  
The following objective will now be discussed. 
O2: To investigate to what extent Boards which are less subject to individual 
human biases are more effective in developing strategies to deal with ERM. 
The testing of this objective O2 is similar to O1, and it is possible to use the information 
from Table 7.3. However, the measure of ERM implementation is taken from Table 5.2 
“State of Risk Readiness  relative to King III and in terms of overall risk process in 
place” showing average scores of 7.3 (high), 2.9 (low) and 6.3 (medium) for BINS, QD 
and VGOLD respectively.  Table 7.3 summarises these results. 
Table 7.3 Relationship between risk bias and ERM  
 Characteristic Source Table 
or Figure 
BINS QD VGOLD 
State of Risk Readiness  relative to King III 
and in terms of overall risk process in place 
Table 5.2 High Low Medium 
Underweighting of risk probabilities Figures 5.3;5.4 Low High Medium 
Risk aversion to gains Figure 5.6 Low High Medium 
Risk tolerance to losses  Figure 5.6 Low High Medium 
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From Table 7.3 it is evident that there is a direct inverse relationship between the degree 
of risk bias and the level of ERM. The direction of the causal relationship is not known 
(i.e. it is not possible to identify which is the independent variable) and there is 
insufficient data to quantify or test the strength of the relationship.  
O3:  To investigate to what extent Boards that adhere to corporate 
governance are more effective in developing strategies to deal with ERM. 
This result is quantifiable. From Table 7.4 (Row 2) there is a high degree of correlation 
(ρ=.97) between the State of Risk Readiness and the degree of corporate governance 
with respect to risk management. The reliability of the correlation coefficient was 
tested, as shown in Table 7.4. It is possible therefore to reject the null hypothesis. 
Therefore: 
H1: Boards that adhere to corporate governance are more effective at dealing with 
strategies to deal with ERM.  
O4: To examine the ways in which the estimation and personal construing of 
risk differs between highly compliant and less compliant Boards. 
From Table 6.6 BINS and VGOLD are more highly compliant, and QD is less so. BINS 
and VGOLD feel confident that they have less need for compliance, while QD feels that 
it has a greater Controllability of its risk. In Table 7.4 the correlation coefficients 
between the State of Risk Readiness and various other Characteristics are compared, 
from which it is possible to establish certain causal links. 
 Table 7.4 Correlations between State of Risk Readiness and various other results  
No Risk Characteristic Source 
Table 
B Q V Test 
between 
No’s 
r=Corr. 
Coeff. 
(Pearson) 
Ho: ρ = 0     
H1: ρ ≠ 0             
test stat with 
n-2=1 df at 
p(.005)= 0.959   
1 State of Risk Readiness 
relative to King III and 
in terms of overall risk 
process in place 
Table 
5.2 
7.6 3.5 6.9 - - - 
2 How well  the 
Company Manages its 
Risk    
Table 
5.2 
7.4 5.4 5.7 1 and 2 r=.97 r>.959 reject 
Ho at p<.01 
3 Board Tolerance to 
Source Dependence  
Table 
5.2 
6.9 5.9 4.9 1 and 3 r=0.29 r<0.959 accept 
Ho 
 4 Influence of Budgetary 
Performance  
Table 
5.2 
5.3 5.9 6.7 1 and 4 r=-0.21 r<0.959 accept 
Ho 
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5 Influence of Budgetary 
under-Performance  
Table 
5.2 
6.0 5.7 7.2 1 and 5 r=0.41 r<0.959 accept 
Ho 
6 Actual Control 
Achieved 
Table 
6.4 
26.0 16.1 40.0 1 and 6 r=0.61 r<0.959 accept 
Ho 
7 Controllability Table 
6.4 
9.4 20.7 13.3 1 and 7 r=-0.99 r<-0.959 reject 
Ho at p<.01 
8 Actual Cost Table 
6.4 
3.1 9.2 10.0 1 and 8 r=-0.65 r<0.959 accept 
Ho 
9 Style and Approach Table 
6.4 
0.0 5.8 0.0 1 and 9 r=-0.96 r<-0.959 reject 
Ho at p<.01 
All the above tests are to test the null Hypothesis Ho: ρ = 0, and H1:: ρ ≠ 0. As the distribution of r is not symmetric  
and N is small (3) it is necessary to derive the distribution of r by generating a distribution of correlation coefficients 
from samples of  3 independent random variables, as discussed further in Appendix I, to arrive at a critical value of 
0.959 for N=3 at p=.01.  
 
In Table 7.4 the Hypotheses tested were: 
Ho: ρ = 0 
H1: ρ ≠ 0 
The green highlighted blocks in Table 7.4 show that there is a high degree of correlation 
between the State of Risk Readiness and 3 other factors. 
 How well the company Manages its Risk (correlation coefficient ρ=0.97) 
 Controllability (correlation coefficient ρ= - 0.99) 
 Style and Approach to risk management (correlation coefficient ρ= - 0.96). 
Bearing in mind that the results are prone to sampling errors, particularly in view of the 
fact that sample sizes are so small, it would nevertheless appear that Boards that are 
more prepared for risk in terms of their regulatory obligations, manage their risks better, 
have less need for greater control, and are less concerned with style and approach to 
their risk issues. 
7.4 Brief observations on Board Remoteness From Reality 
In the pilot study (Section 4.3.4, Interviewee 9), Board “Remoteness From Reality” was 
identified as a potentially important and major source of corporate risk and failure.  
Figure 7.1 below shows a comparison between the Risk Readiness Index (Figure 5.2) 
and the average Remoteness From Reality for each company derived from the RepGrid 
data. These results show that the higher the level of Risk Readiness, the lower the 
Board’s perceived level of “Remoteness From Reality” risk. 
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The data in Table7.5 can be graphically represented as shown in Figure 7.1 by 
transforming each company’s ratings into percentages, so that the degree of Risk 
Readiness and Remoteness From Reality can be compared across the 3 companies.  
Table 7.5 Risk Readiness Index vs. Remoteness From Reality Risk 
Entity BINS QD VGOLD 
Risk Readiness Index RRI (Figure 
5.2) 11 point rating scale* 
7.3/11 
=66% 
2.9/11=26% 6.3/11=57% 
Remoteness From Reality RFR          
5 point rating scale** 
2.7/5= 
54%  
3.5/5= 70% 2.7/5=54% 
RRI : RFR as a ratio of 
percentages*** 
66:54 26:70 57:54 
RRI : RFR as a ratio of rebased (to 
100) percentages**** 
55:45 27:73 51:49 
*The Risk Readiness Index RRI  (Figure 5.2) was derived from the Risk Readiness Questionnaire which was based 
on the questions and 11 point rating scale in order to remain consistent with the techniques used by Beasley et al. 
(2010). The ratings from the questionnaire (7.3, 2.9, 6.3) were expressed as a percentage of the overall maximum 
rating (i.e.11).   
**Remoteness From Reality RFR measures are obtained from the results of the RepGrid interviews. The numbers 
shown above (2.7, 3.5, 2.7) are the averages, for each company, of the 5 point ratings of the risk element 
“Remoteness of Reality” against the supplied construct “Overall a higher source of potential risk to the business”. 
These scores therefore provide a measure of the relative perception, on average, of each Board respectively, of the 
level of remoteness from reality risk. These average ratings have been expressed as a percentage of the overall 
maximum rating (i.e. 5) to arrive at the percentages shown. These percentages (54%, 70%, 54%) therefore represent 
the relative overall degree of perceived concern of remoteness from reality expressed as a percentage of the 
maximum possible rating.  
*** Figures represent the ratio of the RRI to the RFR percentages shown. This is simply the ratio of the actual 
percentage relative to maximum possible rating, for Risk Readiness and Remoteness of Reality, for each company 
respectively. 
**** RRI : RFR ratios are rebased to proportions out of 100 to facilitate comparison across 3 companies. Thus        
55 =100* 66/(66+54).  The resultant numbers simply express the ratio for each company of the degree of Risk 
Readiness to the degree of Remoteness of Reality for each company on a consistent arithmetical basis.  
It is useful to calculate the correlation coefficient between Risk Readiness RRI and perceived Remoteness From 
Reality for all three companies, which is r=-0.98. 
99% confidence limit for the correlation coefficient = [-0.994;-0.09] at p=0.99, derived using Hotelling’s z 
transformation for small samples (Kendall and Stuart, 1969, Vol. 1, p.391) z=.5*ln[(1+r)/(1-r)] = -2.30,  z*=z-
(3z+r)/(4n)=-1.64 and σ=1/(n-1) =.5, where n=3, and the confidence limit is P(z*-Zα/2 . σ < z < z*+ Z1-α/2 .σ) = 1-α 
and Z is approximately normally distributed. z=-2.30, z*=-1.64,  and σ = 0.5 and α=.01, Z.995=2.58. The confidence 
limit of z is therefore [-2.93;-0.35] which re-transformed using the z transformation results in the above confidence 
limit. 
All the above tests are to test the null Hypothesis Ho: ρ = 0, and H1: ρ ≠ 0. As the distribution of r is not symmetric  
and N is small (3) it is necessary to derive the distribution of r by generating a distribution of correlation coefficients 
from samples of  3 independent random variables, as discussed further in Appendix I, to arrive at a critical value of -
0.959 for N=3 at p=.01.  As r=-0.98, Reject Ho, p<.01. 
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From Table 7.5 it is possible to see that the hypothesis Ho: ρ=0, where ρ is the 
correlation coefficient between the levels of Risk Readiness and the perceived degree of 
Remoteness of Reality of the Board can be rejected, p <0.01.  
Figure 7.1 below presents these results graphically. 
Figure7.1 Comparison of the Risk Readiness Index and the Remoteness From  
Reality Risk 
 
This Figure 7.1 shows diagrammatically that the greater the level of Risk Readiness, the 
lower the perceived Remoteness of Reality Risk by members of the Board.  
In reference to the large global companies referred to earlier in this Chapter all were 
very highly regulated, had competent staff and had extensive risk management systems 
and controls. So why did the management let things get so far out of control? The 
common theme may be that they were not sufficiently in touch with the reality of what 
was happening further down the chains of command of the business. A possible 
explanation is that high levels of compliance induced a false sense of confidence that 
risk was under control, leaving Boards vulnerable and unprepared to anticipate the risk. 
This is a behavioural form of moral hazard. What is not clear however is whether the 
converse applies, that is, when Boards were thinking of overall risk to their businesses, 
were they thinking specifically of remoteness from reality, which might have prevented 
the above disasters?  Thus if Boards were to establish internal mechanisms via an 
independent risk committee specifically to establish in what areas they were drifting 
from reality, is it possible that some corporate failures may be averted?  
In the Sections which follow, the analysis of some of the above issues will be dealt with 
in greater detail. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
BINS QD VGOLD
Remoteness from Reality
Risk
Risk Readiness Index
205 
  
7.5 Further theory development  
From the data and results discussed earlier in Chapters 5 and 6 it is evident that there are 
a number of behavioural characteristics which are common to each company, and a 
range of behavioural characteristics which are not shared across all three companies. 
These observations give rise to a general hypothesis which will be developed and 
presented in more detail.  
7.6 The General “Common/Variable” hypothesis relating to behavioural 
Characteristics around risk  
The reader will recall that data was derived from 22 individual Board members from 4 
different sources: Risk Readiness Questionnaire, Risk Aversion Questionnaire, Risk 
Bias Questionnaire and the RepGrid interviews. 
The salient results of all 4 sources of data are summarised in the following Table 7.6. 
Companies demonstrate a similar position with respect to certain Risk Characteristics 
and have differing positions with respect to other Risk Characteristics as shown below.   
Table 7.6 Summary of the empirically derived Risk Characteristics of BINS, QD 
and VGOLD with ratings 
Empirical Risk  
Characteristics 
BINS QD VGOLD Source of 
information 
Risk Readiness 
Questionnaire 
    
Degree of increase in 
risk intensity over past 5 
years 
High(7.9) High(7.9)  Medium (7.2) Table 7.1 
State of Risk Readiness High(7.6)  Low(3.9) Medium (6.5) Table 7.1 
How well does company 
manage its risk 
High(7.5) Low(4.0)  Medium(5.7) Table 7.1 
Board tolerance to 
Source Dependence 
Medium(5.9) High(6.9) Low(4.9) Table 7.1 
Board Risk Tolerance 
when Budgets achieved 
Medium(5.3) Medium(5.9) Medium(6.7) Table 7.1 
Board Risk Aversion 
when Budgets not 
achieved 
Medium(6.0) Medium(5.4) High(7.7) Table 7.1 
Do the Boards members 
within each company  
think differently about 
their risk issues 
Yes Yes Yes Table 5.3 
Risk Aversion 
Questionnaire 
BINS QD VGOLD  
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Risk aversion facing 
gains 
Neutral (6.0) Neutral(6.0) Risk avoiding (7.5) Table 5.6 
Risk tolerance facing 
losses 
Highly risk 
seeking(3.0) 
Very highly risk 
seeking (2.0) 
Risk 
seeking/neutral(4.0) 
Table 5.6 
Risk Bias 
Questionnaire 
BINS QD VGOLD  
Response to low 
probability gain event 
Underestimates  
risk (4.0) 
Underestimates 
risk pronounced 
(2.0) 
Underestimates  
risk  (3.0) 
Table 5.6 and 
Figure 5.3 
Response to high 
probability gain event 
Underestimates 
risk(4.0) 
Underestimates 
risk 
pronounced(3.0) 
Underestimates  
risk (4.0) 
Table 5.6 and 
Figure 5.3 
Response to low 
probability loss event 
Overestimates 
risk (7.5) 
Underestimates 
risk pronounced 
(3.0) 
Underestimates  
risk (4.0) 
Table 5.6 and 
Figure 5.4 
Response to high 
probability loss event 
Underestimates 
Risk (4.0) 
Underestimates 
risk pronounced 
(3.0) 
Underestimates   
risk (4.0) 
Table 5.6 and 
Figure 5.4 
Loss Aversion No evidence 
(6.0) 
No evidence (6.0) No evidence (6.0) Table 5.7 and 
Figure 5.5 
Increasing Risk  
Sensitivity when facing 
gains 
Moderate risk  
sensitivity (6.0) 
Moderate risk 
sensitivity (6.0) 
Moderate risk 
sensitivity (6.0) 
Table 5.7 and 
Figure 5.5 
Diminishing Risk 
Sensitivity when facing 
losses 
Neutral (6.0) Moderate risk 
tolerance (7.0) 
Slight risk 
tolerance  (7.0) 
Table 5.7 and 
Figure 5.5 
Repertory Grid 
Interview/Analysis  
BINS QD VGOLD  
Board’s focus on  
Achieved Actual 
Control 
Very Intense Intense Very Intense Table 6.4 
Actual Control Potential 
over risk issues 
Intense Intense Intense Table 6.4 
Extent to which Board 
feels the Need for  
Control over risk 
management 
Intense Very Intense Intense Table 6.4 
Potential Riskiness 
when considering risk 
issues  
Intense Intense Intense Table 6.4 
Degree of focus on  
Knowledge when 
considering risk issues 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Table 6.4 
Degree of focus on 
Actual Cost of risk 
mitigation when 
considering risk issues 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Table 6.4 
Degree of focus on 
Resources when 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Table 6.4 
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considering risk issues 
Degree of focus on 
Return on Cost when 
considering risk issues 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Table 6.4 
Degree of focus on 
Term of Risk when 
considering  risk issues 
Moderate Slight Moderate Table 6.4 
Degree of focus on 
Freedom of Choice 
when considering risk 
issues 
Slight Slight Slight Table 6.4 
Degree of focus on  
Style and Approach to 
risk issues 
Slight Moderate Slight Table 6.4 
Degree of focus on 
Techniques when 
considering risk issues  
Slight Slight Slight Table 6.4 
Degree of focus on  
Consensus amongst 
Board members when 
considering risk 
Slight Slight Slight Table 6.4 
 
In order to simplify the analysis of the results contained in the above tables and to 
enable further conclusions and causal relationships to be identified, the following 
amendments have been made to Table 7.6 in arriving at Table 7.7 below: 
 Table 7.7 comprises all the Characteristics shown in Table 7.6  which differ 
across all three companies respectively;  
 the Risk Readiness elements have been removed as the state of Risk Readiness 
will be used as the dependent variable in establishing any relationships; 
 the ratings of the Characteristics “Controllability” and “Style and Approach” 
were almost perfectly negatively correlated with the state of Risk Readiness as 
shown in Table 7.6. The wording of the ratings has been changed so that they 
correlate positively with the state of Risk Readiness, so that all Characteristics 
are positively correlated. “Controllability” will therefore become “No 
Controllability”, and “Style and Approach” will become “No Style and 
Approach”, and “Actual Cost” becomes “Absence of focus on Actual Costs”. 
 Ratings from the Risk Aversion Questionnaire and the Risk Bias Questionnaire 
were converted to the rating of 1 to 11 used in the Risk Readiness Questionnaire 
(high 7.5, medium 5.5 and low 3.5).  The ratings for Achieved Actual Control 
will also be reduced to the 11 point range. These broad category ratings are 
indicated in the Table 7.7 below. 
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Table 7.7 Ratings for Characteristics which differ between the 3 companies 
 Risk Readiness – dependent variable (X) BINS QD VGOLD 
 State of Risk Readiness ( Risk Readiness Index  
Figure 5.2)  
7.6 2.9 6.3 
No Characteristics of risk behaviour which 
differ– independent variable (Y) 
BINS QD VGOLD 
1 Risk Aversion facing gains 6.0 6.0 7.5 
2 Degree of bias to low probability losses 7.5 3.0 4.0 
3 Degree of bias to high probability gains 4.0 3.0 4.0 
4 Board has Achieved Actual Control 11.0 8.8 11.0 
5 Extent to which Board feels there is  No  Controllability 
over risk management 
6.4 1.0 3.3 
6 Lack of  Style and Approach to risk 11.0 7.2 11.0 
Average  7.7 4.8 6.8 
Regression line Y=X-1.75 
Sample correlation coefficient r= 0.99. For this size of sample, the value of the correlation coefficient is 
large enough to permit the computation of a confidence interval**. See Appendix I. 
Test for Hypothesis that the correlation coefficient ρ=0; Ho: ρ=0, H1: ρ≠0. As per Table 7.4and Appendix 
I, the critical value under Pearson’s test is 0.958 for p<.01, so that there is a relationship between State of 
Risk Readiness(X) and the Characteristics of risk behaviour which differ (Y).   
** 99% confidence limit for the correlation coefficient = [0.55;0.999] at p=0.99, derived using 
Hotelling’s z transformation for small samples (Kendall and Stuart, 1969, Vol 1, p391) z=.5*ln[(1+r)/(1-
r)],  z*=z-(3z+r)/(4n) and σ=1/(n-1), where n=3, and the confidence limit is                                           
P(z*-Zα/2 . σ < z < z*+ Z1-α/2.σ) = 1-α and Z is approximately normally distributed. z=2.64, z*=1.90,  and 
σ = 0.5 and α=.01, Z.995=2.58. The confidence limit of z is therefore [0.62; 3.19] which re-transformed 
using the z transformation results in the above confidence limit. 
The ratings shown in No’s 4, 5 and 6 were derived by calculating for each Company the percentage of 
Constructs selected under each Category, relative to the highest % score of that Company and converting 
to a 1 to 11 scale for consistency*. Where the Correlation Coefficient in Table 7.4 is negative, then to 
achieve a positive correlation, the rating used becomes complementary to the 11 point scale; thus a rating 
of 4 becomes 11-4=7. 
*The 11 point scale was used in the Risk Readiness questionnaire (Beasley et al., 2010) 
 
Table 7.7 shows that using a simple linear regression equation we can directly link the 
state of Risk Readiness to the ratings of those Characteristics of risk behaviour which 
differ between companies. The correlation coefficient is very close to 1, but lacks 
reliability, as does the coefficient of the dependent variable. However there is clearly a 
very close relationship between the levels of Risk Readiness and the Characteristics of 
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Risk Behaviour which differ between companies, evidenced by the 99% confidence 
interval of the correlation coefficient [0.55; 0.999]. 
Thus it would seem probable that the greater the degree of Risk Readiness:  
 the greater the risk aversion facing gains;  
 the greater the risk weighting for both low probability and high probability when 
facing losses;  
 the higher the achieved actual control;  
 the stronger the view that there is no need for (further) control;  
 and the greater the lack of style and approach to risk. 
The last 2 relationships seem counter-intuitive. A possible explanation is that the greater 
the degree of regulation, the less the company feels that it needs to control risk 
compared to other thought processes, as it already will have in place systems to control 
risk. Also, the greater the degree of Risk Readiness, the less attention is paid to issues 
such as “style” of risk management, as processes are in place and risk has to be dealt 
with according to an established company procedure. 
While the above results have strong intuitive appeal there are clearly potential sampling 
errors, and other problems such as the subjective and arbitrary definition, choice and 
weighting of Characteristics; bias in the selection of Boards; the subjective choice of 
tests relating to risk aversion and risk bias; the uncertainty relating to which of the 
variables are independent and the extent of any cross-correlations between the variables, 
and so on.  
The results do however support the earlier notion discussed in the literature review 
Chapter 2, that Boards comprised of individuals will exhibit human like behavioural 
characteristics and will struggle to make sense of their risk environment (Weick, 1995). 
Some issues will be easier to digest and manage, and Boards’ response may be 
consistent across some fundamental risk issues, while other less tractable risk issues will 
be related to the way the Board interacts and views its risk environment and the 
importance the Board attaches to its risk management obligations. It seems reasonable 
to imagine that Boards will therefore do some fundamental things in a similar way, and 
do other things in a different way. For example Boards (as required by law) keep a 
proper set of accounts to manage their financial risk, but not all Boards will have the 
same risk tolerance to strategic opportunities. Most Boards will strive to achieve profit 
objectives, but not all Boards will carry out a formal assessment of say political or IT 
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risk. Most Boards would want to expand their businesses, but each Board probably has 
a different way of making sense of the associated risks.   
This argument perhaps leads to a general indicative “Common/Variable” risk hypothesis 
which needs to be tested by others researchers and is beyond the scope of this research:     
 Boards of companies will exhibit a COMMON set of behavioural characteristics when 
faced with risk and uncertainty. This Common set of characteristics will be similar 
irrespective of the size of company, the nature of the industry, and level of risk 
readiness of the company in terms of its corporate governance obligations. 
Furthermore Boards will attach the same level of importance to these COMMON 
characteristics when they consider risk.  By contrast Boards will exhibit another distinct 
and complementary set of behavioural characteristics, the VARIABLE characteristics, 
to which Boards, in dealing with risk issues, will attach a different overall level of 
importance, which will be directly proportional to the extent of their compliance to 
corporate governance legislation in terms of risk management. 
If true, this result may have important ramifications for better understanding of 
corporate risk management as it would result in greater predictability of behaviour by 
Boards towards their risk management.   
7.7 Ramifications of the Common/Variable Behavioural Risk hypothesis 
No matter how well or how poorly the company is being managed from a risk point of 
view, there is a fundamental or common understanding of risk issues. Thus all Boards 
ought to possess some basic expertise or skill which governs their risk management 
strategy, presumably providing some protection against the more obvious aspects of risk 
management. Thus Boards are inherently inured against some fundamental errors. The 
greater the degree of Risk Readiness, however, the more these Boards will pay attention 
to certain aspects of risk management than their less regulated counterparts. 
7.8 Summary of the previous section  
In summary it would appear there are significant similarities between certain aspects of 
risk behaviour within Boards, and all Boards may share a common set of behavioural 
characteristics; yet will differ in others, the extent of the difference being linked to the 
overall level of risk readiness of the company. 
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   Summary and Conclusions Chapter 8.
8.1 Summary 
This final Chapter starts by recalling the Aims and Objectives of this research and the 
conclusions discussed in Chapter 7, as follows: 
The aim of the research is: 
To examine why Boards, in spite of strict corporate governance guidelines, deal with 
the myriad risk issues facing the company, to different effect, in developing strategies to 
deal with enterprise risk management (ERM). 
The objectives of the research and the brief conclusions drawn: 
O1:  To investigate to what extent Board members of companies which apply 
corporate governance regulations are liable to human bias in risk estimation.   
Conclusion: there appears to be a direct inverse relationship with the degree of 
corporate governance and the degree of risk bias (Section 7.3). 
O2:  To investigate to what extent Boards which are less subject to individual 
human biases are more effective in developing strategies to deal with ERM.  
Conclusion: there appears to be a direct inverse relationship between the degree 
of risk bias and the level of ERM. The direction of the causal relationship is not 
known, and there is insufficient data to quantify or test the strength of the 
relationship (Section 7.3).  
O3:  To investigate to what extent Boards that adhere to corporate governance, 
are more effective in developing strategies to deal with ERM. 
    Conclusion: there appears to be a high degree of correlation between the State of 
    Risk Readiness and the degree of corporate governance with respect to risk  
    management (Section 7.3).  
O4:  To examine the ways in which the estimation and personal construing of 
risk differs between highly compliant and less compliant Boards.    
    Conclusion: there appears to be a high degree of correlation between the State of 
    Risk Readiness and 3 other Characteristics (Section 7.3); 
 How well the company Manages its Risk (correlation coefficient 
ρ=0.97)     
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 Controllability (correlation coefficient ρ= - 0.99)                             
 Style and Approach to risk management (correlation coefficient ρ= - 
0.96). 
The remainder of this Chapter briefly summarises the background and key issues and 
steps taken in this research. 
It has become evident that risk management is a highly complex area for businesses. 
Companies, particularly in South Africa, are required to comply with an onerous 
regulatory framework in terms of their corporate governance and risk oversight 
responsibilities. 
This research has demonstrated that the analysis of how Boards deal with risk requires a 
profound understanding of the cognitive processes at work deep within the psyche of 
the Board; how they construe risk in terms of their risk responsibilities; how they make 
sense of that risk in terms of its quantitative impact on the company; and the myriad 
biases and influences which play out in the minds of the individuals as they discuss and 
negotiate appropriate Board responses to these factors.   
In order to do this research, data was derived from 4 different sources, in order to 
evaluate four aspects of risk at Board level. 22 members of 3 Boards, operating in 
completely separate industries were interviewed. The companies were chosen with 
different levels of maturity relating to their risk management processes. QD, an 
electronics company, displayed a low level of adherence to risk management processes, 
while BINS and VGOLD, which had more advanced structures and processes, better to  
manage and identify their risks, were regarded as more highly compliant. 
Four different questionnaires and interviews were presented to each member of the 
Board (except in the case of VGOLD, where only 3 of the 5 Board members were 
available, the other two being based in Australia). The data collection process consisted 
of: 
 Risk Readiness Questionnaire designed to assess the level of readiness in the 
organisation; 
 Risk Aversion Questionnaire; 
 Risk Bias Question to test whether Boards as a cognitive entity displayed the 
characteristics propounded by Kahneman and Tversky (1992) relating to the way 
individuals behave; 
 A Repertory Grid interview providing an in-depth view of how Board members 
construed and made sense of their risk.  
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The results of the questionnaires were analysed using statistical techniques. The 
RepGrid results produced over 200 personal constructs which were content analysed, 
and provided considerable insight into the way Board members and Boards as a whole 
construed risk.The findings were that the Boards were to a lesser or greater extent 
unprepared to deal with their risks according to the legislative requirements of King III 
(2009). This conclusion was corroborated by the findings of an independent survey 
carried out by Deloitte (2012). 
In terms of consistency regarding risk tolerance and risk aversion amongst all groups, 
overall Boards appeared to be neutral in the face of gains, and risk seeking in the face of 
losses. Further all Board members tended to underweight their risks when facing gains 
and losses, apart from BINS which overweighted low probabilities facing losses, 
attributed possibly to their higher level of regulatory compliance. There was no 
evidence of loss aversion, nor was there any evidence of risk aversion facing losses, nor 
evidence of risk tolerance facing gains as predicted by Kahneman and Tversky (1992).    
Consistency amongst Board members relating to their views around risk was tested and 
it was evident that members within each Board had significantly different thoughts 
about risk. 
It appeared that there were possibly strong links between levels of risk readiness and 
levels of competency; and between levels of risk readiness and levels of perception 
amongst the Board that risks were being well managed in the organisation.  There was a 
negative relationship between the levels of risk readiness and the overall level of 
tolerance to risk and the feeling that Boards needed greater control over risk. There was 
slight evidence of source based bias in which Board members attached different levels 
of significance to risk depending on its source. 
An important and apparently unique aspect of this research is the insight gained into 
how Boards make sense of their risk. Members were interviewed individually and the 
results were analysed using RepGrid techniques. These results were then fed back to the 
intact Boards. There is evidence as shown in Chapter 6 that individual Board members 
construe elements of their Company risk differently to the way they construe risk as an 
intact Board. Thus group sensemaking at Board level appears to differ from individual 
sensemaking. The development of the ‘Group Sensemaking’ theory led to the 
identification of another important phenomenon referred to as ‘Reality Drift’. In making 
sense of their risk, Boards continually drift away from the reality of certain issues due to 
their inherent cognitive biases and exposure to false information.      
214 
  
An important aspect of this research highlighted a possible link between risk readiness, 
and certain behavioural aspects of Board behaviour with respect to risk, referred to in 
this thesis as the Common/Variable Risk Hypothesis, which proposes that Boards 
exhibit a common set of behavioural characteristics and responses with respect to risk, 
and a different set of behavioural characteristics with respect to risk which vary between 
companies. The extent of the variance of the variable characteristics is dependent on the 
degree of risk readiness of the firm.  
This research has provided a fascinating insight into a broad range of issues relating to 
risk in the corporate environment. Boards are not fully prepared to deal with their risks; 
there are a host of external and internal issues which contrive to render unpredictable 
the future prospects of the firm; and it is evident that Boards are prone to errors of 
judgment and in-built biases when faced with risk. 
8.2 Limitations of this research 
There are several limitations of this research, which are dealt with below. Those which 
have already been dealt with in earlier sections are also repeated here: 
8.2.1 Data Size and Sampling Errors 
Due to the small number of companies chosen (3), and the relatively small number of 
Board members interviewed (22) there are clearly potential sampling errors and the 
possibility of unwarranted causal relationships (Kahneman, 2013), and other problems 
such as the subjective and arbitrary definition, choice and weighting of Risk 
Characteristics; bias in the selection of Boards; the subjective choice of tests relating to 
risk aversion and risk bias; the uncertainty relating to which of the variables are 
independent and the extent of any cross-correlations between the variables, and so on. 
While care was taken to use appropriate statistical techniques, the results must be 
viewed against the risk of random errors, particularly due to small sample sizes. 
Of the 22 Board members interviewed in the main study, 21 were white males, and 1 an 
Indian female, which does not reflect the demographic profile of South Africa. While as 
discussed before there are legislative imperatives to change Board profiles, this is a slow 
process, particularly in view of the skills shortage amongst other population groups. 
More demographically representative companies may have resulted in different 
conclusions.  
8.2.2 Methodological limitations 
This research focused on a subjective set of risk factors and on a number of issues upon 
which the literature seemed to focus. Prospect Theory provided a basis to examine the 
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extent of risk aversion and risk bias. Prospect Theory has been much criticised in the 
literature, and there may be better techniques to measure these aspects of risk aversion 
and cognitive bias, particularly at a corporate level; and assuming, as the author did, that 
they were important variables to measure and link to other factors.   
In the absence of a published set of questions in a South African context identified by 
the author, the basis of the questionnaire to establish the degree of risk readiness of 
South African companies was based on Beasley et al., (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013), and 
consequently USA regulatory bias may have been introduced into the data, although the 
Deloitte (2012) report focuses on much the same issues. 
Although extreme care was taken to ensure the reliability of the RepGrid data, it is 
possible that the data and subsequent analysis were subject to interviewer bias and 
subjectivity in the choice of Risk Characteristics, upon which much of the analysis and 
conclusions were based. 
8.2.3 Temporal bias 
The regulatory landscape in South Africa is in a state of flux. As reported in this thesis, 
the extent of risk readiness in terms of regulatory adherence explains much of the 
behaviour of firms towards risk. As firms become more aware of their obligations, and 
as more measures are introduced, so the degree of risk readiness, cognitive bias, 
understanding of risk and the whole risk environment may change to the extent that the 
conclusions and observations in this research may, too, be subject to change over time.   
8.3 Suggestions for further research 
There are many aspects of this research which give rise to surprising results. The overall 
levels of readiness which are low by the standards set by King III (2009) are however 
consistent with the results of Beasley, et al. (2011), Deloitte (2012) who reported that 
generally firms were unprepared for their risk regulatory obligations. 
In view of the fact that the data was derived from only 22 Board members spanning 3 
companies, to enable more conclusive results to be drawn around Board behaviour 
relating to risk weighting and risk bias, a larger sample of companies should ideally be 
investigated, with different cultural profiles in terms of race and gender. It would also 
be instructive to compare these attitudes to risk within industrial sectors and across 
country borders, also in terms of size of company and possibly by the differences in 
regulatory framework, where such differences exist (e.g. between more highly and less 
highly regulated economies). It would also be interesting to examine gender and cultural 
issues of risk construction; to establish which areas of risk management are influenced 
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more by internal and external environmental factors; and which areas of risk are more 
influenced by our inherent psychological or genetic biases towards risk. The work of 
Kahneman (2013) deals with many of these issues from an individual viewpoint, and 
their application to Board behaviour would add more to the understanding of the way 
Boards arrive at decisions relating to risk.  
Specifically, the areas of further research might: 
 Consider the effect of different reference points (budgets, sales targets etc.) 
on the impact of risk bias in prospect theory and develop techniques to utilise 
uncertain prospects as opposed to (probability supplied) risk prospects, 
involving several outcomes. This would examine a more representative real 
life situation than the bi-polar risk technique used in this research. 
 Test the Common / Variable risk hypothesis by using a wider sample and 
perhaps a more encompassing standardised set of behavioural characteristics. 
 Test the concept of ‘Reality Drift’ to establish whether there is a systematic 
movement away from reality due to inefficiencies in the flow of data 
management within the firm, and skewed institutional pressure at the expense 
of field based logics to explain some or all the reasons behind corporate 
failures (Power, 2009, p.854). 
 Test whether the identified phenomenon referred to as behavioural moral 
hazard exists and whether higher levels of corporate governance compliance 
engender a false sense of security against corporate risk. 
8.4 Significance of results 
This research will be of great interest to South African and other international Board 
members and researchers in the field of ERM, who are struggling to come to terms with 
understanding how to deal effectively with risk obligation issues: 
 Firstly, the questionnaires designed for this thesis will provide South African 
companies with a further means of assessing their levels of legal risk compliance 
under King III (2009); 
 Secondly, this research will broaden the level of understanding around risk 
issues, and in particular that managing risk requires a systematic approach and a 
high degree of skill and that companies which do not have expertise in the field 
of risk management are likely not to meet their risk governance obligations; and 
at the same time are likely to commit errors of judgement where risk and 
uncertainty are factors. 
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 Thirdly, Boards will be able to realise that there are many aspects to risk control 
and mitigation, and that they as Board members are subject to a large number of 
biases in terms of the way they construe risk. This may assist them in 
understanding that, in spite of strict corporate governance guidelines, they need 
to counteract these biases in arriving at a realistic view of the risks they face. 
 Fourthly, there is evidence that the risk behaviour of firms may to some extent 
be predictable, being directly related to the degree of compliance and risk 
readiness; this will be of considerable interest to regulators. 
 Fifthly, for researchers, the results of this study raise some considerable doubts 
as to whether cognitive bias in decision making around risky issues in a 
corporate environment can be described by the well accepted tenets of Prospect 
Theory. 
 Sixthly, this research highlights a possible phenomenon referred to as ‘Reality 
Drift’ in which Boards of companies may gradually lose touch with key aspects 
of their businesses through a process of cognitive bias and false and inadequate 
information. This phenomenon may explain why Boards of  many regulated 
companies  make errors of judgement  and overlook areas of major risks to their 
businesses;  
 Seventhly, the research highlights a possible form of behavioural moral hazard 
in which regulated companies may suffer from a false sense of security against 
risk due to their compliance with risk management legislation.   
 Finally, this research appears to be unique in the study of intact Boards, and adds 
to the important body of literature in respect of “sensemaking” and “group 
sensemaking”, particularly in the area of risk management. Considerable light is 
thrown on how Boards construe their risk, and how individual Board member 
constructs are transformed and coalesced into group constructs as Boards 
formulate and reformulate their combined view on the internal and external 
environment. 
8.5 Answering the Research Question 
In this final section we answer the research question, which is restated for convenience: 
Why South African Boards construe elements of their regulatory obligations 
differently in respect of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
The answer to this question is many and varied, and can be set out under several 
headings: 
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8.5.1 Different institutional environments  
BINS the insurance company is subject to a range of solvency and capital adequacy 
requirements, and an onerous set of reporting requirements in order to maintain its 
insurance license. It is necessary for the Board to be constantly aware of these issues, 
and to devote resources to implement their regulatory requirements. QD is subject to 
general corporate governance legislation and to direct regulation with the South African 
Reserve Bank relating to cash protection. VGOLD is subject Australian listing authority 
requirements, and to a range of mining specific regulation relating to mining rights, 
mechanisms for the sale of gold, and health and safety issues.     
This research has shown that these Boards appear to respond to institutional pressures in 
different ways. Each of the companies assessed in this thesis were subject to different 
regulatory pressures, and devoted different levels of resource to their compliance 
program. It would seem that Boards view their regulatory options differently depending 
on the degree of institutional pressure applied to them. 
8.5.2 Different levels of maturity with respect to regulatory compliance 
The Boards analysed exhibited different levels of maturity with respect to their 
corporate governance and ERM, resulting in different attitudes to risk, and different 
processes and resource allocation with respect to their risk management; and further 
exhibited considerably different levels of skills, knowledge and comprehension of risk 
issues. In spite of this Board members focused on the 4 main construct categories citing:  
 Actual Control Achieved 
 Actual Control Potential   
 Controllability 
 Potential Riskiness 
This observation led to the development of the Common / Variable Risk hypothesis. In 
spite of differences in type of company and their regulatory environment, businesses 
appear to share similar views on certain risk issues, and vary their views on other risk 
issues, with the degree of variation between companies on these latter risk issues 
depending on the extent of the differences in their respective risk preparedness or 
regulatory compliance. 
8.5.3 Psychological and behavioural interactions in Board level relationships and 
Board dynamics 
Boards are comprised of different individuals all with their own experiences, views, 
skills and knowledge. Each Board member is also a unique individual with their own 
personal set of constructs as this thesis has shown. Members interact with each other 
219 
  
and the resulting view of the Board is shaped by the interpersonal discussions, levels of 
knowledge, force of conviction and hierarchical issues within the Board. Boards 
composed of different personalities will therefore develop different Board responses to 
risk, and construe their risks differently.  
8.5.4 Biases and behavioural issues 
As shown in this thesis, Boards exhibit different degrees of cognitive bias when faced 
with risk. The degree of bias was shown to be linked to the degree of risk readiness 
within each company, so that Boards’ construal of risk is associated to the level of 
corporate governance and ERM compliance. Generally Boards underweight the 
probability of gains, which means that they tend to view future risky projects in a 
pessimistic light, and tend to view the possibility of losses in an optimistic light, all of 
which have consequences in terms of the capital asset pricing model.    
8.5.5 Conclusion 
It is possible to state in conclusion that Boards construe elements of their regulatory 
obligations differently in respect of risk as a result of different regulatory and 
institutional demands; different levels of risk maturity; different levels of skills 
knowledge and experience; and different behavioural dynamics within the Board as 
members construe and re-construe their risk obligations; and Boards construe their risks 
differently from their individual members. 
This thesis began by recalling the fatal flaws of the ancient mythical Homerian heroes 
when faced with risky challenges. Shakespeare too, reminds us that men’s judgments 
facing risk and uncertainty are linked to their fortunes and the environment in which 
they find themselves. Marcus Antonius, the great Roman Triumvir, in facing the 
ultimate personal sacrifice, himself underestimated twofold the institutional might of 
Rome as an enemy, and the extent of Cleopatra’s devotion to him, losing the respect of 
his generals, his empire, and his life in the process: 
“I see men’s judgements are become 
A parcel to their fortunes; and things outward 
Do draw the inward quality after them, 
To suffer all alike.” 
(Anthony and Cleopatra, Act III, Scene XIII, 31) 
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